Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 37.8x · EV/EBITDA 15.2x · ROE 7.5%. (2012–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $7.8B | $6.1B | $6.2B | $5.6B | $4.5B | $6.0B | $4.4B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $2.8B | $2.7B |
| Enterprise Value | $8.8B | $7.1B | $7.7B | $7.3B | $6.2B | $7.7B | $5.7B | $4.4B | $8.1B | $7.8B | $7.5B |
| P/E Ratio → | 37.83 | 31.63 | 25.18 | 47.22 | 24.25 | 29.61 | 59.10 | 33.37 | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 2.22 | 2.37 | 2.51 | 2.40 | 1.75 | 2.51 | 2.39 | 1.65 | 1.52 | 0.75 | 0.74 |
| P/B Ratio | 2.87 | 2.25 | 2.57 | 2.39 | 1.90 | 2.41 | 1.91 | 1.37 | 1.36 | 0.99 | 0.92 |
| P/FCF | 43.86 | 26.62 | 21.01 | 19.76 | 17.89 | 21.79 | 19.06 | — | — | 23.13 | 20.71 |
| P/OCF | 26.76 | 20.90 | 17.04 | 16.66 | 15.02 | 18.66 | 16.96 | 337.55 | — | 15.59 | 14.44 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.77 | 3.14 | 3.14 | 2.43 | 3.19 | 3.08 | 2.41 | 4.14 | 2.08 | 2.09 |
| EV / EBITDA | 15.17 | 14.34 | 15.38 | 21.54 | 12.72 | 16.51 | 14.49 | 10.97 | 20.04 | 20.78 | 12.58 |
| EV / EBIT | 25.63 | 41.71 | 22.43 | 41.10 | 18.48 | 24.57 | 39.52 | 19.13 | 31.50 | 102.48 | 53.29 |
| EV / FCF | — | 31.08 | 26.28 | 25.90 | 24.76 | 27.72 | 24.56 | — | — | 63.89 | 58.04 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 42.0% | 42.0% | 42.2% | 39.4% | 37.4% | 40.0% | 42.4% | 42.9% | 42.7% | 42.1% | 42.1% |
| Operating Margin | 13.4% | 13.4% | 14.0% | 7.4% | 12.8% | 12.5% | 12.6% | 13.6% | 12.7% | 5.9% | 7.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | 7.5% | 7.5% | 9.9% | 5.1% | 7.3% | 8.5% | 4.1% | 5.0% | -16.5% | -7.8% | -2.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 7.5% | 7.5% | 10.3% | 5.0% | 7.7% | 8.4% | 3.3% | 4.2% | -12.9% | -10.3% | -2.5% |
| ROA | 3.8% | 3.8% | 5.0% | 2.4% | 3.7% | 4.2% | 1.7% | 1.3% | -3.3% | -2.9% | -0.7% |
| ROIC | 6.7% | 6.7% | 6.4% | 3.2% | 5.9% | 5.8% | 4.8% | 3.4% | 2.5% | 2.1% | 2.5% |
| ROCE | 7.5% | 7.5% | 7.6% | 3.8% | 7.0% | 6.7% | 5.7% | 4.1% | 2.9% | 2.4% | 2.8% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0.79 | 0.86 | 0.84 | 0.79 | 0.68 | 0.71 | 2.46 | 1.90 | 1.81 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.33 | 3.33 | 3.80 | 5.95 | 4.07 | 4.24 | 3.99 | 3.92 | 13.27 | 14.44 | 8.80 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.38 | 0.64 | 0.74 | 0.73 | 0.65 | 0.55 | 0.63 | 2.36 | 1.75 | 1.67 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 2.06 | 2.06 | 3.08 | 5.10 | 3.53 | 3.53 | 3.25 | 3.45 | 12.69 | 13.26 | 8.09 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 4.46 | 5.27 | 6.13 | 6.87 | 5.93 | 5.51 | — | — | 40.76 | 37.33 |
| Interest Coverage | 3.18 | 3.18 | 6.11 | 3.62 | 6.54 | 5.75 | 2.28 | 2.55 | 0.83 | 0.23 | 0.37 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.68 | 3.68 | 3.34 | 3.24 | 3.45 | 2.93 | 3.15 | 2.84 | 2.17 | 2.14 | 1.91 |
| Quick Ratio | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.70 | 2.43 | 2.61 | 2.26 | 2.50 | 2.16 | 2.01 | 1.69 | 1.53 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.46 | 1.46 | 0.95 | 0.78 | 0.77 | 0.80 | 0.93 | 0.65 | 0.20 | 0.44 | 0.39 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.21 | 0.37 | 0.36 |
| Inventory Turnover | 5.02 | 5.02 | 5.77 | 4.73 | 5.49 | 5.24 | 5.26 | 5.25 | 5.97 | 4.46 | 5.00 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 74.07 | 65.31 | 72.24 | 65.26 | 74.86 | 79.43 | 72.35 | 71.18 | 38.65 | 107.36 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.0% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 1.0% | 0.3% | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | 40.8% | 40.8% | 32.0% | 65.5% | 41.9% | 30.4% | 16.4% | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 2.6% | 3.2% | 4.0% | 2.1% | 4.1% | 3.4% | 1.7% | 3.0% | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 2.3% | 3.8% | 4.8% | 5.1% | 5.6% | 4.6% | 5.2% | — | — | 4.3% | 4.8% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.4% | 0.3% | 1.3% | 16.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.3% | 1.7% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 5.1% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 16.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $242M | $243M | $242M | $246M | $248M | $250M | $260M | $288M | $286M | $272M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 14 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying ESI stock.
Element Solutions Inc's current P/E ratio is 37.8x. The historical average is 35.8x. This places it at the 71th percentile of its historical range.
Element Solutions Inc's current EV/EBITDA is 15.2x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 18.2x.
Element Solutions Inc's return on equity (ROE) is 7.5%. The historical average is -0.2%.
Based on historical data, Element Solutions Inc is trading at a P/E of 37.8x. This is at the 71th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Element Solutions Inc's current dividend yield is 1.01% with a payout ratio of 40.8%.
Element Solutions Inc has 42.0% gross margin and 13.4% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
Element Solutions Inc's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 3.3x, indicating high leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Margin compression accelerating
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
TTM/Forward P/E Gap Signals Bet on Step-Up
ESI's P/E TTM of 42.04 versus forward P/E of 18.10 implies the market is pricing in a near-doubling of earnings, per current valuation multiples — a gap that demands scrutiny given gross margin compression and the fact that EV/EBITDA at 18.46 sits above nearly every specialty chemicals peer.
The divergence between TTM and forward multiples is unusually wide even for a business benefiting from an acquisition-driven revenue step-up; at 18.1x forward EV/EBITDA, ESI commands a premium to Quaker Houghton (12.78x) and Cabot (6.15x) and is broadly in line with Entegris-tier semiconductor materials names, which suggests the market has already partially re-rated ESI as a tech-adjacent materials supplier rather than a traditional chemical firm. P/B of 2.99 against peers spanning 1.85x to 5.17x looks reasonable in isolation, but because goodwill constitutes ~42% of total assets, the tangible book multiple is materially higher and the equity cushion thinner than the headline P/B suggests. Investors should treat the forward multiple as the operative valuation reference, but recognize it assumes the acquired revenue base delivers synergies and margin recovery that recent quarterly data does not yet confirm.
Gross Margin Erodes on Mix and Pass-Through
ESI's gross margin fell from 43.6% in 2024Q2 to 34.4% in 2026Q3, a 920 basis point decline over ten quarters, per reported quarterly figures, indicating that the recent revenue acceleration is arriving at materially lower unit profitability than the historical baseline.
The operating margin trajectory is less alarming but still telling — op margin compressed from 15.7% to 11.4% over the same span, meaning roughly 40% of the gross margin hit was absorbed by operating leverage, while the remainder appears offset by SG&A scale. Net margin volatility (0.9% in 2025Q4 to 16.5% in 2025Q1) reflects both stock-based compensation swings and amortization from acquisitions, making reported net income an unreliable proxy for earning power; adjusted EBITDA margin is the more meaningful read here. The critical judgment call is whether this is a transient mix shift from the 2026 acquisition or a structural re-basing of the margin profile — the fact that the decline began well before the acquisition (falling from 43.6% in 2024Q2 to 42.2% in 2025Q3) suggests at least some of the compression is metal pass-through driven and potentially reversible, though the pace since 2025Q4 warrants closer monitoring.
ROIC Lags Specialty Chemical Peer Set
ESI's annualized ROIC sits near 7.2% in 2026Q3 against peer ROIC figures of 12.3% (HWKN), 12.2% (BCPC), and 17.4% (CBT), based on reported quarterly ratios — a meaningful gap suggesting the company is not yet converting its elevated goodwill balance into commensurate economic returns.
The ROIC has been range-bound between 1.4% and 2.0% per quarter for two years with no discernible upward trend, even as revenue grew 51.7% year over year — implying that the incremental capital deployed (including the $864.2M 2026 acquisition) has not yet lifted returns on invested capital above the cost of that capital. ROE of 2.3% in 2026Q3 against peers in the 11-15% range deepens the concern, though ESI's negative retained earnings (−$765.6M) mechanically depress ROE and ROIC is the cleaner metric. The fundamental issue is asset intensity: ESI's asset turnover of 0.17 is very low, meaning the return profile is heavily margin-driven — and margins are currently moving in the wrong direction. This combination suggests returns will remain sub-peer until either the acquired revenue matures into higher-margin mix or the balance sheet is rationalized.
Cash Cycle Compresses Through Payables Leverage
ESI's cash conversion cycle shortened from 119 days in 2024Q2 to 98 days in 2026Q3, per quarterly disclosures, driven primarily by DIO reduction from 86 to 58 days — a working capital improvement that is helping fund acquisition activity without incremental external financing.
The DSO has remained stubbornly elevated at 64–70 days with no meaningful improvement, suggesting ESI's customer base (largely mid-tier PCB and electronics manufacturers in Asia) retains significant payment leverage — a dynamic consistent with the company's consumable but non-exclusive product positioning. DPO compression from 37 to 27 days is notable and cuts against the DIO improvement; if ESI is shortening inventory cycles while simultaneously paying suppliers faster, this may reflect tighter supplier terms tied to the post-acquisition credit profile rather than operational discipline. Investors should track whether the 98-day cycle holds as the acquired business integrates — historically ESI's CCC has oscillated within a 20-day band, and a sustained break above 105 days would suggest integration friction rather than efficiency gains.
Leverage Rebuilds After Two-Year Deleveraging
ESI's debt-to-equity ratio rose from 0.61 in 2025Q3 to 0.72 in 2026Q3 as total debt climbed to $2.1B, per reported balance sheets, reversing two years of deleveraging and pushing D/EBITDA to 13.09 — a level that appears elevated against typical investment-grade specialty chemical thresholds.
Interest coverage has been volatile, swinging from 9.10x in 2025Q1 to −2.91x in 2025Q4 and recovering to 5.09x in 2026Q3, which likely reflects both acquisition-related charges and quarter-to-quarter EBITDA swings rather than a solvency event — but the negative quarter should prompt investors to model coverage under a downside volume scenario. With goodwill at 42% of assets and tangible book value near $400M against $2.1B of debt, an impairment scenario would materially compress the equity cushion, raising effective leverage faster than reported D/EBITDA implies. The trajectory — not the absolute level — is the concern: ESI appears to be re-employing capital toward M&A rather than further deleveraging, and while the current 5.09x coverage is manageable, further bolt-on activity at elevated valuations could compress the margin for error.
P/E Misreads Pass-Through Accounting Distortion
The P/E ratio is the most commonly misapplied metric for ESI's business model because metal pass-through pricing and acquisition-driven amortization inflate or deflate reported net income in ways that do not reflect underlying unit economics — making adjusted EBITDA or metal-neutral FCF the analytically superior reference.
This matters concretely: TTM P/E of 42.04 looks expensive versus peers, but that figure reflects depressed net income from amortization charges and quarter-to-quarter swings in stock-based compensation (ranging from −$8.1M to $43.3M in adjacent quarters) rather than weak cash generation — cumulative operating cash flow over ten quarters was 35% above cumulative net income, per ESI's cash flow statements. The more informative lens is EV/EBITDA on an adjusted basis, which at 12.78x forward looks far more defensible against peers like Hawkins (18.01x) and Balchem (22.03x). Analysts using P/E alone will systematically misjudge ESI's valuation across cycles: in metal-price-driven revenue spikes, P/E will look artificially cheap, and in margin-compression troughs like the current period, it will look artificially expensive — neither reading reflects the durable cash economics of the qualified-in consumable model.