Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -1.4x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -116.1%. (1998–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $2.8B | $2.3B | $1.8B | $2.7B | $7.2B | $15.8B | $12.0B | $749M | $271M | $511M | $217M |
| Enterprise Value | $3.3B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $3.7B | $7.4B | $14.1B | $12.1B | $1.1B | $505M | $589M | $239M |
| P/E Ratio → | -1.45 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 4.01 | 3.21 | 2.91 | 3.01 | 10.22 | 31.37 | — | 3.26 | 1.55 | 3.84 | 2.52 |
| P/B Ratio | 2.36 | 2.27 | 1.01 | 0.92 | 1.77 | 3.42 | 20.52 | 3.19 | 100.04 | 6.93 | 2.55 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 3.84 | 4.30 | 4.12 | 10.52 | 28.04 | — | 4.89 | 2.89 | 4.43 | 2.78 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -34.1% | -34.1% | -99.4% | -57.0% | -27.7% | -34.1% | 503.5% | 4.5% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 4.6% |
| Operating Margin | -95.7% | -95.7% | -321.2% | -150.7% | -96.9% | -87.1% | 626.6% | -20.7% | -39.8% | -76.6% | -60.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -229.8% | -229.8% | -334.7% | -153.6% | -103.2% | -91.6% | 639.4% | -36.4% | -44.7% | -95.6% | -66.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -116.1% | -116.1% | -89.4% | -39.3% | -16.7% | -17.7% | -145.3% | -70.6% | -204.6% | -160.1% | -54.8% |
| ROA | -52.7% | -52.7% | -49.5% | -25.7% | -12.4% | -12.6% | -52.9% | -13.0% | -23.6% | -49.7% | -25.5% |
| ROIC | -24.7% | -24.7% | -46.1% | -24.7% | -14.2% | -18.1% | -67.0% | -8.4% | -26.8% | -58.7% | -42.2% |
| ROCE | -28.1% | -28.1% | -59.5% | -29.6% | -12.8% | -13.2% | -64.4% | -10.0% | -34.8% | -61.8% | -30.2% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.60 | 0.39 | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.96 | 2.25 | 100.45 | 1.41 | 0.80 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.44 | 0.48 | 0.34 | 0.05 | -0.36 | 0.19 | 1.60 | 86.22 | 1.07 | 0.26 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | -25.00 | -25.00 | -44.21 | -29.45 | -17.53 | -10.02 | -9.36 | -1.33 | -3.17 | -11.58 | -4.41 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 2.31 | 2.31 | 1.97 | 1.85 | 5.20 | 10.58 | 3.09 | 2.11 | 1.06 | 1.03 | 1.67 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.46 | 1.46 | 1.06 | 0.86 | 4.19 | 9.94 | 2.55 | 1.49 | 0.74 | 0.61 | 1.22 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.27 | 0.14 | 3.40 | 9.20 | 1.78 | 0.81 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.69 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.27 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.12 | 0.08 | -0.07 | 0.26 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.36 |
| Inventory Turnover | 1.83 | 1.83 | 1.84 | 1.46 | 1.39 | 2.50 | 2.80 | 1.92 | 3.59 | 2.69 | 2.74 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 123.41 | 145.87 | 151.54 | 99.86 | 95.41 | -444.34 | 72.66 | 78.06 | 66.39 | 50.65 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.5% | 16.0% | 0.7% | 0.1% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.5% | 16.0% | 0.7% | 0.1% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $1.2B | $858M | $595M | $580M | $558M | $355M | $237M | $219M | $216M | $181M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 28 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying PLUG stock.
Plug Power Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -1.4x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Plug Power Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -116.1%. The historical average is -74.2%.
Based on historical data, Plug Power Inc. is trading at a P/E of -1.4x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Plug Power Inc. has -34.1% gross margin and -95.7% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Persistent negative gross margins
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Gross Margin Recovery Still Elusive
According to recent SEC filings, PLUG's gross margin improved to -0.9% in Q2 2026 from -13.2% in Q1 2026, but remains negative, indicating the company still subsidizes fuel costs for customers.
The gross margin improvement is encouraging but the absolute level remains deeply negative, suggesting the structural mismatch between third-party hydrogen procurement costs and fixed customer contract prices persists. Operating margin also improved to -36.0% from -63.6% sequentially, but this is still a massive loss per dollar of revenue. The net margin of -105.6% in Q2 2026, per reported figures, includes significant non-cash charges such as warrant revaluations, which obscure the underlying operational burn. Investors should monitor whether the gross margin can turn positive as internal hydrogen production ramps, but the history of volatility suggests caution.
Capital Efficiency Decaying Sharply
Based on reported figures, PLUG's ROIC improved to -3.4% in Q2 2026 from -29.8% in Q4 2024, but ROE remains deeply negative at -27.7%, reflecting continued value destruction on a shrinking equity base.
The improvement in ROIC is largely a function of a smaller asset base after impairments, not a genuine return on invested capital. ROE has been consistently negative, ranging from -7.0% to -67.6% over the past ten quarters, per financial statements, indicating that the company is not compounding shareholder value. The drivers are primarily margin-related, as asset turnover remains extremely low at 0.08, meaning the company generates very little revenue relative to its asset base. This suggests that even if margins improve, the capital intensity of the hydrogen infrastructure business will likely keep returns below the cost of capital for the foreseeable future.
Working Capital Cycle Stretched
Per recent filings, PLUG's cash conversion cycle improved to 268 days in Q2 2026 from 475 days in Q4 2024, but remains extremely long, driven by high inventory days of 255 and slow collections at 86 days.
The improvement in CCC is positive but the absolute level is still far above any reasonable benchmark, indicating significant capital tied up in inventory and receivables. DIO of 255 days suggests that the company is holding large amounts of hydrogen and electrolyzer components, which may be a sign of production ramp-up or slow sales conversion. DSO of 86 days is elevated, possibly reflecting the company's reliance on a few large customers with extended payment terms. The DPO of 73 days is relatively low, meaning the company is not leveraging supplier financing effectively. This working capital intensity is a major drag on cash flow, and any further improvement would require better inventory management and faster collections.
Leverage Rising as Equity Erodes
According to SEC filings, PLUG's debt-to-equity surged to 1.40 in Q2 2026 from 0.32 in Q1 2024, as total debt remained near $823M while equity collapsed to $581.8M.
The rising D/E ratio is a direct consequence of the shrinking equity base, not a significant increase in absolute debt. Interest coverage is deeply negative at -10.24 in Q2 2026, per reported figures, meaning the company cannot service its debt from operating income. This suggests that the company is reliant on external financing, either through equity raises or additional debt, to meet its obligations. The recent improvement in liquidity, as noted in the earnings beat, may provide some breathing room, but the balance sheet remains fragile. Investors should monitor the company's ability to refinance or raise capital without further diluting shareholders.
Liquidity Buffer Thin Despite Ratio
Based on reported balance sheets, PLUG's current ratio improved to 2.32 in Q2 2026, but cash of $161.9M is only enough to cover about two quarters of operating losses, per cash flow data.
The current ratio appears healthy, but it is inflated by inventory, which is not easily convertible to cash in a stress scenario. The quick ratio of 1.32 is more conservative but still above 1.0, suggesting that current assets excluding inventory can cover current liabilities. However, the cash burn rate of approximately -$94M per quarter in operating cash flow, per recent filings, means the company has limited runway without additional financing. The recent capital raise and improved liquidity position, as noted in the earnings beat, may extend the runway, but the company remains vulnerable to any unexpected cash outflows or delays in financing.
Peer Comparison Highlights Structural Gaps
Compared to peers like Bloom Energy and Ballard Power, PLUG's ROIC of -3.4% in Q2 2026 is better than BLDP's -68.8% but worse than BE's 4.1%, per reported data, reflecting its unique vertical integration.
PLUG's valuation multiple of 4.48x P/S is significantly higher than peers like FCEL (0.79x) and BLDP (1.34x), suggesting the market is pricing in a more aggressive growth trajectory. However, the company's negative gross margins and persistent losses indicate that this premium is not supported by current fundamentals. The peer group comparison is complicated by PLUG's dual identity as a hardware manufacturer and energy producer, making direct comparisons difficult. The company's D/E of 1.40 is higher than most peers, reflecting its capital-intensive business model and reliance on debt financing. Investors should be cautious about using traditional peer multiples to value PLUG, as the business model is fundamentally different from pure-play fuel cell companies.
Misapplied P/S Multiple Obscures Burn
The most commonly misapplied ratio for PLUG is the price-to-sales multiple, which at 4.48x appears reasonable for a growth company but obscures the fact that the company loses over 100% of revenue on a net basis.
Using P/S for PLUG is misleading because the company's revenue is not a reliable indicator of value creation; the negative gross and net margins mean that each dollar of sales actually destroys value. A more appropriate metric would be EV/EBITDA, but that is also not meaningful given the deeply negative EBITDA. Instead, investors should focus on the cash burn rate and the path to positive gross margin, as these are the true drivers of value. The company's history of warrant revaluations and non-cash charges further complicates the use of earnings-based multiples. A better approach would be to model the company's future cash flows based on the ramp-up of internal hydrogen production and the conversion of its electrolyzer backlog, rather than relying on current revenue multiples.