Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -3.0x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -114.6%. (2020–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $2.2B | $33M | $93005 | $452859 | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $2.1B | $-31316862 | $-2567619 | $-2471464 | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -2.97 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 380.58 | 5.70 | 0.15 | 1.63 | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.15 | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | -5.46 | -4.05 | -8.92 | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 96.2% | 96.2% | 100.0% | 99.7% | 100.0% | — | — |
| Operating Margin | -763.1% | -763.1% | -1010.9% | -1780.0% | -188.1% | 1.8% | 3.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | -7335.0% | -7335.0% | -1009.3% | -1780.0% | -188.1% | 1.8% | 3.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -114.6% | -114.6% | -224.0% | -320.6% | -419.6% | 10.9% | 100.0% |
| ROA | -112.3% | -112.3% | -203.2% | -286.0% | -173.0% | 10.1% | 31.5% |
| ROIC | -9.8% | -9.8% | -7752.3% | -50763.8% | — | 9.4% | — |
| ROCE | -11.9% | -11.9% | -224.4% | -320.6% | -419.6% | 10.9% | 100.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.00 | 0.00 | — | — | — | 0.03 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 0.61 | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.09 | -0.95 | -1.00 | -0.89 | -0.09 | -3.17 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | -1.65 | -3.17 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | -1.05 | -1.00 |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Net cash position: cash ($67M) exceeds total debt ($4M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 6.66 | 6.66 | 6.26 | 19.30 | 0.63 | 2.16 | 1.46 |
| Quick Ratio | 6.66 | 6.66 | 6.26 | 19.30 | 0.63 | 2.16 | 1.46 |
| Cash Ratio | 6.26 | 6.26 | 6.17 | 19.05 | 0.63 | 2.16 | 1.46 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.01 | 0.20 | 0.09 | 0.92 | 2.91 | 8.39 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 3.5% | 6.9% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 39.1% | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 3.5% | 6.9% | 0.0% | 39.1% | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $2M | $9471 | $7087 | $6831 | $6125 | $6125 |
Includes 30+ ratios · 6 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying ASST stock.
Strive, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -3.0x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Strive, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -114.6%. The historical average is -161.3%.
Based on historical data, Strive, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -3.0x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Strive, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 3.53%.
Strive, Inc. has 96.2% gross margin and -763.1% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Cash burn vs revenue gap
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Gross Margin Volatility Masks Structural Strength
According to reported figures, ASST's gross margin swung from 96.7% in 2026Q1 to -4.5% in 2026Q2, yet operating margin remained deeply negative at -7.3%, indicating fixed overhead overwhelms the digital delivery model's inherent profitability.
The extreme gross margin volatility, with quarters like 2025Q2 showing -137.8%, suggests one-time COGS charges or revenue recognition timing rather than a fundamental erosion of the 96%+ structural gross margin typical of digital services. However, the operating margin has never been positive across the ten quarters, with 2026Q2 at -7.3% despite 94.7% revenue growth, implying SG&A costs scale nearly proportionally with revenue. This suggests the company cannot achieve operating leverage at its current revenue base, and investors should monitor whether the fixed overhead can be amortized as revenue expands or if it represents a permanent structural drag.
ROIC Decay Despite Capital Infusion
Based on reported figures, ASST's ROIC improved from -32.1% in 2024Q3 to -1.5% in 2026Q2, but this masks a massive capital base expansion that has not translated into proportional returns, with ROE still deeply negative at -23.4%.
The apparent ROIC improvement is misleading because the denominator—invested capital—has ballooned due to the $67.5M cash raise, while the numerator (NOPAT) remains deeply negative. ROE of -23.4% in 2026Q2, though improved from -163.3% in 2024Q4, still indicates the company is destroying shareholder value on every dollar of equity. The driver is not margin expansion but rather the dilution of losses across a larger capital base, which suggests the company is not compounding returns but rather masking operational decay with balance sheet size.
Liquidity Fortress with Hidden Burn Risk
As reported in financial statements, ASST's current ratio stands at 7.62 in 2026Q2 with $145.5M in cash, providing a multi-year runway, but the -$21.5M quarterly operating loss implies a burn rate that could exhaust funds within three years if revenue growth stalls.
The current ratio of 7.62 and quick ratio of 7.62 (identical due to negligible inventory) indicate a fortress-like liquidity position that far exceeds any micro-cap peer. However, this liquidity is being actively deployed into a daily dividend yielding 13% annualized and acquisitions, which may accelerate cash depletion despite the apparent buffer. The $67.5M cash reserve, per reported data, provides a cushion, but the negative operating cash flow of -$22.4M in 2026Q2 suggests the company is burning through its fortress walls faster than revenue growth can rebuild them.
Zero Debt Masks Off-Balance-Sheet Risks
According to recent SEC filings, ASST's debt-to-equity ratio is effectively zero at 0.00 in 2026Q2, with interest coverage of -536.38, indicating no traditional leverage but raising questions about the sustainability of its dividend-funded model.
The absence of debt is a double-edged sword: it provides financial flexibility and eliminates refinancing risk, but it also means the company is entirely equity-funded, which dilutes existing shareholders. The negative interest coverage of -536.38 in 2026Q2 reflects the massive net losses relative to any interest income, though the $145.5M cash pile likely generates some offsetting interest revenue. The real leverage risk is not balance-sheet debt but the operational leverage of fixed overhead against a $5.7M revenue base, which amplifies losses when revenue growth decelerates.
Asset Turnover Collapse Signals Capital Misallocation
Based on reported figures, ASST's asset turnover fell from 0.39 in 2024Q3 to 0.00 in 2026Q2, indicating that the $1.4B asset base is generating virtually no revenue, a stark contrast to the 96% gross margin digital model.
The collapse in asset turnover from 0.39 to 0.00 over eight quarters is the clearest signal of capital misallocation: the company has accumulated a massive balance sheet through equity raises but has not converted those assets into revenue. The working capital metrics (DSO, DIO, DPO) are largely unavailable, but the extreme DPO values in earlier quarters (e.g., 22,430 days in 2024Q2) suggest either data anomalies or a business model where payables are not meaningful. This efficiency collapse implies that the $67.5M cash pile is not being deployed into revenue-generating assets, and investors should question whether the company is a going concern or a 'funded shell' awaiting a strategic pivot.
P/S Multiple Misapplied to Cash-Rich Shell
The most commonly misapplied ratio for ASST is the price-to-sales multiple of 173.29, which appears absurdly expensive but obscures the fact that the market is likely valuing the $67.5M cash pile and optionality, not the $5.7M revenue base.
A traditional P/S analysis would flag ASST as egregiously overvalued, but this ignores the balance sheet reality: with a P/B of 0.04, the market is pricing the company at a 96% discount to book value, suggesting it is valuing the cash and potential pivot rather than the operating business. The correct alternative metric is price-to-cash or EV/cash, which would show the company trading at a significant discount to its liquid assets, implying the market is assigning negative value to the operating business. This misapplication of P/S leads investors to overlook the 'real option' nature of the stock, where the value lies in management's ability to deploy the cash pile into a value-accretive acquisition or strategic shift, not in the current Discord management revenue.