Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -3.0x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -44.5%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $319M | $328M | $229M | $1.3B | $880M | $2.3B | $2.8B | $225M | $631M | $1.5B | $461M |
| Enterprise Value | $166M | $175M | $103M | $953M | $551M | $1.9B | $2.4B | $138M | $1.6B | $2.7B | $1.5B |
| P/E Ratio → | -3.04 | — | — | — | — | 21.69 | 54.26 | — | — | — | 37.04 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.16 | 0.80 | 0.46 | 0.85 | 1.12 | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0.87 | 0.26 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.18 | 1.51 | 1.41 | 3.49 | 1.36 | 3.14 | 6.41 | 1.27 | 0.25 | 0.52 | 0.17 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 15.39 | — | 1.06 | 3.13 | 0.69 |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | 131.01 | 14.22 | — | 0.69 | 1.76 | 0.44 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.17 | 0.07 | 0.61 | 0.29 | 0.68 | 0.95 | 0.09 | 0.88 | 1.53 | 0.81 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 11.25 | 14.02 | 19.11 | — | — | — | 78.56 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | 15.27 | 22.02 | — | — | — | 68.36 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 12.98 | — | 2.72 | 5.50 | 2.19 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 24.7% | 24.7% | 19.5% | 19.0% | 22.2% | 22.0% | 22.1% | 18.1% | 17.7% | 17.7% | 16.7% |
| Operating Margin | -5.9% | -5.9% | -13.7% | -7.6% | 1.4% | 4.0% | 3.9% | -8.6% | -11.8% | -2.7% | -0.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | -8.1% | -8.1% | -18.6% | -19.7% | -1.8% | 3.9% | 2.1% | -8.2% | -11.4% | -6.5% | 0.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -44.5% | -44.5% | -99.2% | -61.3% | -5.1% | 18.4% | 17.0% | -8.8% | -7.6% | -4.0% | 0.5% |
| ROA | -20.5% | -20.5% | -49.9% | -40.7% | -3.6% | 11.4% | 8.4% | -3.4% | -3.0% | -1.6% | 0.2% |
| ROIC | -91.0% | -91.0% | -296.8% | -46.9% | 6.6% | 57.1% | 160.3% | -5.2% | -4.3% | -0.9% | -0.3% |
| ROCE | -29.8% | -29.8% | -65.8% | -21.7% | 3.6% | 17.1% | 27.5% | -5.3% | -4.6% | -1.0% | -0.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.55 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 0.87 | 0.38 | 0.48 | — | — | — | 80.00 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.70 | -0.78 | -0.83 | -0.51 | -0.61 | -1.00 | -0.49 | 0.38 | 0.40 | 0.37 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | -6.71 | -3.36 | -3.54 | — | — | — | 53.81 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | -2.41 | — | 1.65 | 2.37 | 1.50 |
| Interest Coverage | -71.38 | -71.38 | -116.16 | -150.03 | — | 59.32 | 127.75 | -392.38 | -148.83 | -15.25 | 24.29 |
Net cash position: cash ($175M) exceeds total debt ($22M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.01 | 1.51 | 2.17 | 2.03 | 1.78 | 0.82 | 1.86 | 1.83 | 1.87 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.22 | 1.22 | 0.96 | 1.45 | 2.13 | 2.01 | 1.76 | 0.79 | 0.63 | 0.57 | 0.45 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.71 | 1.30 | 1.94 | 1.85 | 1.52 | 0.59 | 0.47 | 0.33 | 0.24 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 2.46 | 3.47 | 2.46 | 2.20 | 2.59 | 3.00 | 3.49 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.26 |
| Inventory Turnover | 152.48 | 152.48 | 97.21 | 97.03 | 230.15 | 418.61 | 311.32 | 204.66 | 0.57 | 0.53 | 0.52 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 7.28 | 4.15 | 4.54 | 3.35 | 2.81 | 3.35 | 6.96 | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | 0.0% | 13.7% | 5.3% | 12.1% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | 0.7% | — | — | — | — | 444.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 4.6% | 1.8% | — | — | — | 2.7% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 6.5% | — | 93.9% | 31.9% | 144.8% |
| Buyback Yield | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.5% | 0.3% | 5.2% | 25.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 23.5% | 16.6% | 100.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.5% | 0.3% | 5.3% | 25.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 37.1% | 22.0% | 100.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $60M | $47M | $45M | $44M | $43M | $42M | $35M | $30M | $25M | $25M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying BBBY stock.
Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -3.0x. The historical average is 39.1x.
Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -44.5%. The historical average is 1.1%.
Based on historical data, Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. is trading at a P/E of -3.0x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. has 24.7% gross margin and -5.9% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Insolvency and structural obsolescence
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Persistent Destruction of Invested Capital
As reported in financial statements, the company's ROIC has remained deeply negative, reaching a nadir of -67.0% in 2024Q1 and failing to recover above -17.8% in 2026Q1, which suggests a fundamental inability to generate returns that exceed the cost of capital for its remaining operations.
The consistent negative ROIC trend indicates that every dollar of capital deployed into the business is effectively eroding shareholder value rather than compounding it. This decay is driven by the inability to achieve positive operating margins, rendering the company's capital base a liability in the current retail environment.
Working Capital Instability and Leverage
Based on the provided quarterly data, the cash conversion cycle has remained consistently negative, fluctuating between -66 days and -20 days, which suggests that the company is relying heavily on extended vendor payment terms to bridge the gap created by its deteriorating operational performance.
While a negative CCC is often a sign of efficiency in retail, here it appears to be a symptom of extreme liquidity stress where the company is forced to delay payments to suppliers to preserve cash. Investors should monitor whether vendors continue to extend these terms as the company's creditworthiness declines.
Liquidity Buffer Nearing Critical Thresholds
According to recent balance sheet data, the current ratio has compressed from 1.51 in 2023Q4 to 1.03 in 2026Q1, indicating that the company's ability to cover short-term obligations is increasingly reliant on the rapid liquidation of remaining inventory rather than sustainable cash generation.
The proximity of the current ratio to 1.00 leaves virtually no margin for error in the event of a further sales decline or unexpected operational costs. This liquidity position appears highly vulnerable, as any disruption in inventory turnover would likely lead to an immediate breach of working capital requirements.
Misapplication of Price-to-Book Valuation
As evidenced by the company's 1.74 P/B ratio, investors may be misinterpreting the book value as a floor, failing to account for the fact that the firm's assets are largely comprised of depreciating inventory and lease obligations that may hold little value in a liquidation scenario.
The P/B ratio is a misleading metric for a business in terminal decline, as it obscures the reality that the company's assets are not generating sufficient returns to justify their carrying value. A more appropriate focus would be on the liquidation value of the brand IP and remaining inventory, rather than the accounting book value.