Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -9.1x · EV/EBITDA 10.8x · ROE -72.5%. (1997–2026 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $872M | $406M | $1.3B | $3.0B | $2.7B | $5.0B | $5.5B | $4.2B | $2.9B | $2.5B | $2.7B |
| Enterprise Value | $1.7B | $1.2B | $2.2B | $3.7B | $3.7B | $5.8B | $5.8B | $4.5B | $3.3B | $2.7B | $3.2B |
| P/E Ratio → | -9.11 | — | 10.25 | 17.78 | 18.94 | 22.43 | 21.51 | 27.34 | 16.94 | 19.04 | 18.90 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.48 | 0.23 | 0.67 | 1.49 | 1.31 | 2.26 | 2.60 | 2.44 | 1.89 | 1.66 | 1.95 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.08 | 0.51 | 0.75 | 1.83 | 1.82 | 3.78 | 4.41 | 3.59 | 2.96 | 2.42 | 2.67 |
| P/FCF | 6.21 | 3.08 | 15.27 | 11.12 | 81.33 | 79.96 | 25.36 | 16.44 | 17.46 | 11.65 | 13.11 |
| P/OCF | 5.09 | 2.37 | 11.21 | 9.79 | 13.04 | 35.65 | 17.39 | 15.36 | 15.10 | 10.95 | 11.93 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.68 | 1.16 | 1.84 | 1.77 | 2.63 | 2.76 | 2.65 | 2.08 | 1.84 | 2.28 |
| EV / EBITDA | 10.82 | 7.62 | 11.16 | 11.79 | 14.28 | 18.95 | 18.17 | 20.98 | 14.21 | 13.43 | 15.48 |
| EV / EBIT | 15.79 | — | 10.34 | 14.73 | 15.12 | 21.25 | 19.94 | 20.53 | 16.15 | 14.11 | 18.36 |
| EV / FCF | — | 9.25 | 26.55 | 13.66 | 109.73 | 93.08 | 26.92 | 17.84 | 19.29 | 12.93 | 15.33 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 45.7% | 45.7% | 47.9% | 47.3% | 43.4% | 42.9% | 44.2% | 43.0% | 41.0% | 41.3% | 41.0% |
| Operating Margin | 6.0% | 6.0% | 7.5% | 13.0% | 10.2% | 12.3% | 13.4% | 10.4% | 12.7% | 11.4% | 12.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | -50.3% | -50.3% | 6.5% | 8.4% | 6.9% | 10.1% | 12.1% | 8.9% | 10.8% | 3.0% | 10.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -72.5% | -72.5% | 7.5% | 10.8% | 10.2% | 17.4% | 21.2% | 14.1% | 16.8% | 4.4% | 14.4% |
| ROA | -34.3% | -34.3% | 4.1% | 5.9% | 5.0% | 8.8% | 12.2% | 8.6% | 10.3% | 2.6% | 7.6% |
| ROIC | 3.8% | 3.8% | 4.3% | 8.2% | 6.9% | 11.0% | 13.6% | 9.5% | 11.6% | 9.2% | 9.1% |
| ROCE | 5.0% | 5.0% | 5.6% | 10.7% | 9.0% | 14.1% | 17.5% | 12.3% | 15.0% | 11.9% | 10.9% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.04 | 1.04 | 0.57 | 0.43 | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.31 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.29 | 0.48 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 5.21 | 5.21 | 4.84 | 2.25 | 3.81 | 2.78 | 1.20 | 1.76 | 1.40 | 1.43 | 2.36 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.02 | 0.56 | 0.42 | 0.64 | 0.62 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.45 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 5.09 | 5.09 | 4.74 | 2.19 | 3.70 | 2.67 | 1.06 | 1.65 | 1.35 | 1.33 | 2.24 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 6.18 | 11.28 | 2.54 | 28.40 | 13.12 | 1.56 | 1.40 | 1.83 | 1.28 | 2.22 |
| Interest Coverage | -13.53 | -13.53 | 4.11 | 4.71 | 5.94 | 21.41 | 23.06 | 17.34 | 17.21 | 13.84 | 11.68 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.71 | 1.71 | 2.00 | 1.87 | 2.16 | 1.80 | 1.58 | 2.01 | 1.94 | 1.87 | 1.92 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.81 | 0.81 | 1.03 | 0.99 | 1.06 | 0.87 | 0.80 | 1.26 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 0.92 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.08 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.84 | 0.61 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.79 | 0.93 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 0.91 | 0.77 |
| Inventory Turnover | 2.13 | 2.13 | 2.19 | 2.67 | 2.58 | 2.28 | 2.43 | 3.80 | 3.05 | 3.45 | 2.85 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 74.92 | 83.06 | 73.25 | 67.41 | 76.02 | 67.68 | 74.40 | 65.40 | 68.10 | 59.92 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 9.8% | 5.6% | 5.3% | 4.5% | 4.6% | 3.7% | 5.9% | 5.3% | 5.3% |
| FCF Yield | 16.1% | 32.5% | 6.6% | 9.0% | 1.2% | 1.3% | 3.9% | 6.1% | 5.7% | 8.6% | 7.6% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.2% | 0.5% | 8.1% | 1.8% | 0.7% | 3.7% | 3.7% | 0.2% | 7.4% | 3.0% | 2.8% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.2% | 0.5% | 8.1% | 1.8% | 0.7% | 3.7% | 3.7% | 0.2% | 7.4% | 3.0% | 2.8% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $23M | $23M | $24M | $24M | $24M | $25M | $25M | $26M | $27M | $28M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying HELE stock.
Helen of Troy Limited's current P/E ratio is -9.1x. The historical average is 16.1x.
Helen of Troy Limited's current EV/EBITDA is 10.8x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 11.8x.
Helen of Troy Limited's return on equity (ROE) is -72.5%. The historical average is 9.5%.
Based on historical data, Helen of Troy Limited is trading at a P/E of -9.1x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Helen of Troy Limited has 45.7% gross margin and 6.0% operating margin.
Helen of Troy Limited's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 5.2x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Impairment recurrence eroding equity
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Deep Discount Reflects Earnings Quality Doubt
At a forward P/E of 7.75x and P/B of 0.77x, Helen of Troy trades at a pronounced discount to Church & Dwight's 32.4x earnings, though the negative -0.68x TTM P/E renders the trailing multiple meaningless amid reported impairment-driven losses.
The 8.95x trailing EV/EBITDA sits below every listed peer except ACCO Brands (7.00x) and materially below the 18.8x commanded by Church & Dwight, suggesting the market is pricing HELE's design-led brands closer to commodity house-of-brands operators than to premium compounders. The 4.69x P/FCF is arguably the more informative multiple here, since cumulative operating cash flow of roughly $340.7M over the ten-quarter window stands in stark contrast to cumulative net losses near -$634.9M; if investors treat the cash generation as more representative of economics than the accounting loss, the discount may look overstated. However, the suspension of formal guidance and 6.4% TTM revenue contraction limit the ability to underwrite any re-rating, so the apparent cheapness may persist until top-line stabilization is confirmed over several more quarters.
Gross Margin Gains Fail to Reach Bottom Line
Helen of Troy's gross margin expanded to 52.2% in 2027Q2, the highest level across the ten-quarter window, yet operating margin remained muted at 5.2%, indicating pricing and mix advantages are being absorbed by selling, general, and administrative spending rather than converted to earnings.
The divergence between a premium-tier gross margin and a mid-single-digit operating margin suggests brand marketing and retail distribution costs are rising at least as fast as gross profit dollars, an inference consistent with SG&A reaching roughly 46% of revenue in the most recent quarter versus a 33-42% range historically. The -50.33% TTM net margin should be read as an accounting artifact rather than an operating verdict, since the operating margin stayed positive at 5.98% and the loss magnitude aligns with the 2026Q1-2026Q2 impairment charges rather than core deterioration. Adjusted earning power therefore appears to be in the high-single-digit net margin territory, comparable to Spectrum Brands' 3.6% and ahead of Newell's -4.0%, but well short of Church & Dwight's 11.9%; the licensed-brand structure (Honeywell, Braun, Vicks) remains a structural cap because renewal economics are not fully within management's control.
Returns Recovering From Impairment Trough
ROIC swung from -12.9% in 2026Q1 to 0.9% in 2027Q2, yet remains an order of magnitude below the 13.9%-14.0% generated by Church & Dwight and Hamilton Beach, per the peer comparison table, indicating capital deployed in prior acquisitions is still producing negligible economic returns.
The recovery in ROIC appears driven primarily by the denominator effect — roughly $730M in cumulative goodwill write-downs shrank the invested capital base — rather than by a step-change in operating efficiency, since asset turnover has fluctuated in a narrow 0.13-0.22 band without a clear uptrend. ROE of 0.4% in 2027Q2 against a TTM figure of -72.5% illustrates how mechanically sensitive this metric has become to the collapsing equity base; investors should discount ROE entirely here and anchor on ROIC and FCF return instead. Until ROIC clears mid-single digits on a sustained basis, the acquisition-led capital allocation model cannot be credited with compounding value, and the 22% of remaining assets still sitting in goodwill represents ongoing impairment risk if any licensed or acquired brand underperforms.
Inventory-Heavy Model Binds Working Capital
Days inventory outstanding ranged from 154 to 219 across the ten-quarter window, pushing the cash conversion cycle to 149-197 days in the periods where full data is available, a level that structurally traps capital in seasonal health and outdoor stock relative to faster-moving consumer peers.
The extended inventory position is partly a function of the business model itself — flu-season-dependent thermometers and humidifiers alongside holiday-weighted Hydro Flask and Osprey gifting demand — so the elevated DIO reflects planned seasonality as much as inefficiency, though the drift from 154 days in 2025Q3 toward 207 days by 2027Q2 warrants monitoring for demand-planning slippage. Asset turnover of 0.21 in the latest quarter versus 0.15-0.22 historically suggests no meaningful improvement in revenue generated per dollar of assets, implying that margin recovery, not volume efficiency, must carry the profitability story. The absence of a reported DPO figure in 2027Q2 limits full cycle reconstruction for the most recent period, but the DSO range of 69-94 days indicates retail receivable collection has remained broadly stable even as revenue contracted.
Deleveraging Offsets Compressed Coverage
Total debt has been reduced roughly 30% from $956.8M in 2025Q4 to $672.6M in 2027Q2, lowering debt-to-equity from 1.04 to 0.49, yet interest coverage of just 2.10x and net debt near $650M against $22.6M of cash signal that debt service remains a meaningful constraint.
The direction of travel is constructive — active debt paydown combined with a recovering equity base has halved the leverage ratio in six quarters — but the absolute cash buffer is chronically thin at roughly 3% of total debt, leaving the company reliant on revolver access or operating cash flow for any unexpected funding need. The 29.35x debt-to-EBITDA reading in 2027Q2 is almost certainly distorted by a seasonally depressed EBITDA denominator rather than a sudden leverage spike, given that the same ratio printed 10.46x one quarter earlier; investors should normalize across a full cycle before drawing covenant conclusions. Coverage did recover from -22.18x in the impairment quarter, but at 2.10x it is still the thinnest among periods with positive interest expense, and any renewed earnings softness or further licensed-brand impairment could tighten the cushion materially.
P/E Misreads an Acquisition-Led Impairment Cycle
The most commonly misapplied ratio for Helen of Troy is the trailing P/E, printed at -0.68x, which converts a non-cash impairment charge into an apparent permanent capital loss and obscures that the business generated $340.7M of operating cash flow over the same ten quarters.
Because the company grows through acquisitions and carries a large finite-lived intangible balance, accounting rules force write-downs that flow through net income but do not reflect the ongoing cash economics of the OXO, Hydro Flask, and licensed-health portfolios; using the negative trailing P/E invites a value-trap conclusion that the underlying cash generation does not support. The more appropriate lens is free cash flow yield — a 4.69x P/FCF implies roughly a 21% yield, which should be sanity-checked against the sustainability of that cash given working-capital swings between -1.6% and 16.7% FCF margins, and against the possibility that license renewals for Honeywell, Braun, or Vicks require cash outlays not visible in trailing figures. As a secondary caution, the P/B of 0.77x is similarly treacherous, since the equity denominator has been mechanically deflated by roughly $850M of impairment-driven retained-earnings destruction, meaning the apparent discount to book value partly reflects an accounting reset rather than a genuine asset bargain.