Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 25.1x · EV/EBITDA 15.3x · ROE 24.8%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $22.7B | $23.8B | $22.6B | $17.8B | $12.7B | $11.4B | $8.5B | $8.1B | $5.5B | $7.5B | $6.5B |
| Enterprise Value | $24.8B | $25.9B | $24.0B | $19.7B | $13.8B | $12.6B | $10.0B | $9.6B | $7.1B | $8.1B | $7.1B |
| P/E Ratio → | 25.09 | 26.85 | 29.15 | 23.43 | 24.89 | 28.61 | 24.42 | 20.25 | 15.14 | 30.83 | 22.27 |
| P/S Ratio | 3.44 | 4.07 | 4.02 | 3.31 | 2.57 | 2.72 | 2.32 | 2.05 | 1.22 | 2.03 | 1.85 |
| P/B Ratio | 5.96 | 6.17 | 6.89 | 6.15 | 5.36 | 5.08 | 4.10 | 4.12 | 3.03 | 4.53 | 4.05 |
| P/FCF | 24.45 | 27.20 | 27.90 | 24.84 | 27.97 | 25.12 | 15.27 | 16.25 | 12.96 | 24.92 | 19.64 |
| P/OCF | 22.03 | 23.10 | 22.82 | 20.17 | 21.77 | 20.95 | 13.19 | 13.67 | 10.55 | 19.68 | 16.32 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 4.43 | 4.27 | 3.67 | 2.79 | 3.01 | 2.71 | 2.43 | 1.57 | 2.22 | 2.01 |
| EV / EBITDA | 15.34 | 18.20 | 18.42 | 16.59 | 16.11 | 18.55 | 15.62 | 14.41 | 10.01 | 13.19 | 12.15 |
| EV / EBIT | 20.38 | 21.60 | 22.25 | 19.33 | 19.55 | 24.59 | 20.59 | 17.81 | 13.08 | 16.68 | 14.89 |
| EV / FCF | — | 29.63 | 29.61 | 27.57 | 30.43 | 27.86 | 17.83 | 19.24 | 16.77 | 27.19 | 21.32 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 35.5% | 35.5% | 33.8% | 35.1% | 29.7% | 27.5% | 29.5% | 29.7% | 29.0% | 31.5% | 31.5% |
| Operating Margin | 20.8% | 20.8% | 19.4% | 19.3% | 14.3% | 12.7% | 13.4% | 13.3% | 12.4% | 14.1% | 14.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | 15.2% | 15.2% | 13.8% | 14.1% | 11.0% | 9.5% | 9.5% | 9.2% | 8.0% | 6.6% | 8.4% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 24.8% | 24.8% | 25.2% | 28.9% | 23.7% | 18.5% | 17.4% | 19.2% | 20.9% | 15.0% | 17.5% |
| ROA | 11.9% | 11.9% | 11.4% | 12.3% | 10.2% | 7.7% | 7.0% | 7.4% | 8.4% | 6.7% | 8.7% |
| ROIC | 17.1% | 17.1% | 17.2% | 18.7% | 15.3% | 11.4% | 10.6% | 11.5% | 14.6% | 17.3% | 17.5% |
| ROCE | 20.1% | 20.1% | 19.9% | 21.0% | 16.6% | 12.7% | 12.1% | 13.0% | 15.8% | 17.4% | 17.7% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.68 | 0.68 | 0.52 | 0.79 | 0.66 | 0.68 | 0.81 | 0.85 | 1.00 | 0.64 | 0.62 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 1.83 | 1.83 | 1.32 | 1.93 | 1.82 | 2.25 | 2.65 | 2.52 | 2.54 | 1.71 | 1.71 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.55 | 0.42 | 0.68 | 0.47 | 0.56 | 0.69 | 0.76 | 0.89 | 0.41 | 0.35 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 1.49 | 1.49 | 1.07 | 1.64 | 1.30 | 1.83 | 2.24 | 2.24 | 2.27 | 1.10 | 0.96 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 2.43 | 1.71 | 2.73 | 2.46 | 2.74 | 2.56 | 3.00 | 3.81 | 2.27 | 1.68 |
| Interest Coverage | 18.71 | 18.71 | 14.62 | 27.79 | 14.25 | 9.40 | 8.06 | 7.84 | 7.45 | 10.87 | 10.92 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.72 | 1.72 | 1.64 | 1.64 | 1.86 | 1.76 | 1.67 | 1.86 | 1.96 | 2.27 | 2.63 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 1.01 | 1.18 | 1.14 | 1.12 | 1.11 | 1.18 | 1.37 | 1.73 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.42 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.55 | 0.76 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.71 | 0.84 | 0.78 | 0.92 | 0.79 | 0.72 | 0.80 | 0.92 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| Inventory Turnover | 3.48 | 3.48 | 4.42 | 4.18 | 4.69 | 4.60 | 4.93 | 4.38 | 4.89 | 3.96 | 4.51 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 53.51 | 49.03 | 53.35 | 54.71 | 58.77 | 54.84 | 63.17 | 61.21 | 55.65 | 56.76 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 2.4% | 2.3% | 3.2% | 2.1% | 2.2% |
| Payout Ratio | 32.3% | 32.3% | 34.4% | 32.3% | 42.1% | 54.3% | 57.3% | 51.6% | 47.8% | 64.8% | 49.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 4.0% | 3.7% | 3.4% | 4.3% | 4.0% | 3.5% | 4.1% | 4.9% | 6.6% | 3.2% | 4.5% |
| FCF Yield | 4.1% | 3.7% | 3.6% | 4.0% | 3.6% | 4.0% | 6.5% | 6.2% | 7.7% | 4.0% | 5.1% |
| Buyback Yield | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 1.4% | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 1.2% | 3.8% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 2.2% | 2.2% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 3.2% | 2.0% | 2.8% | 2.7% | 3.9% | 3.4% | 6.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $54M | $54M | $54M | $54M | $55M | $55M | $55M | $55M | $55M | $56M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying HUBB stock.
Hubbell Incorporated's current P/E ratio is 25.1x. The historical average is 20.6x. This places it at the 77th percentile of its historical range.
Hubbell Incorporated's current EV/EBITDA is 15.3x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 12.1x.
Hubbell Incorporated's return on equity (ROE) is 24.8%. This is above the typical threshold of 15-20% considered good for most companies. The historical average is 18.1%.
Based on historical data, Hubbell Incorporated is trading at a P/E of 25.1x. This is at the 77th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Hubbell Incorporated's current dividend yield is 1.25% with a payout ratio of 32.3%.
Hubbell Incorporated has 35.5% gross margin and 20.8% operating margin. Operating margin above 20% indicates strong pricing power and cost efficiency.
Hubbell Incorporated's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 1.8x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio below 2x is generally considered financially healthy.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Acquisition-driven leverage and goodwill spike
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Gross Recovery Masks Net Erosion
Gross margin recovered to 36.8% in 2026Q3 from a 33.1% trough in 2025Q1, yet net margin slipped to 14.0% from 17.0% a year earlier; as Hubbell's income statements show, pricing has restored the top of the margin band while below-the-line items absorb the gain.
Operating margin of 21.8% sits near the top of the 17.4%–22.7% band maintained across the last ten quarters, so the recovery appears cyclical rather than structural, with price-over-cost mechanics doing more work than fixed-cost leverage. The widening gap between operating and net margin suggests amortization of acquisition intangibles and financing costs are increasingly the swing factor, making operating margin the more informative read of underlying earning power while warranting footnote-level verification of the non-operating drag.
Acquisition Dilutes Return Trajectory
Annualized ROIC has slipped to roughly 13.6% in 2026Q3 from about 19% a year earlier, and quarterly ROE fell to 6.5% from 7.1%, per Hubbell's reported return metrics, a deterioration that coincides with the acquisition-driven balance sheet expansion.
The divergence between a rising operating margin (21.8% versus 17.4% a year earlier) and a falling ROIC (3.4% versus 4.2%) points to invested capital growing faster than operating profit, consistent with the 41.7% expansion in total assets and the $4.4 billion goodwill block. If this pattern persists through two more quarters, it would suggest the acquisition is diluting rather than compounding returns; the annualized ROIC still appears roughly in line with Eaton's 13.6%, so the concern is direction rather than level.
Inventory Build Extends Conversion Cycle
Cash conversion cycle stretched to 108 days in 2026Q3 from 80 days in 2024Q2, driven by inventory days of 101 versus 82; as Hubbell's working capital history shows, asset turnover simultaneously fell to 0.16 from 0.21, signalling a heavier, slower asset base.
The 28-day extension is concentrated almost entirely on the inventory side, which may reflect pre-build ahead of utility deployments or the working capital profile absorbed with the acquisition; the direction matters more than the level for now. DSO has held in a narrow 54–58 day range throughout, implying customer payment discipline is unchanged, so the drag appears supplier-and-inventory driven rather than a loosening of receivables terms, and the pronounced Q1 seasonal drain of roughly $167–196 million remains a recurring working-capital pattern investors should model through.
Coverage Halves on Acquisition Debt
Interest coverage has fallen to 6.95x in 2026Q3 from 13.68x two quarters earlier, while D/E climbed to 1.24 from 0.72; as Hubbell's filings show, the roughly $2.4 billion of incremental acquisition borrowing reset the credit profile within a single quarter.
Coverage near 7x EBIT still appears serviceable in absolute terms, but the speed of the deterioration means debt service comfort has materially narrowed versus the 15x–24x coverage enjoyed through 2024–2025. With D/E now above the 0.52–0.70 range the company maintained for two years and the supplied D/EBITDA reading roughly doubling year over year, the trajectory implies leverage is being reduced by earnings growth rather than repayment; the maturity structure of the new borrowings warrants close examination given how quickly the profile moved.
Discount to Large-Cap Electrical Peers
Hubbell trades at 26.26x trailing earnings and 18.41x EV/EBITDA versus Eaton's 36.73x and 26.71x; as current market multiples show, its 1.26 PEG trails Eaton's 1.50, suggesting the market is not pricing aggressive growth re-acceleration despite the utility premium.
Despite the narrative of a grid-modernization premium, Hubbell screens as a discount to both Eaton and Rockwell on every headline multiple, which implies the market is treating the utility franchise as closer to a steady-state infrastructure supplier than a secular grower. The 21.17x forward P/E embeds an assumption of sustained earnings growth that management declined to underwrite when guidance was skipped alongside the 2026-10-27 report, so the valuation gap versus peers should be read as an unvalidated expectation rather than a demonstrated bargain; P/B of 6.03x is additionally flattered by an equity base that shrank against a $11.9 billion asset stack.
ROE Overstates Operating Performance
The most misapplied ratio for Hubbell is ROE, whose 24.8% annualized print looks superior to Eaton's 19.5%; based on reported leverage of 1.24x debt-to-equity versus 0.58x a year earlier, the uplift appears substantially balance-sheet driven rather than operational.
Because roughly $2.4 billion of new borrowing was layered onto a $4.1 billion equity base in a single quarter, any equity-based return metric now conflates capital structure decisions with operating execution, and it will look artificially resilient if goodwill impairments were ever to compress book value. The better lens is ROIC on tangible invested capital excluding the $4.4 billion of goodwill, or EV/EBITDA for cross-company comparison, since both book-value returns and trailing P/E are distorted whenever acquisition accounting and leverage move together as sharply as they have here.