Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 121.6x · EV/EBITDA 8.1x · ROE 4.7%. (2002–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $6.5B | $4.5B | $4.8B | $7.0B | $7.5B | $4.9B | — | — | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $8.0B | $6.0B | $6.6B | $7.2B | $7.7B | $5.0B | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 121.60 | 20.92 | 10.61 | 14.51 | 44.36 | 14.02 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 2.18 | 1.38 | 1.56 | 2.70 | 5.31 | 5.83 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 1.44 | 0.99 | 1.02 | 1.78 | 2.08 | 3.29 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | 67.31 | 10.47 | 59.40 | 42.44 | 70.42 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 6.86 | 4.75 | 7.26 | 12.18 | 26.73 | 801.16 | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.83 | 2.16 | 2.80 | 5.45 | 5.87 | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 8.13 | 5.52 | 6.20 | 8.94 | 21.13 | 143.83 | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | 15.59 | 13.84 | 11.25 | 12.68 | 32.91 | 12.84 | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 13.95 | 82.31 | 43.97 | 72.26 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 19.7% | 19.7% | 27.4% | 28.7% | 21.6% | -0.9% | -2.6% | 9.0% | -6.5% | 3.5% | 42.4% |
| Operating Margin | 15.7% | 15.7% | 22.8% | 23.8% | 15.8% | -8.9% | -15.2% | 3.7% | -13.3% | -2.2% | 39.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | 6.6% | 6.6% | 14.7% | 18.6% | 11.9% | 41.5% | -412.6% | -53.7% | -81.7% | -41.3% | -34.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 4.7% | 4.7% | 10.5% | 12.8% | 6.6% | 59.2% | -237.7% | -16.9% | -16.7% | -8.3% | -13.4% |
| ROA | 2.8% | 2.8% | 6.7% | 9.0% | 4.6% | 11.1% | -63.4% | -8.0% | -8.8% | -4.6% | -7.6% |
| ROIC | 6.2% | 6.2% | 9.8% | 11.6% | 6.3% | -13.0% | -3.3% | 0.5% | -1.2% | -0.2% | 7.4% |
| ROCE | 7.5% | 7.5% | 11.7% | 13.0% | 7.0% | -2.6% | -2.5% | 0.6% | -1.5% | -0.3% | 9.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.16 | — | 1.06 | 0.83 | 0.68 | 0.67 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 1.81 | 1.81 | 1.96 | 0.76 | 1.84 | 6.73 | 0.03 | 7.93 | 11.32 | 7.77 | 2.59 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.33 | 0.39 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.03 | — | 1.03 | 0.75 | 0.57 | 0.56 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 1.38 | 1.38 | 1.72 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 1.12 | -1.57 | 7.71 | 10.22 | 6.50 | 2.16 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 3.48 | 22.91 | 1.52 | 1.84 | — | -2.88 | — | — | 11.43 | 8.34 |
| Interest Coverage | 2.68 | 2.68 | 6.23 | 9.66 | 5.48 | 12.14 | -0.89 | 0.17 | -0.48 | -0.09 | 4.77 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.67 | 1.67 | 1.48 | 1.65 | 1.58 | 1.83 | 2.76 | 0.82 | 1.80 | 1.75 | 1.88 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.67 | 1.67 | 1.48 | 1.65 | 1.58 | 1.83 | 2.76 | 0.82 | 1.80 | 1.75 | 1.88 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.62 | 0.62 | 0.26 | 0.56 | 0.71 | 0.78 | 1.67 | 0.20 | 1.03 | 1.12 | 1.15 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.44 | 0.38 | 0.47 | 0.27 | 0.41 | 0.23 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.23 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 74.26 | 104.97 | 82.99 | 129.83 | 95.67 | 71.66 | 78.21 | 67.66 | 59.71 | 51.28 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 4.9% | 7.1% | 5.8% | 1.4% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | 147.8% | 147.8% | 62.0% | 20.5% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 0.8% | 4.8% | 9.4% | 6.9% | 2.3% | 7.1% | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 1.5% | 9.6% | 1.7% | 2.4% | 1.4% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.3% | 0.4% | 7.7% | 1.4% | 1.1% | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 5.2% | 7.5% | 13.5% | 2.8% | 1.1% | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $160M | $152M | $145M | $199M | $199M | $251M | $249M | $247M | $245M | $243M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 24 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying NE stock.
Noble Corporation Plc's current P/E ratio is 121.6x. The historical average is 20.9x. This places it at the 100th percentile of its historical range.
Noble Corporation Plc's current EV/EBITDA is 8.1x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 10.4x.
Noble Corporation Plc's return on equity (ROE) is 4.7%. The historical average is -0.5%.
Based on historical data, Noble Corporation Plc is trading at a P/E of 121.6x. This is at the 100th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Noble Corporation Plc's current dividend yield is 4.89% with a payout ratio of 147.8%.
Noble Corporation Plc has 19.7% gross margin and 15.7% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
Noble Corporation Plc's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 1.8x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio below 2x is generally considered financially healthy.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Negative FCF amid capex intensity
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Premium Multiple on Compressed Earnings
Noble trades at a trailing P/E of 35.41 against Valaris at 7.16, while its EV/EBITDA of 8.30 sits below both Valaris (11.61) and Seadrill (11.44) per current market data, suggesting equity-level expensiveness paired with a more reasonable enterprise-level entry point.
The divergence between a 35.41 trailing P/E and an 8.30 EV/EBITDA implies the equity is being priced off depressed post-merger earnings while the enterprise value reflects a de-levered balance sheet, so the forward P/E of 90.40 may overstate true expensiveness if it captures the Brazil disruption and below-the-line charges rather than underlying floater earning power. However, at 1.68x book versus Transocean's 0.77x, Noble already carries a meaningful premium to the largest floater peer, which appears to price in both the Diamond Offshore consolidation and sustained UDW dayrate strength that reported results have not yet corroborated.
Margin Whawsk Undermines Earning Power
Noble's gross margin swung from 13.0% in 2025Q4 to 38.9% in 2026Q1 before settling at 38.0% in 2026Q2, yet operating margin collapsed to 8.8% and net margin to -5.1% in that same quarter, per reported financial statements, indicating cost volatility and heavy non-operating drag.
The 26-point gross margin swing within two quarters suggests the reported margin is not a reliable proxy for structural pricing power, and the fact that operating income fell 71.9% from Q1 to Q2 on only an 8.4% revenue decline confirms a rigid cost base with unfavorable flow-through at current utilization. Adjusting for the roughly $100-177M of below-the-line drag implied by the gap between positive operating income and reported net losses in the last two quarters, true earning power likely resides closer to operating cash flow of roughly $144M per quarter than to headline net income, though the sustainability of that cash figure warrants scrutiny.
Post-Merger Returns Fail to Compensate
ROIC has decayed from 3.5% in 2024Q2 to 0.8% in 2026Q3 and ROE turned negative at -2.7%, as per Noble's reported quarterly ratios, meaning the enlarged asset base created by the Maersk and Diamond consolidations is generating returns well below any plausible cost of capital.
Since ROIC has remained below 3% for eight consecutive quarters while total assets sit near $7.2B, the consolidation appears to have added scale without commensurate earnings, with the 2026Q1 print of 2.8% looking more like a temporary lift from contract mix than a compounding trend. Given that net PP&E now absorbs effectively the entire asset base, any sustained recovery in returns will depend on dayrate expansion flowing through the fixed rig cost structure rather than on further asset accumulation, a driver investors should test against upcoming contract renewals.
Cash Halved as Rig Assets Dominate
Noble's cash declined from $662.6M in 2026Q1 to $337.2M in 2026Q3 and the current ratio compressed from 1.99 to 1.76, according to recent SEC filings, a drawdown that tracks the back-to-back free cash flow deficits reported over the same window.
With quick and current ratios identical at 1.76 and net PP&E of $7.2B against the same figure in total assets, Noble's short-term liquidity rests almost entirely on cash and receivables, with inventory providing no buffer, so the position is adequate but not fortress-like under stress. A stress scenario combining another two quarters of roughly $50M FCF deficits alongside the sustained ~$80M quarterly dividend would leave the liquidity cushion thinner than the headline 1.76 current ratio implies, and this interplay between payouts and cash depletion appears to be the key item to monitor.
Lags Valaris on Returns, Leads on Gearing
Against Valaris's ROIC of 10.9% and net margin of 41.5%, Noble's 0.8% ROIC and negative net margin appear materially inferior per current peer data, yet its debt-to-equity of 0.44 remains well below Transocean's 0.70, suggesting a deliberate trade of returns for balance sheet resilience.
The return gap versus Valaris looks partly structural given Noble's heavier post-merger asset base absorbing depreciation and integration costs, but the magnitude of the shortfall relative to the sector leader suggests execution issues beyond fleet mix, particularly the Brazil suspension. Conversely, the gearing advantage over Transocean may be temporary rather than durable if negative FCF persists, since maintaining that buffer would likely require either dividend restraint or asset sales that peers have not needed to pursue.
P/E Misleads on Cyclical Drillers
The trailing P/E of 35.41 and forward P/E of 90.40 are the most commonly misapplied ratios for Noble's business model, since cyclical offshore drillers structurally show peak-like P/E readings precisely when reported earnings trough, as current market pricing data illustrates.
Because net income is distorted by large non-cash depreciation on a $7.2B rig fleet plus the volatile below-the-line charges implied by recent quarters, P/E captures a trough-earnings denominator rather than sustainable earning power; investors should instead anchor on EV/EBITDA, which at 8.30 already discounts the enterprise relative to peers, and on operating cash flow conversion. The adjustment that matters most is separating the disclosed Brazil operational impact from recurring performance, since failing to do so risks simultaneously misreading both the valuation multiple and the trajectory the current share price appears to discount.