Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -68.7x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -3.7%. (2007–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $346M | $1.0B | $153M | $477M | $489M | $4.5B | $1.5B | $988M | $3.4B | $4.9B | $3.5B |
| Enterprise Value | $301M | $976M | $126M | $465M | $463M | $4.5B | $1.4B | $989M | $3.4B | $4.9B | $3.5B |
| P/E Ratio → | -68.71 | — | — | — | — | 129.63 | 50.30 | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.24 | 0.71 | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0.28 | 1.89 | 0.72 | 0.64 | 6035.89 | 5525.95 | 267.59 |
| P/B Ratio | 2.06 | 6.35 | 1.44 | 3.69 | 3.15 | 24.59 | 11.98 | — | 1083.35 | 437.00 | 250.78 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | 43.29 | — | 19.50 | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | 23.87 | — | 18.08 | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.68 | 0.10 | 0.31 | 0.27 | 1.89 | 0.68 | 0.65 | 6139.69 | 5519.98 | 266.76 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 101.32 | 43.94 | 143.28 | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | 144.46 | 47.85 | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | 41.01 | — | 18.22 | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 11.7% | 11.7% | 9.8% | 11.2% | 12.6% | 13.7% | 12.9% | 10.7% | -109.5% | -87.7% | -31.5% |
| Operating Margin | -0.7% | -0.7% | -4.2% | -4.7% | -2.9% | 1.4% | 1.1% | -0.2% | -1068.9% | -579.7% | -69.5% |
| Net Profit Margin | -0.3% | -0.3% | -3.5% | -3.9% | -3.3% | 1.5% | 1.4% | -1.1% | -1592.8% | -582.4% | -73.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -3.7% | -3.7% | -36.8% | -41.5% | -34.0% | 23.4% | 48.2% | -1859.1% | -124.9% | -40.9% | -90.8% |
| ROA | -1.1% | -1.1% | -9.6% | -11.3% | -9.8% | 6.1% | 10.9% | -423.0% | -83.8% | -32.0% | -63.4% |
| ROIC | -7.3% | -7.3% | -39.3% | -43.2% | -23.3% | 23.2% | 64.4% | -29.0% | -13.4% | -85.0% | -100.5% |
| ROCE | -5.1% | -5.1% | -28.2% | -32.7% | -19.7% | 15.2% | 13.8% | — | -69.8% | -36.1% | -79.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.39 | 0.39 | 0.69 | 0.70 | 0.62 | 0.59 | 0.44 | — | 18.78 | 0.14 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 2.42 | 1.74 | 5.72 | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.28 | -0.25 | -0.09 | -0.17 | 0.04 | -0.79 | — | 18.63 | -0.47 | -0.77 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 0.16 | -3.09 | 0.17 | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | -2.28 | — | -1.28 | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | -1.85 | -1.85 | -45.86 | -23.27 | -62.25 | 50.78 | 44.93 | -3.21 | -15.79 | — | -23.80 |
Net cash position: cash ($108M) exceeds total debt ($63M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.41 | 1.41 | 1.16 | 1.16 | 1.26 | 1.23 | 1.10 | 0.01 | 1.87 | 3.67 | 10.17 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.70 | 0.76 | 0.54 | 0.64 | -0.42 | 0.83 | 2.70 | 9.83 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.41 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.31 | 0.33 | 2.54 | 9.68 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 3.08 | 3.03 | 3.00 | 3.17 | 3.79 | 3.79 | 657.22 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.79 |
| Inventory Turnover | 7.67 | 7.67 | 11.31 | 9.76 | 9.64 | 8.37 | 10.11 | 12.50 | 0.78 | 0.64 | 45.73 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 15.78 | 19.74 | 20.39 | 18.82 | 9.78 | 11.62 | 12.89 | 304.34 | 106.37 | 4.28 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 0.8% | 2.0% | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | 2.3% | — | 5.1% | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.3% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.3% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $20M | $19M | $19M | $19M | $22M | $18M | $18M | $19M | $17M | $15M |
Persistent negative operating margins
Based on recent financial data, Newegg's P/S ratio of 0.24 and negative P/E of -68.71 suggest that the market is pricing the company as a distressed asset rather than a growth-oriented e-commerce platform, reflecting deep skepticism regarding its long-term ability to achieve sustainable profitability in a competitive retail landscape.
The absence of a meaningful forward P/E or EV/EBITDA multiple indicates that investors are currently prioritizing liquidity and speculative volatility over traditional earnings-based valuation metrics. This valuation gap relative to broader e-commerce peers suggests that the market may be discounting the company's specialized logistics capabilities, viewing them instead as secondary to the core retail business's structural margin challenges.
According to historical financial statements, Newegg's ROIC has struggled to maintain positive territory, fluctuating between -9.8% and 3.7% over the last ten quarters, which indicates that the company is currently failing to generate returns that exceed its cost of capital, thereby eroding long-term shareholder value.
The persistent inability to sustain positive ROIC highlights a fundamental misalignment between the company's capital-intensive logistics infrastructure and its thin-margin retail revenue model. Investors should monitor whether future shifts toward third-party marketplace services can improve capital efficiency, as the current trend suggests that the business model is not yet compounding value for its shareholders.
As reported in recent filings, Newegg's cash conversion cycle has shown significant volatility, ranging from 3 to 30 days, which underscores the company's heavy reliance on precise inventory and payables management to maintain operational liquidity amidst fluctuating consumer demand for high-value electronics and hardware components.
The variability in the cash conversion cycle suggests that Newegg's working capital efficiency is highly sensitive to seasonal inventory build-ups and the timing of vendor payments. While the company has managed to keep its DSO relatively low, the reliance on DPO to manage cash flow warrants further investigation into potential supplier leverage constraints during periods of market stress.
Based on the provided balance sheet data, Newegg's current ratio has remained tight, hovering between 1.16 and 1.71, which indicates a limited margin of safety for managing short-term obligations, particularly given the inherent inventory obsolescence risks associated with the fast-moving consumer electronics and semiconductor hardware industry.
The quick ratio, which has dipped as low as 0.52, suggests that the company's liquidity is heavily dependent on the rapid turnover of inventory, which may be problematic during cyclical downturns. This reliance on inventory liquidity leaves the company vulnerable to sudden markdowns, which could further pressure the already strained balance sheet and limit the firm's financial flexibility.
The most commonly misapplied metric for Newegg is the Price-to-Sales (P/S) ratio, which obscures the fundamental shift between first-party retail revenue and third-party marketplace commission revenue, potentially leading analysts to misinterpret top-line growth as a proxy for operational health when it may actually reflect a change in business model.
Because Newegg records only commissions for third-party sales, a shift toward a marketplace model can cause reported revenue to decline even as profitability improves. Analysts should instead focus on Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) and take rates to accurately assess the company's true scale and earning power, as P/S fails to capture the underlying shift in economic risk and margin profile.
Includes 30+ ratios · 19 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying NEGG stock.
Newegg Commerce, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -68.7x. The historical average is 55.7x.
Newegg Commerce, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -3.7%. The historical average is -23.5%.
Based on historical data, Newegg Commerce, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -68.7x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Newegg Commerce, Inc. has 11.7% gross margin and -0.7% operating margin.