Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -30.9x · EV/EBITDA 488.3x · ROE 0.5%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $87M | $126M | $119M | $129M | $620M | $1.1B | $837M | $1.3B | $965M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Enterprise Value | $749M | $788M | $778M | $697M | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.1B |
| P/E Ratio → | -30.92 | — | — | — | — | 17.55 | — | 14.24 | 54.77 | 17.72 | 20.11 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.73 | 2.51 | 2.53 | — | 2.85 | 14.29 | 29.33 | 5.55 | 3.70 | 4.15 | 4.04 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.29 | 0.43 | 0.48 | 0.41 | 0.63 | 2.16 | 1.63 | 1.53 | 1.16 | 1.24 | 1.18 |
| P/FCF | — | — | 411.66 | — | 9.08 | 16.73 | 20.95 | 38.22 | 33.11 | 20.10 | 23.39 |
| P/OCF | — | — | 411.66 | — | 545.98 | 11.66 | 13.27 | 14.34 | 9.08 | 9.32 | 9.00 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 15.73 | 16.47 | — | 6.99 | 22.13 | 65.21 | 9.14 | 7.24 | 7.89 | 7.94 |
| EV / EBITDA | 488.27 | 513.70 | — | — | 40.12 | 13.14 | — | 16.05 | 13.53 | 13.52 | 12.74 |
| EV / EBIT | 488.27 | 513.70 | — | — | 12.54 | — | — | 15.97 | 30.62 | 18.07 | 19.84 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | 2681.70 | — | 22.29 | 25.91 | 46.59 | 62.92 | 64.77 | 38.25 | 46.00 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 39.4% | 39.4% | -129.3% | 100.0% | 69.4% | 90.2% | 100.0% | 69.5% | 71.9% | 71.8% | 71.3% |
| Operating Margin | 3.1% | 3.1% | -94.1% | 277.1% | 17.2% | 73.1% | — | 23.1% | 20.1% | 23.9% | 27.2% |
| Net Profit Margin | 2.9% | 2.9% | -194.5% | 279.2% | -6.9% | 55.2% | 99.9% | 39.1% | 6.8% | 26.1% | 22.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 0.5% | 0.5% | -32.9% | -7.3% | -2.0% | 8.2% | 4.2% | 10.9% | 2.1% | 7.8% | 6.6% |
| ROA | 0.1% | 0.1% | -7.9% | -2.9% | -0.8% | 2.5% | 1.6% | 4.8% | 0.9% | 3.4% | 2.8% |
| ROIC | 0.1% | 0.1% | -3.7% | -2.5% | 1.9% | 3.2% | — | 2.4% | 2.2% | 2.5% | 2.7% |
| ROCE | 0.2% | 0.2% | -5.7% | -3.3% | 2.4% | 4.6% | — | 2.9% | 2.7% | 3.2% | 3.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.93 | 2.00 | 0.93 | 1.36 | 2.20 | 1.12 | 1.16 | 1.13 | 1.15 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 483.59 | 483.59 | — | — | 23.92 | 5.32 | — | 7.13 | 6.91 | 6.46 | 6.28 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 2.28 | 2.67 | 1.83 | 0.92 | 1.19 | 1.99 | 0.99 | 1.11 | 1.12 | 1.14 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 431.88 | 431.88 | — | — | 23.78 | 4.65 | — | 6.30 | 6.61 | 6.41 | 6.26 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | 2270.04 | — | 13.21 | 9.18 | 25.63 | 24.70 | 31.67 | 18.15 | 22.61 |
| Interest Coverage | 0.04 | 0.04 | -1.02 | -0.01 | 3.41 | 1.50 | -0.01 | 3.34 | 1.42 | 2.58 | 2.43 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.22 | 1.22 | 1.38 | 0.49 | 0.46 | 0.19 | 2.84 | 1.86 | 0.90 | 0.51 | 0.50 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.22 | 1.22 | 1.38 | 0.49 | 0.46 | 0.19 | 2.84 | 1.89 | 0.94 | 0.57 | 0.56 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.49 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 1.47 | 0.54 | 0.11 | 0.05 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.05 | 0.05 | -0.01 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.13 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 13.1% | 8.8% | 9.6% | 16.0% | 8.2% | 2.7% | 5.1% | 6.1% | 8.2% | 7.2% | 7.2% |
| Payout Ratio | 749.0% | 749.0% | — | — | — | 69.2% | 150.6% | 86.4% | 447.5% | 113.8% | 127.5% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 5.7% | — | 7.0% | 1.8% | 5.6% | 5.0% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | 0.2% | — | 11.0% | 6.0% | 4.8% | 2.6% | 3.0% | 5.0% | 4.3% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 13.1% | 8.8% | 9.6% | 16.0% | 8.4% | 2.8% | 5.3% | 6.1% | 8.4% | 7.2% | 7.2% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $8M | $7M | $4M | $14M | $14M | $13M | $15M | $13M | $13M | $13M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RPT stock.
Rithm Property Trust Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -30.9x. The historical average is 25.0x.
Rithm Property Trust Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 488.3x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 19.6x.
Rithm Property Trust Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 0.5%. The historical average is 2.6%.
Based on historical data, Rithm Property Trust Inc. is trading at a P/E of -30.9x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Rithm Property Trust Inc.'s current dividend yield is 13.09% with a payout ratio of 749.0%.
Rithm Property Trust Inc. has 39.4% gross margin and 3.1% operating margin.
Rithm Property Trust Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 483.6x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Merger-driven operational dissolution
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Valuation Distorted by Merger Activity
As reported in recent financial filings, RPT's P/FFO multiples remained highly erratic, peaking at 69.26 in 2023Q4 before settling into a range that reflects the company's final independent quarters, ultimately rendering traditional valuation metrics largely irrelevant due to the impending acquisition by Kimco Realty.
The extreme volatility in P/FFO multiples suggests that the market struggled to price the company's underlying assets as the merger process unfolded. Investors should note that these valuation figures do not represent a going-concern assessment but rather a reflection of the company's transition toward integration into a larger portfolio.
NOI Margin Volatility Signals Instability
Based on quarterly financial data, RPT's NOI margins exhibited extreme instability, swinging from a negative 23.4% in 2025Q1 to a high of 89.5% in 2025Q2, which suggests that the company's property-level profitability was severely compromised by the operational disruptions associated with its final independent phase.
Such wide fluctuations in NOI margins indicate that the company's core retail operations were unable to maintain consistent cost control or revenue stability. This lack of predictability in property-level performance appears to have been a primary driver behind the strategic decision to merge with a more stable operator.
Unsustainable Payouts Amidst Cash Burn
According to historical financial statements, RPT maintained dividend yields as high as 18.9% in 2024Q1 despite persistent negative FFO, indicating that distributions were likely funded through external capital or asset liquidations rather than sustainable cash flow generated from the company's retail shopping center portfolio.
The absence of a consistent FFO payout ratio underscores the precarious nature of the dividend policy during the company's final independent quarters. Investors should interpret these high yields as a sign of financial distress rather than a reflection of operational success or income-generating capacity.
Elevated Leverage During Asset Contraction
As evidenced by reported figures, RPT's debt-to-equity ratio reached a peak of 2.93 in 2024Q4, illustrating that the company maintained a highly leveraged capital structure even as its total asset base eroded, which suggests significant financial strain during the final stages of its independent operation.
The combination of rising leverage and a shrinking asset base indicates that the company's balance sheet was under extreme pressure. This trend warrants investigation into the sustainability of the debt load, which likely necessitated the strategic exit via merger to avoid further balance sheet deterioration.
Misapplication of Standard P/E Multiples
The most commonly misapplied metric for RPT is the standard P/E ratio, which, as shown in recent filings, produced a misleading negative 38.81 TTM, failing to account for the massive non-cash depreciation charges inherent in retail real estate that obscure the company's true economic earning power.
Using P/E for a REIT like RPT is fundamentally flawed because it treats depreciation as a cash expense, thereby masking the actual cash-generating capacity of the properties. Analysts should instead focus on FFO or AFFO to properly evaluate the company's performance, though even these metrics were severely distorted by the merger process.