Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio N/A · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE N/A. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | — | $285M | $736M | $910M | $1.2B | $919M | $1.1B | $652M | $372M | $254M | $148M |
| Enterprise Value | — | $255M | $727M | $854M | $1.2B | $883M | $1.1B | $641M | $363M | $248M | $140M |
| P/E Ratio → | — | — | 73.98 | 90.80 | 100.08 | 94.26 | 119.16 | 75.23 | 41.70 | 43.94 | 29.72 |
| P/S Ratio | — | 3.60 | 10.51 | 15.28 | 23.11 | 19.78 | 26.56 | 19.19 | 12.55 | 10.52 | 7.43 |
| P/B Ratio | — | 2.28 | 4.03 | 5.35 | 6.99 | 5.54 | 7.08 | 17.30 | 11.67 | 9.84 | 6.53 |
| P/FCF | — | 16.36 | 57.70 | 51.78 | 89.45 | 62.82 | 132.64 | 67.34 | 53.52 | 47.76 | 35.49 |
| P/OCF | — | 15.71 | 55.25 | 41.66 | 69.61 | 47.85 | 101.22 | 56.03 | 40.10 | 36.93 | 27.39 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 3.22 | 10.38 | 14.34 | 22.18 | 19.01 | 25.40 | 18.86 | 12.24 | 10.26 | 7.03 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | 61.60 | 67.98 | 64.69 | 59.50 | 72.51 | 47.81 | 27.88 | 23.83 | 15.31 |
| EV / EBIT | — | 39.22 | 58.55 | 92.59 | 79.11 | 79.52 | 92.76 | 60.69 | 35.25 | 29.93 | 19.39 |
| EV / FCF | — | 14.62 | 56.97 | 48.58 | 85.84 | 60.38 | 126.84 | 66.16 | 52.16 | 46.59 | 33.57 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | 58.4% | 61.6% | 80.5% | 79.9% | 77.2% | 74.4% | 73.4% | 73.1% | 73.9% | 77.0% |
| Operating Margin | — | -89.3% | 8.8% | 14.6% | 27.7% | 24.2% | 27.9% | 31.3% | 34.7% | 34.2% | 36.2% |
| Net Profit Margin | — | -81.7% | 14.2% | 16.7% | 23.2% | 21.1% | 22.4% | 25.3% | 30.1% | 24.0% | 24.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | -42.1% | 5.6% | 5.7% | 7.3% | 6.1% | 9.6% | 24.7% | 31.0% | 23.8% | 23.4% |
| ROA | — | -38.1% | 5.0% | 5.2% | 6.7% | 5.6% | 8.6% | 19.0% | 21.6% | 17.5% | 17.9% |
| ROIC | — | -39.6% | 3.2% | 5.4% | 8.7% | 7.1% | 13.0% | 32.8% | 36.7% | 36.2% | 42.2% |
| ROCE | — | -44.1% | 3.3% | 4.8% | 8.5% | 6.7% | 11.3% | 26.4% | 27.2% | 26.6% | 29.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.06 | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.24 | -0.05 | -0.33 | -0.28 | -0.22 | -0.31 | -0.30 | -0.29 | -0.24 | -0.35 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | -0.79 | -4.48 | -2.71 | -2.41 | -3.31 | -0.85 | -0.72 | -0.60 | -0.88 |
| Debt / FCF | — | -1.74 | -0.73 | -3.20 | -3.60 | -2.44 | -5.80 | -1.18 | -1.35 | -1.17 | -1.92 |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | 504.86 | — | — | — | 216.78 | — |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | — | 7.67 | 3.26 | 10.88 | 18.98 | 12.04 | 23.45 | 4.42 | 3.69 | 6.20 | 6.08 |
| Quick Ratio | — | 7.67 | 3.26 | 10.81 | 18.80 | 11.95 | 23.28 | 4.26 | 3.63 | 5.98 | 5.71 |
| Cash Ratio | — | 4.81 | 1.68 | 9.63 | 16.58 | 10.68 | 21.08 | 2.39 | 1.95 | 3.04 | 3.78 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.60 | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.74 | 0.67 | 0.63 | 0.72 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | 14.47 | 7.78 | 10.47 | 10.98 | 11.80 | 25.57 | 13.64 | 5.87 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 67.38 | 47.63 | 62.50 | 93.35 | 102.52 | 92.28 | 88.75 | 92.28 | 83.62 | 67.69 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 1.1% | 1.4% | 2.3% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | 48.2% | 48.3% | 38.8% | 49.2% | 45.5% | 48.9% | 46.6% | 59.6% | 69.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 1.4% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 1.1% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 2.4% | 2.3% | 3.4% |
| FCF Yield | — | 6.1% | 1.7% | 1.9% | 1.1% | 1.6% | 0.8% | 1.5% | 1.9% | 2.1% | 2.8% |
| Buyback Yield | — | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | — | 0.0% | 0.7% | 2.7% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 1.1% | 1.4% | 2.3% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $20M | $20M | $20M | $21M | $21M | $19M | $18M | $18M | $18M | $17M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
Live VCP patterns, Cup & Handle overlays, support/resistance, and AI trade plans.
High-probability breakout stocks crossing their pivot across 5 pattern engines.
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SLP stock.
Based on historical data, Simulations Plus, Inc. is trading at valuation metrics that vary. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Goodwill impairment and project-mix volatility
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Multiples Price Modest Growth, Not Recovery
SLP trades at a forward P/E of 21.26 and P/FCF of 21.49, per the supplied valuation snapshot, but the trailing P/E of -5.75 is an artifact of the 2025Q3 goodwill impairment, making trailing multiples unusable as valuation anchors.
Against Veeva's 50.24 trailing P/E and 36.06 EV/EBITDA, SLP's forward 12.05x EV/EBITDA appears to price a mid-teens earnings profile rather than premium growth, which seems reasonable given that revenue growth has decelerated to 7.5% year over year from the 22-30% pace of mid-2025. The 4.73x P/S multiple is harder to justify on fundamentals alone: with net margin at 16.3% in 2026Q3, revenue multiples must be supported by durable margin expansion, yet gross margin has swung between 36.6% and 72.2% over ten quarters, so investors should not assume the current multiple reflects structural quality. The 2.98x price-to-book deserves special caution since retained earnings remain negative after the impairment, meaning book value is a depressed, non-economic denominator that inflates the apparent premium.
Margins Recover on Overhead, Not Pricing
As reported in recent quarterly statements, SLP's operating margin rebounded to 20.6% in 2026Q3 from 3.9% in 2026Q1, but this appears driven by overhead discipline, with SG&A falling to $7.2M while revenue grew 7.5% year over year.
The most reliable measure of earning power here is probably not the reported operating margin but the mid-cycle gross margin, which returned to 69.1% in 2026Q3 after a 36.6% trough in 2024Q4, suggesting the true earnings anchor sits somewhere between those extremes rather than at the current print. Net margin of 16.3% also overstates economics when compared against peer Certara at -0.4% and Veeva at 28.4%, positioning SLP as a mid-tier earner whose profitability depends heavily on which projects fall into a given quarter. One adjustment worth monitoring is stock-based compensation, which consumed roughly 47% of net income in 2026Q3, implying that cash-based operating profitability is materially thinner than the net margin headline suggests.
Returns on Capital Remain Impairment-Choked
Based on the supplied ratio history, SLP's ROIC has printed between 0.1% and 4.1% over the last five quarters versus a -40.2% collapse in 2025Q3, indicating returns on invested capital have barely recovered from the goodwill write-down.
With ROE at just 2.6% in 2026Q3 versus Veeva's 14.0%, SLP appears to be generating far less value per unit of capital than the market's 21x forward earnings multiple implies. The low ROIC reflects both depressed profitability in the post-impairment base and an asset base still dominated by goodwill, which does not contribute economically to returns unless the acquired businesses earn adequate spreads on capital. Investors should treat any recovery toward mid-single-digit or better ROIC as confirmation that the 2024Q4 acquisition is finally earning its cost of capital; continued sub-5% returns would suggest capital is being held below the company's own hurdle.
Debt-Free Structure Removes Refinancing Risk
As disclosed in SLP's balance sheets, total debt stood at just $487K against a debt-to-equity ratio near zero in 2026Q3, leaving the company effectively unlevered with interest coverage data unavailable given the immaterial interest burden.
The zero-debt capital structure means leverage is not a live risk factor for SLP, and the 5.54x current ratio, backed by $35.3M of cash, provides a substantial buffer even in scenarios where revenue growth continues to decelerate. The trade-off is that the balance sheet offers no financial leverage to amplify equity returns, which partly explains why ROE of 2.6% trails peers' more leveraged capital structures despite similar asset intensity. Analysts should note that with debt at immaterial levels, the debt-to-equity and debt/EBITDA ratios carry little analytical signal for this business; the relevant capital-allocation question is whether the $35.3M cash pile will be deployed toward accretive acquisitions that repair the impaired goodwill balance rather than held idle.
Receivable Timing Swings Mask Working Capital
According to the reported ratio data, SLP's DSO ranged from 53 to 77 days over ten quarters, while DIO and CCC are unavailable for most periods, meaning the cash conversion cycle cannot be reliably reconstructed and receivable timing appears to dominate cash volatility.
The wide DSO band suggests collection timing on large pharma contracts, rather than operational inefficiency, is the primary driver of quarter-to-quarter cash swings, consistent with working capital changes having moved from -$5.4M to +$2.4M over the observed window. Asset turnover of just 0.09-0.17 on a quarterly basis reflects an intangible-heavy asset base rather than poor operating intensity, since capital expenditure is only 0.4% of revenue, confirming an asset-light model where the real constraint is revenue conversion, not asset utilization. Investors should be wary of inferring working-capital leverage from DPO, which has been inconsistently reported; the available data does not support conclusions about supplier payment terms or customer leverage.
Trailing P/E Misleads Post-Impairment
The trailing P/E of -5.75 for SLP is meaningless as a valuation metric because it incorporates the 2025Q3 goodwill impairment, a non-recurring write-down that collapsed reported earnings and equity base simultaneously, per the company's recent SEC filings.
This is the single most commonly misapplied ratio for SLP's business model, since pharma software and simulation companies carry large acquisition-generated goodwill that can produce massive one-time impairments without any change in underlying software economics, making the trailing multiple read as either unprofitable or absurdly cheap depending on which quarter is examined. The proper analytical approach is to anchor on forward P/E of 21.26, forward EV/EBITDA of 12.05, and P/FCF of 21.49, which normalize for the impairment and capture SLP's genuinely profitable, cash-generative operations. Even these adjusted metrics warrant scrutiny, however, because the 36.6%-72.2% gross margin range implies that normalization is itself an assumption; a more conservative reference point would be free cash flow margin in the 20-30% mid-cycle range rather than the 50.5% printed in 2026Q3.