Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 8.7x · EV/EBITDA 7.3x · ROE 18.0%. (2018–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $3.1B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $3.7B | $2.0B | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $4.6B | $5.3B | $5.3B | $6.2B | $6.3B | $5.1B | $3.7B | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 8.72 | 9.93 | 9.13 | 9.36 | 7.80 | 5.46 | 6.34 | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.51 | 0.62 | 0.64 | 0.79 | 0.77 | 0.54 | 0.34 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 1.51 | 1.72 | 1.91 | 2.49 | 3.01 | 2.50 | 1.76 | — | — |
| P/FCF | 13.81 | 16.85 | 11.63 | 14.84 | 11.06 | 6.14 | 2.02 | — | — |
| P/OCF | 7.06 | 8.61 | 7.24 | 9.07 | 8.88 | 5.45 | 1.94 | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.88 | 0.90 | 1.01 | 0.99 | 0.75 | 0.65 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 7.29 | 8.35 | 8.10 | 7.87 | 6.64 | 5.07 | 6.81 | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | 9.04 | 10.16 | 9.25 | 8.75 | 7.32 | 5.65 | 8.85 | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 23.88 | 16.19 | 18.96 | 14.29 | 8.56 | 3.79 | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 34.8% | 34.8% | 33.9% | 34.3% | 34.6% | 34.7% | 30.5% | 29.6% | 28.6% |
| Operating Margin | 8.5% | 8.5% | 9.1% | 11.0% | 13.2% | 13.4% | 7.4% | 3.7% | 2.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | 6.2% | 6.2% | 7.1% | 8.4% | 9.8% | 9.9% | 5.4% | 2.5% | 0.4% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 18.0% | 18.0% | 21.1% | 29.0% | 40.6% | 52.1% | 55.9% | 62849.7% | 253.8% |
| ROA | 7.4% | 7.4% | 8.7% | 11.2% | 13.7% | 15.0% | 7.1% | 3.2% | 0.7% |
| ROIC | 10.6% | 10.6% | 11.9% | 16.0% | 21.3% | 23.7% | 11.8% | 6.6% | 6.2% |
| ROCE | 12.5% | 12.5% | 13.9% | 18.4% | 24.1% | 27.2% | 12.4% | 5.8% | 5.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 1.09 | 1.32 | 1.89 | — | 192.36 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 2.98 | 2.98 | 2.72 | 2.15 | 1.86 | 1.92 | 3.88 | 8.92 | 6.18 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.72 | 0.75 | 0.69 | 0.88 | 0.98 | 1.55 | — | 183.40 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 2.46 | 2.46 | 2.28 | 1.71 | 1.50 | 1.43 | 3.18 | 8.42 | 5.89 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 7.03 | 4.56 | 4.12 | 3.23 | 2.42 | 1.77 | 12.60 | 17.11 |
| Interest Coverage | 14.42 | 14.42 | 15.60 | 15.40 | 18.62 | 18.48 | 4.80 | 2.22 | 1.21 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.89 | 1.89 | 1.78 | 1.87 | 1.62 | 1.52 | 1.21 | 1.72 | 1.85 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.51 | 0.39 | 0.48 | 0.36 | 0.25 | 0.19 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.32 | 0.43 | 0.32 | 0.20 | 0.11 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.15 | 1.21 | 1.32 | 1.39 | 1.48 | 1.30 | 1.12 | 1.48 |
| Inventory Turnover | 2.63 | 2.63 | 3.00 | 3.39 | 3.26 | 3.77 | 4.00 | 3.09 | 3.01 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 2.10 | 1.03 | 1.15 | 0.94 | 1.06 | 1.11 | 1.06 | 1.20 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.1% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.5% | — | 13.1% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | 9.2% | 9.2% | 7.5% | 5.2% | 3.9% | — | 83.2% | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 11.5% | 10.1% | 11.0% | 10.7% | 12.8% | 18.3% | 15.8% | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 7.2% | 5.9% | 8.6% | 6.7% | 9.0% | 16.3% | 49.5% | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 6.5% | 5.3% | 9.5% | 4.2% | 10.0% | 11.2% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 7.5% | 6.2% | 10.4% | 4.7% | 10.5% | 11.2% | 13.1% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $68M | $73M | $77M | $84M | $94M | $91M | $90M | $79M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 8 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying ASO stock.
Academy Sports and Outdoors, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 8.7x. The historical average is 8.0x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Academy Sports and Outdoors, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 7.3x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 7.1x.
Academy Sports and Outdoors, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 18.0%. The historical average is 67.2%.
Based on historical data, Academy Sports and Outdoors, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 8.7x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Academy Sports and Outdoors, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 1.05% with a payout ratio of 9.2%.
Academy Sports and Outdoors, Inc. has 34.8% gross margin and 8.5% operating margin.
Academy Sports and Outdoors, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 3.0x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Depressed Consumer Spending
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Compelling Value with Growth Priced In
Academy Sports' forward P/E of 9.42 and PEG ratio of 0.97 suggest the market is pricing in modest growth, while its EV/EBITDA of 8.00 represents a significant discount to Dick's Sporting Goods' 9.86 multiple, indicating potential value mispricing.
ASO's valuation metrics appear deeply discounted to its primary peer DKS, trading at a ~33% discount on forward P/E and ~19% on EV/EBITDA, which may reflect its regional footprint versus DKS's national scale. However, the sub-1.0 PEG ratio implies the market is not fully valuing ASO's earnings growth trajectory, particularly given its recent guidance raise and margin expansion. This discrepancy could represent an opportunity if investors re-evaluate ASO's distinct category moat in hunting and fishing, which is not exposed to the same competitive pressures as traditional sporting goods.
Private Label Drives Margin Expansion
Academy Sports' trailing twelve-month gross margin appears structurally elevated near 40.4%, a significant improvement from the 31-32% range seen in early 2024, suggesting that private label penetration is delivering durable margin uplift.
The sequential expansion of gross margin from 31.3% in 2024Q1 to 40.4% in 2026Q2 is a dramatic shift that likely reflects a combination of successful private label brand growth, strategic pricing, and potentially a favorable sales mix shift. This level of margin durability suggests ASO is successfully capturing value from its 'destination' categories, where price sensitivity may be lower. However, investors should monitor whether this margin level is sustainable if consumer trade-down intensifies, as it could force increased promotional activity in these high-margin private label goods.
ROIC Improving, But Gap to Peers Remains
Academy Sports' ROIC of 5.2% in 2026Q2, while improving from a trough of 1.5% in 2025Q1, remains materially below peer Dick's Sporting Goods' 11.1% ROIC, suggesting capital efficiency still lags the sector leader.
The volatility in ASO's ROIC, which swings from 1.5% to over 5% within a few quarters, highlights the working capital-intensive and seasonal nature of the business. The recent uptick to 5.2% appears driven by margin expansion rather than asset turnover, as turnover has remained relatively flat. The persistent gap to DKS's double-digit ROIC suggests that ASO's regional model and category mix may generate structurally lower returns on invested capital, or that there is still significant room for operational improvement in inventory and asset management.
Inventory Intensity Drives Working Capital Needs
Based on reported financials, ASO's Days Inventory Outstanding of 154 days in 2026Q2 is exceptionally high, indicating a significant cash tied up in seasonal outdoor gear that is critical to its product mix but creates vulnerability to demand shifts.
The DIO of 154 days is a defining characteristic of ASO's model, reflecting the long lead times and seasonal nature of hunting, fishing, and firearms inventory. While this is necessary to maintain its 'destination' status, it creates substantial execution risk if consumer preferences change or a season is warmer than expected. The company appears to manage this by extending payables (DPO of 73 days), resulting in a cash conversion cycle that is long but relatively stable, suggesting disciplined supplier negotiations despite the heavy inventory load.
The Hidden Risk in a 'Safe' Balance Sheet
The single most misapplied metric for Academy Sports is its extremely low debt-to-equity ratio of 0.90%, which masks the real risk of its capital-light model being disrupted by e-commerce, a transition its minimal leverage may leave it underprepared to fund.
Investors frequently cite ASO's near-zero leverage as a primary strength, but this framing obscures a more critical strategic risk. In specialty retail, a fortress balance sheet is only valuable if deployed effectively; ASO's conservative capital structure may indicate a lack of investment in the omnichannel and digital capabilities required to compete with national players and pure-play e-commerce. The relevant metric is not debt level, but rather the return on incremental capital deployed for growth initiatives, and whether the current pace of store expansion is sufficient to offset secular shifts in consumer purchasing behavior.