Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.0x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -91.5%. (2014–2024 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $17M | $14M | $7M | $24M | $100M | $233M | $273M | $368M | $481M | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $830M | $3.6B | $1.9B | $-818214942 | $-2736229780 | $-1401788806 | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.02 | — | — | — | — | 1.45 | 1.13 | 1.49 | 2.80 | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.21 | 0.36 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.34 | — | — |
| P/FCF | 0.22 | 0.17 | — | — | 0.19 | 0.68 | 0.38 | 0.84 | 1.25 | — | — |
| P/OCF | 0.96 | 0.11 | 0.30 | 0.53 | 0.14 | 0.47 | 0.32 | 0.66 | 1.00 | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.59 | 0.53 | 0.58 | 2.60 | 0.56 | -0.32 | -1.59 | -1.06 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 5.22 | -2.89 | -7.64 | -4.78 | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -10.05 | -6.52 | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 12.75 | — | — | 6.74 | 5.57 | -1.15 | -6.27 | -3.63 | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 28.7% | 28.7% | 28.1% | 33.2% | 15.8% | 36.3% | 38.1% | 36.6% | 35.2% | 29.2% | 12.1% |
| Operating Margin | -46.7% | -46.7% | -8.8% | -44.0% | -27.8% | 4.9% | 5.9% | 15.8% | 16.2% | 1.8% | -9.5% |
| Net Profit Margin | -56.8% | -56.8% | -18.6% | -49.3% | -3.8% | 4.8% | 9.4% | 14.4% | 13.0% | -3.5% | -5.4% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -91.5% | -91.5% | -19.8% | -27.2% | -1.8% | 5.2% | 7.9% | 11.1% | 21.8% | -59.3% | — |
| ROA | -26.0% | -26.0% | -7.8% | -10.1% | -0.5% | 1.7% | 3.9% | 6.7% | 8.8% | -3.1% | -4.0% |
| ROIC | -27.8% | -27.8% | -4.6% | -9.9% | -5.2% | 3.7% | 12.0% | — | — | — | — |
| ROCE | -31.7% | -31.7% | -5.3% | -14.9% | -6.6% | 2.7% | 3.7% | 12.0% | 25.1% | 14.9% | -254.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 2.49 | 2.49 | 1.05 | 0.61 | 1.56 | 1.62 | 0.70 | 0.02 | — | 0.04 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 13.86 | 7.62 | 0.14 | — | 0.07 | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.68 | 0.71 | 0.33 | 1.26 | 0.53 | -0.35 | -1.03 | -1.33 | -2.17 | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 4.58 | -3.85 | -8.67 | -6.43 | -3.87 | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | 12.58 | — | — | 6.56 | 4.89 | -1.54 | -7.11 | -4.88 | -1.31 | -585.41 |
| Interest Coverage | -623.91 | -623.91 | -25.33 | — | -2.30 | — | — | 9.97 | 43.86 | 8.52 | -39.04 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.63 | 0.75 | 0.91 | 1.27 | 1.49 | 2.00 | 1.62 | 0.57 | 0.52 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.62 | 0.75 | 0.91 | 1.26 | 1.48 | 1.99 | 1.62 | 0.56 | 0.52 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.29 | 0.43 | 0.21 | 0.92 | 1.38 | 1.94 | 1.57 | 0.38 | 0.22 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.58 | 0.46 | 0.26 | 0.16 | 0.31 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.49 | 0.84 | 0.68 |
| Inventory Turnover | 1078.98 | 1078.98 | 278.54 | 180.06 | 155.73 | 76.56 | 60.46 | 118.88 | 100.06 | 76.85 | 77.24 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 3.91 | 3.30 | 6.93 | 61.26 | 9.07 | 14.79 | 0.44 | 0.86 | 3.27 | 1.19 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | 92.4% | 79.0% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | 114.4% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 69.1% | 88.3% | 67.1% | 35.7% | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 100.0% | 574.3% | — | — | 539.4% | 146.5% | 260.2% | 118.7% | 80.2% | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 38.7% | 24.6% | 24.0% | 100.0% | 29.6% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 38.7% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 29.6% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $7M | $7M | $7M | $7M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $7M | $6M | $6M |
Asset impairment and insolvency
Based on recent financial data, BEDU's P/S ratio of 0.01 and P/B of 0.03 suggest that the market has largely abandoned expectations of future earnings, pricing the company as a distressed asset rather than a viable, long-term participant in the Chinese private education sector.
The extreme compression in valuation multiples indicates that investors are assigning negligible value to the company's remaining asset base. This pricing appears to reflect a market consensus that the firm's historical growth model is no longer sustainable, rendering traditional P/E or EV/EBITDA metrics effectively meaningless for assessing future potential.
According to reported quarterly figures, BEDU's ROIC has collapsed from positive territory to -33.6% in 2024Q4, illustrating a profound inability to generate returns on invested capital that exceeds the cost of maintaining its extensive and increasingly underutilized physical school infrastructure.
The sharp decline in ROIC suggests that the company's capital allocation strategy, particularly regarding international expansion, has failed to produce the expected synergies. This trend implies that the firm is currently destroying shareholder value with every dollar of capital deployed, necessitating a fundamental reassessment of its operational footprint.
As reported in recent filings, BEDU's Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) reached 192 days in 2025Q2, a significant increase from historical norms that suggests growing difficulty in collecting tuition payments from a customer base potentially impacted by broader economic instability in the Chinese real estate market.
The erratic nature of the cash conversion cycle, which swung from -129 days in 2024Q4 to 81 days in 2025Q2, highlights a lack of operational control over working capital. This volatility suggests that the company's ability to manage its supplier and customer relationships is being compromised by its shrinking scale.
Based on the latest balance sheet data, BEDU's debt-to-equity ratio has risen to 2.21, which, when combined with the company's negative operating margins, indicates that debt service capacity is becoming increasingly precarious and may require urgent restructuring to avoid a potential default scenario.
The rising leverage ratio in the context of a contracting asset base suggests that the company is becoming more reliant on external financing to cover its operational shortfalls. Investors should monitor the company's ability to refinance these obligations, as the lack of consistent interest coverage data warrants significant caution.
As indicated by the company's financial statements, the P/E ratio is a fundamentally flawed metric for BEDU, as it fails to account for the massive, non-recurring goodwill impairments that have historically distorted net income and masked the underlying cash-generating ability of the school network.
Analysts should prioritize cash-based metrics or asset-level valuation over earnings-based multiples, which are currently rendered useless by the company's volatile accounting adjustments. Relying on P/E ratios in this context risks ignoring the severe liquidity risks and the potential for further asset write-downs that could impact the firm's solvency.
Includes 30+ ratios · 11 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying BEDU stock.
Bright Scholar Education Holdings Limited's current P/E ratio is -0.0x. The historical average is 1.7x.
Bright Scholar Education Holdings Limited's return on equity (ROE) is -91.5%. The historical average is -17.1%.
Based on historical data, Bright Scholar Education Holdings Limited is trading at a P/E of -0.0x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Bright Scholar Education Holdings Limited has 28.7% gross margin and -46.7% operating margin.