Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 61.0x · EV/EBITDA 20.6x · ROE 9.6%. (2019–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $4.9B | $7.7B | $6.0B | $2.0B | $1.5B | $2.3B | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $5.7B | $8.5B | $6.7B | $2.5B | $2.1B | $2.5B | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 61.00 | 97.17 | 168.97 | 1143.32 | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 2.98 | 4.70 | 4.69 | 2.04 | 1.98 | 4.69 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 5.38 | 8.58 | 7.87 | 2.91 | 5.80 | 10.92 | — | — |
| P/FCF | 89.64 | 141.50 | 243.40 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 16.50 | 26.05 | 24.39 | 14.05 | 24.42 | 29.05 | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 5.20 | 5.20 | 2.60 | 2.80 | 4.96 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 20.62 | 30.83 | 33.45 | 21.75 | 49.09 | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | 35.34 | 51.97 | 59.52 | 50.95 | 1515.75 | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 156.57 | 269.71 | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 25.9% | 25.9% | 26.6% | 26.0% | 24.5% | 30.8% | 35.4% | 40.3% |
| Operating Margin | 9.8% | 9.8% | 8.3% | 4.8% | -0.4% | -22.3% | 3.4% | 12.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | 4.9% | 4.9% | 2.8% | 0.2% | -0.6% | -2.5% | 1.7% | 11.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 9.6% | 9.6% | 4.9% | 0.4% | -2.0% | -8.8% | 7.4% | 36.4% |
| ROA | 2.9% | 2.9% | 1.7% | 0.1% | -0.5% | -3.1% | 2.7% | 16.9% |
| ROIC | 7.7% | 7.7% | 6.0% | 3.3% | -0.3% | -34.4% | 6.6% | 20.6% |
| ROCE | 6.4% | 6.4% | 5.4% | 3.6% | -0.4% | -36.2% | 6.6% | 22.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.21 | 1.21 | 1.23 | 1.00 | 2.48 | 0.71 | 1.25 | 0.61 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.94 | 3.94 | 4.74 | 5.87 | 14.85 | — | 3.58 | 1.20 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 2.40 | 0.62 | 0.84 | 0.41 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 2.97 | 2.97 | 3.26 | 4.71 | 14.37 | — | 2.39 | 0.81 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 15.06 | 26.30 | — | — | — | 4.89 | 1.88 |
| Interest Coverage | 5.79 | 5.79 | 4.14 | 1.52 | 0.08 | -15.86 | 2.85 | 13.14 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.49 | 1.49 | 1.76 | 1.49 | 0.39 | 0.44 | 1.05 | 1.12 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.28 | 1.28 | 1.58 | 1.15 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.79 | 0.79 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.12 | 1.12 | 1.44 | 0.97 | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.53 | 0.47 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.54 | 0.51 | 0.55 | 0.62 | 0.90 | 1.26 | 1.42 |
| Inventory Turnover | 24.82 | 24.82 | 25.79 | 15.22 | 14.23 | 14.76 | 13.57 | 13.04 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 4.10 | 3.02 | 3.45 | 5.91 | 7.80 | 12.08 | 10.14 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 9.1% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | 135.4% | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 1.6% | 1.0% | 0.6% | 0.1% | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 1.1% | 0.7% | 0.4% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 12.3% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 21.5% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $126M | $115M | $62M | $52M | $46M | $47M | $47M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 7 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying BROS stock.
Dutch Bros Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 61.0x. The historical average is 133.1x.
Dutch Bros Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 20.6x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 33.8x.
Dutch Bros Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 9.6%. The historical average is 6.8%.
Based on historical data, Dutch Bros Inc. is trading at a P/E of 61.0x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Dutch Bros Inc. has 25.9% gross margin and 9.8% operating margin.
Dutch Bros Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 3.9x, indicating high leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Cannibalization and wage inflation
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Margin Recovery Amid Cost Pressures
Operating margin rebounded to 12.8% in 2026Q2 from a trough of 4.6% in 2024Q4, according to quarterly financials, yet gross margin at 27.4% remains below the 28.9% peak, signaling ongoing input cost and wage headwinds.
The sequential margin expansion from 7.7% to 12.8% in 2026Q2 suggests operating leverage is emerging as revenue scales, but the gross margin volatility—dipping to 22.8% in 2026Q1—indicates that cost pressures, particularly from California's AB 1228 wage hike and dairy/energy input costs, are not fully abating. Net margin of 6.8% in 2026Q2, while improved, remains thin relative to the company's growth ambitions, implying that profitability is still sensitive to pre-opening expenses and commodity swings. Investors should monitor whether the gross margin can stabilize above 28% as the company matures its shop base.
Capital Returns Still in Early Innings
ROIC improved to 2.8% in 2026Q2 from 0.8% in 2024Q4, per reported figures, but remains far below the cost of capital, reflecting the heavy investment phase in company-operated shops.
The doubling of ROIC from 1.5% in 2026Q1 to 2.8% in 2026Q2 is encouraging, yet the absolute level is low, indicating that the massive PPE build-out ($1.9B in net PPE) has yet to generate meaningful returns. ROE at 3.9% and ROA at 1.2% similarly underscore that the company is in a capital-intensive expansion phase, where returns are diluted by new store openings. The trend suggests that if same-store sales and AUV growth persist, returns could compound, but the current data does not yet demonstrate a proven ability to earn above the cost of capital.
Working Capital Efficiency Tightens
Cash conversion cycle improved to 2 days in 2026Q2 from 9 days in 2024Q1, as DSO and DIO compressed, according to the ratio data, indicating better working capital management despite rapid expansion.
The reduction in DSO from 3 days to 3 days (stable) and DIO from 21 to 9 days reflects a more efficient inventory turnover, likely due to a streamlined supply chain and a focus on high-velocity cold beverages. DPO has remained stable around 10 days, suggesting the company is not stretching supplier payments, which is typical for a growth-stage restaurant chain. The near-zero CCC is a positive sign, but it also implies limited float to fund operations, making the company more reliant on operating cash flow and external capital to finance its aggressive shop-opening cadence.
Leverage Creeps Higher with Expansion
Debt-to-equity rose to 1.26 in 2026Q2 from 1.24 in 2024Q1, while interest coverage improved to 9.88 from 2.11 in 2024Q4, per balance sheet data, indicating a manageable but growing debt burden.
The increase in total debt to $1.2B is funding the company-operated shop expansion, and while interest coverage has improved significantly from the 2024Q4 trough, the D/EBITDA ratio of 11.4x in 2026Q2 remains elevated, suggesting that EBITDA is still thin relative to debt. The reliance on external funding, as noted in the cash flow analysis, implies that the balance sheet is not yet self-funding, and any slowdown in growth or margin deterioration could strain debt service. Investors should monitor whether the company can transition to internal cash flow generation without further dilutive equity raises or excessive leverage.
Liquidity Buffer Thins as Expansion Accelerates
Current ratio declined to 1.35 in 2026Q2 from 2.29 in 2024Q1, with quick ratio at 1.19, based on reported figures, indicating a thinner cushion against short-term obligations.
The steady decline in liquidity ratios reflects the conversion of cash into PPE and the growth of current liabilities, likely from construction payables and accrued expenses. While a current ratio above 1.0 is adequate, the trend is concerning if the pace of expansion continues, as the company may need to rely on credit lines or additional debt to cover short-term obligations. The quick ratio of 1.19 suggests that inventory is not a major liquidity concern, but the overall buffer is shrinking, warranting close monitoring of cash flow generation.
Misapplied EV/EBITDA Multiple
The forward EV/EBITDA of 7.70 appears optically cheap, but this metric is misleading for a company with heavy pre-opening expenses and stock-based compensation, as reported in the financials.
Analysts often apply a restaurant-sector EV/EBITDA multiple to Dutch Bros, but the company's EBITDA is depressed by pre-opening costs and SBC, which are non-cash or non-recurring in nature. The trailing EV/EBITDA of 26.40 is more reflective of the current earnings power, while the forward multiple assumes a significant margin expansion that may not materialize if wage inflation and cannibalization persist. A more appropriate metric would be EV/Sales or a multiple on adjusted EBITDA that adds back pre-opening expenses and SBC, to better capture the underlying cash generation of the established shop base.