Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.4x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -59.8%. (2017–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $103M | $324M | $557M | $397M | $354M | $884M | $927M | $876M | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $77M | $298M | $555M | $302M | $-327073490 | $-1768750348 | $62.2B | $13.8B | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.39 | — | — | — | 5.02 | 0.45 | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.34 | 0.61 | 2.07 | 1.88 | 0.56 | 0.18 | 2.07 | 0.62 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.15 | 0.74 | 2.09 | 1.14 | 0.08 | 0.26 | 2.14 | 1.26 | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 0.71 | 2.80 | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | 0.69 | 2.69 | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.56 | 2.06 | 1.43 | -0.52 | -0.36 | 139.01 | 9.69 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | -4.25 | -0.98 | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | -3.70 | -0.98 | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | -1.42 | 188.06 | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 7.8% | 7.8% | -31.3% | -113.9% | 35.3% | 57.2% | 8.4% | -36.3% | 18.8% | 46.2% |
| Operating Margin | -21.2% | -21.2% | -84.3% | -194.3% | 7.0% | 36.6% | -53.6% | -74.0% | 4.9% | 27.4% |
| Net Profit Margin | -39.7% | -39.7% | -92.7% | -195.8% | 11.1% | 40.0% | -45.4% | -72.7% | 4.5% | 28.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -59.8% | -59.8% | -81.3% | -18.1% | 1.8% | 100.9% | -36.1% | -221.6% | 22.3% | 43.8% |
| ROA | -39.5% | -39.5% | -52.2% | -15.7% | 1.4% | 58.9% | -20.1% | -86.4% | 9.4% | 31.2% |
| ROIC | -24.9% | -24.9% | -65.7% | -16.2% | 1.5% | 219.5% | -2.6% | -10.8% | 11.7% | 39.5% |
| ROCE | -29.7% | -29.7% | -70.7% | -17.8% | 1.1% | 90.1% | -41.7% | -222.4% | 24.3% | 42.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 19.37 | 4.35 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 0.34 | 0.02 | — | — | 7.18 | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.06 | -0.01 | -0.27 | -0.16 | -0.77 | 141.72 | 18.63 | 3.28 | -0.21 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | -8.84 | -1.46 | — | — | 5.41 | -0.48 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | -2.12 | 185.25 | — | — | -2.25 |
| Interest Coverage | -52.58 | -52.58 | -329.65 | — | — | — | -70.78 | -50.63 | 32.76 | — |
Net cash position: cash ($81M) exceeds total debt ($55M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.31 | 3.31 | 1.87 | 2.69 | 7.38 | 2.53 | 1.70 | 3.30 | 1.18 | 3.37 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.93 | 1.93 | 1.34 | 1.64 | 4.57 | 2.14 | 1.32 | 2.61 | 0.67 | 2.63 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.62 | 0.62 | 0.54 | 0.71 | 1.35 | 1.29 | 0.21 | 1.85 | 0.22 | 0.76 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.88 | 0.58 | 0.43 | 0.13 | 0.87 | 0.43 | 1.43 | 1.93 | 1.09 |
| Inventory Turnover | 2.70 | 2.70 | 3.74 | 3.18 | 0.28 | 2.59 | 1.82 | 9.89 | 3.75 | 2.71 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 13.29 | 155.39 | 100.80 | 289.90 | 20.45 | 81.88 | 0.73 | 3.04 | 0.36 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 565.3% | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 19.9% | 221.4% | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 141.2% | 35.7% | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 11.7% | 26.7% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 11.7% | 26.7% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $469M | $271M | $172M | $172M | $172M | $156M | $144M | $132M | $131M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 9 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying CAN stock.
Canaan Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -0.4x. The historical average is 2.7x.
Canaan Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -59.8%. The historical average is -27.6%.
Based on historical data, Canaan Inc. is trading at a P/E of -0.4x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Canaan Inc. has 7.8% gross margin and -21.2% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Sustained gross margin losses
Gross Margins Never Turn Structurally Positive
According to the reported ratio data, Canaan's gross margin swung from -106.4% in 2024Q1 to a best of 11.0% in 2025Q3 before printing -92.1% in 2026Q2, leaving the company without a durable profitability base relative to peers like CLSK at 41.6%.
The gross margin series suggests cost of revenue has repeatedly exceeded revenue, indicating that pricing and unit economics have not stabilized across the ten quarters. Operating margin of -192.0% in 2026Q2 shows that losses are not solely a gross-level issue, since SG&A and R&D amplify the shortfall. Investors should monitor whether any quarter-over-quarter improvement reflects sustainable pricing power rather than the temporary volume effects that have characterized the revenue swings.
Returns Decaying Alongside Shrinking Asset Base
Based on the reported figures, Canaan's ROE moved from -10.4% in 2024Q1 to -29.0% in 2026Q2 and ROIC from -16.6% to -13.5%, indicating returns on invested capital remain deeply negative relative to CLSK's 10.3% ROIC.
Negative ROE and ROIC across all ten quarters suggest the capital base has not generated economic returns, and the deterioration in ROE largely reflects both losses and equity erosion. The reported contraction in total assets and PPE implies the denominator is shrinking, which can mechanically distort return ratios and should not be read as improving efficiency. Whether returns are decaying or simply reflecting a smaller base warrants further investigation.
Low Leverage Masks Equity Erosion Risk
As reported in the ratio data, Canaan's debt-to-equity ran from 0.01 in 2024Q2 to 0.94 in 2025Q1 before settling at 0.21 in 2026Q2, with interest coverage deeply negative at -124.36x, meaning earnings provide no debt service cushion.
Low current debt-to-equity levels appear manageable on the surface, but negative interest coverage across the period indicates that operating earnings do not cover financing costs. The volatility in leverage across quarters suggests the financing profile has shifted materially, and the shrinking equity base means the same debt level represents a rising share of capital. Investors should monitor refinancing terms, as the reported data does not provide sufficient detail to assess maturity profile or covenant headroom.
Current Ratio Strong but Cash Burn Persists
According to reported figures, Canaan's current ratio of 2.86 and quick ratio of 1.67 in 2026Q2 appear comfortable, yet cash of $66.0M against ongoing operating losses suggests liquidity may erode faster than the ratios imply.
The headline liquidity ratios look adequate, but they rest on balance sheet items that may not reflect the pace of operating cash outflows. The steep drop in deferred revenue from $86.9M to $4.1M removes a forward funding source, which could weaken liquidity further if it reflects lower customer prepayments. Under a severe stress scenario with continued operating losses, the current ratio would likely compress, and the analysis would require cash flow data that is largely unavailable in the supplied dataset.
Deep Discount Reflects Unresolved Earnings Risk
Based on current multiples, Canaan trades at 0.20x book value and 0.25x sales with negative earnings, a discount that appears to price in continued losses rather than a mispriced recovery.
The low price-to-book and price-to-sales multiples may look attractive against peers, but with book value eroding from $411.0M to $292.7M, the P/B discount partly reflects deteriorating asset backing. Negative P/E and absent EV/EBITDA make earnings-based valuation impossible, so the market appears to be anchoring on asset value and revenue rather than profit. Investors should monitor whether the discount narrows only if gross margins achieve sustained positive readings.
Peer Leverage Misreads Canaan's Ratio Profile
As reported in the peer data, Canaan's ROE of -29.0% and -125.8% net-margin-driven losses are not comparable to CLSK's positive 47.6% net margin, so simple peer ratio screens may understate structural divergence.
Comparing Canaan's ratios directly with peers can be misleading because the group mixes profitable miners with loss-making operators, making sector averages a weak benchmark. The most commonly misapplied metric here is price-to-book, since the asset base is shrinking and book value may overstate recoverable value. A more informative approach would pair P/B with cash-based measures such as free cash flow yield, though the supplied dataset largely lacks the cash flow data needed to make that adjustment reliably.