Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -7.3x · EV/EBITDA 10.9x · ROE -2.5%. (2003–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $769M | $1.6B | $744M | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $3.2B | $1.3B | $893M | $1.0B | $707M |
| Enterprise Value | $6.5B | $7.4B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $5.3B | $4.5B | $4.4B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $2.6B |
| P/E Ratio → | -7.32 | — | 20.59 | 6.78 | 8.98 | 21.43 | 21.53 | 7.78 | 3.76 | 9.98 | 10.87 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.14 | 0.29 | 0.12 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.41 | 0.92 | 0.42 | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.25 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.18 | 0.38 | 0.18 | 0.51 | 0.95 | 1.01 | 1.69 | 0.94 | 0.70 | 0.98 | 0.79 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | 7.62 | — | — | 4.35 | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | 2.77 | 2.40 | — | — | 2.24 | 4.13 | 5.09 | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.32 | 0.73 | 0.58 | 0.70 | 0.86 | 1.28 | 0.83 | 0.70 | 0.87 | 0.92 |
| EV / EBITDA | 10.93 | 12.32 | 9.34 | 5.83 | 8.76 | 9.60 | 10.16 | 6.05 | 5.33 | 8.04 | 13.92 |
| EV / EBIT | 151.46 | 196.88 | 79.80 | 8.48 | 12.22 | 23.11 | 21.55 | 10.14 | 6.51 | 11.74 | 16.71 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | 18.23 | — | — | 8.57 | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 18.3% | 18.3% | 16.7% | 16.8% | 16.9% | 17.2% | 19.8% | 22.4% | 20.7% | 18.8% | 14.6% |
| Operating Margin | 0.8% | 0.8% | -0.5% | 6.0% | 4.8% | 3.6% | 6.3% | 8.1% | 9.7% | 7.9% | 3.3% |
| Net Profit Margin | -1.9% | -1.9% | 0.6% | 3.6% | 3.2% | 1.8% | 4.2% | 5.4% | 6.3% | 2.9% | 2.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -2.5% | -2.5% | 0.9% | 9.1% | 10.8% | 4.7% | 8.8% | 12.7% | 20.3% | 10.2% | 7.5% |
| ROA | -0.7% | -0.7% | 0.3% | 2.6% | 2.9% | 1.4% | 2.4% | 3.3% | 4.4% | 1.8% | 1.3% |
| ROIC | 0.4% | 0.4% | -0.3% | 5.9% | 5.4% | 3.7% | 5.6% | 6.8% | 9.1% | 7.0% | 2.8% |
| ROCE | 0.5% | 0.5% | -0.4% | 9.2% | 10.0% | 6.0% | 8.3% | 12.0% | 19.6% | 15.5% | 5.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.80 | 1.80 | 1.42 | 1.21 | 1.75 | 1.53 | 1.53 | 1.75 | 1.72 | 2.35 | 2.71 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 12.84 | 12.84 | 12.54 | 5.89 | 6.73 | 6.89 | 6.61 | 5.71 | 4.42 | 6.75 | 12.88 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.35 | 0.88 | 0.68 | 1.33 | 1.12 | 0.66 | 0.92 | 1.37 | 1.82 | 2.14 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 9.64 | 9.64 | 7.76 | 3.34 | 5.10 | 5.05 | 2.87 | 2.98 | 3.52 | 5.23 | 10.17 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | 10.61 | — | — | 4.22 | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.40 | 4.58 | 5.80 | 3.38 | 2.87 | 3.21 | 3.82 | 2.14 | 2.26 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 1.04 | 1.07 | 1.18 | 0.96 | 0.86 | 1.04 | 0.99 | 1.02 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.76 | 0.84 | 0.78 | 0.89 | 0.71 | 0.66 | 0.95 | 0.91 | 0.94 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.40 | 0.33 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.46 | 0.39 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.37 | 0.44 | 0.64 | 0.83 | 0.71 | 0.53 | 0.59 | 0.77 | 0.58 | 0.53 |
| Inventory Turnover | 3.38 | 3.38 | 4.14 | 5.37 | 4.07 | 3.66 | 3.17 | 4.12 | 11.33 | 7.95 | 8.25 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 86.67 | 90.63 | 57.99 | 60.41 | 61.39 | 57.29 | 67.54 | 60.65 | 51.67 | 61.21 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.9% | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.7% | 1.3% | 9.6% | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 4.9% | 14.8% | 11.1% | 4.7% | 4.6% | 12.9% | 26.6% | 10.0% | 9.2% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | 13.1% | — | — | 23.0% | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 9.1% | 4.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 9.1% | 4.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 1.0% | 0.3% | 0.9% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $67M | $67M | $72M | $71M | $69M | $62M | $61M | $62M | $62M | $58M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 23 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying CSIQ stock.
Canadian Solar Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -7.3x. The historical average is 16.7x.
Canadian Solar Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 10.9x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 13.1x.
Canadian Solar Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -2.5%. The historical average is 12.3%.
Based on historical data, Canadian Solar Inc. is trading at a P/E of -7.3x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Canadian Solar Inc. has 18.3% gross margin and 0.8% operating margin.
Canadian Solar Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 12.8x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Leverage amid operational cash burn
Margin Collapse Signals Structural Strain
Canadian Solar's operating margin has deteriorated to -5.9% in 2026Q2, a stark reversal from the 7.5% peak in 2025Q2, indicating that high fixed costs and pricing pressure are overwhelming manufacturing efficiencies.
The gross margin's extreme volatility, from 29.8% to 13.9% in a single year, underscores the company's vulnerability to polysilicon price swings and module oversupply. The collapse in operating margin to negative territory suggests that SG&A and R&D expenses are not scaling down with revenue, creating severe negative operating leverage that is now eroding the equity base.
Capital Returns Turn Negative, Compounding Erosion
ROIC has swung from a positive 1.0% in 2025Q2 to -0.5% in 2026Q2, indicating the company is now destroying value on its invested capital base amid a severe industry downturn.
The negative ROIC trend, coupled with a negative ROE of -1.8%, confirms that the business is not generating sufficient returns to cover its cost of capital. This decay in returns is driven by both margin compression and the capital-intensive nature of maintaining a large manufacturing footprint and project pipeline during a period of weak demand.
Leverage Intensifies as Profitability Fades
The Debt/Equity ratio has climbed to 1.72 in 2026Q2 from 1.40 in 2024Q1, while interest coverage has turned negative at -1.12, suggesting debt service is becoming increasingly uncomfortable.
The rising leverage ratio, combined with a negative interest coverage ratio, indicates that the company's debt burden is growing more concerning as profitability deteriorates. This trend limits financial flexibility and raises refinancing risk, particularly if the sector downturn persists and project asset valuations come under pressure.
Working Capital Cycle Lengthens, Tying Up Cash
The Cash Conversion Cycle has expanded to 109 days in 2026Q2 from 95 days in 2024Q4, driven by a sharp increase in Days Inventory Outstanding to 139 days, indicating significant cash is tied up in unsold stock.
The lengthening CCC, particularly the surge in DIO, suggests inventory is moving more slowly, likely due to weak demand and oversupply in the module market. This inefficiency is a major contributor to the severe negative free cash flow, as working capital changes have been a significant source of cash consumption.
Deep Value Discount Amidst Operational Distress
The P/B ratio of 0.21 and P/S of 0.16 appear to price Canadian Solar as a distressed manufacturer, yet the EV/EBITDA of 11.14 suggests the market is still assigning some value to its project pipeline and future earnings potential.
The valuation multiples present a mixed signal: the extremely low price-to-book and price-to-sales ratios reflect the market's focus on current losses and negative net margins. However, the positive EV/EBITDA indicates that the enterprise value is not solely driven by equity, and the market may be pricing in the optionality of the Recurrent Energy project pipeline and e-STORAGE business, albeit at a significant discount to historical levels.
The Most Misapplied Ratio: Price-to-Book
The P/B ratio of 0.21 is the most commonly misapplied metric for Canadian Solar, as it obscures the significant value embedded in its project development pipeline and the capital-intensive nature of its business model.
For a company like Canadian Solar, which holds a substantial portfolio of project assets at cost on its balance sheet, the P/B ratio is misleading. These assets may be worth significantly more or less than their book value depending on interest rates and project IRRs, making the ratio a poor indicator of intrinsic value. A more appropriate metric would be EV/EBITDA or a sum-of-the-parts analysis that separately values the manufacturing and project development segments.