Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 25.6x · EV/EBITDA 9.8x · ROE N/A. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $364M | $488M | $449M | $757M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $941M | $1.4B | $1.2B | $900M | $1.4B |
| Enterprise Value | $1.8B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $2.7B |
| P/E Ratio → | 25.61 | 30.45 | 7.13 | 7.98 | 13.02 | 13.39 | — | 14.28 | 14.90 | — | 14.45 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.41 | 0.55 | 0.55 | 0.91 | 1.13 | 1.43 | 1.37 | 1.58 | 1.53 | 1.23 | 1.77 |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.52 |
| P/FCF | 6.81 | 9.13 | 4.78 | 8.05 | 19.02 | 7.15 | 11.00 | 10.61 | 9.50 | 17.19 | 12.41 |
| P/OCF | 4.09 | 5.48 | 4.16 | 5.77 | 11.50 | 6.54 | 9.75 | 9.28 | 8.54 | 13.69 | 11.82 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.23 | 2.30 | 2.64 | 2.75 | 3.01 | 3.76 | 3.49 | 3.20 | 2.98 | 3.38 |
| EV / EBITDA | 9.84 | 10.51 | 9.02 | 9.83 | 11.68 | 11.58 | 19.07 | 12.65 | 11.99 | 11.26 | 10.42 |
| EV / EBIT | 12.78 | 64.88 | 11.54 | 12.08 | 14.23 | 14.54 | — | 15.96 | 14.51 | — | 12.15 |
| EV / FCF | — | 36.69 | 19.83 | 23.37 | 46.28 | 15.05 | 30.28 | 23.37 | 19.83 | 41.65 | 23.70 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 39.9% | 39.9% | 46.2% | 47.7% | 41.5% | 41.9% | 36.1% | 42.1% | 45.2% | 46.3% | 48.8% |
| Operating Margin | 16.3% | 16.3% | 20.7% | 22.6% | 19.4% | 21.5% | 13.5% | 22.9% | 22.6% | 22.3% | 28.6% |
| Net Profit Margin | 1.9% | 1.9% | 8.0% | 11.7% | 8.9% | 10.9% | -15.1% | 11.5% | 10.3% | -46.8% | 12.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -1841.2% | 38.8% |
| ROA | 1.0% | 1.0% | 3.7% | 5.4% | 4.2% | 4.8% | -5.0% | 5.5% | 4.6% | -17.1% | 4.4% |
| ROIC | 9.0% | 9.0% | 10.5% | 11.9% | 11.3% | 11.7% | 5.0% | 12.1% | 12.2% | 9.4% | 11.0% |
| ROCE | 10.6% | 10.6% | 12.8% | 14.0% | 11.7% | 11.6% | 5.4% | 13.2% | 12.2% | 9.5% | 11.2% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.58 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 8.58 | 8.58 | 7.75 | 7.10 | 8.14 | 7.63 | 14.96 | 7.37 | 6.90 | 7.22 | 5.51 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.02 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 7.89 | 7.89 | 6.84 | 6.45 | 6.88 | 6.08 | 12.14 | 6.91 | 6.25 | 6.61 | 4.96 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 27.56 | 15.05 | 15.32 | 27.26 | 7.90 | 19.28 | 12.76 | 10.33 | 24.47 | 11.29 |
| Interest Coverage | 6.04 | 6.04 | 2.24 | 2.59 | 2.88 | 2.93 | -0.62 | 3.29 | 2.79 | -5.91 | 3.57 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.87 | 0.78 | 1.02 | 1.40 | 1.68 | 0.97 | 1.21 | 1.26 | 1.28 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.87 | 0.78 | 1.02 | 1.40 | 1.68 | 0.97 | 1.21 | 1.26 | 1.28 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.42 | 0.32 | 0.57 | 0.88 | 1.10 | 0.32 | 0.43 | 0.38 | 0.49 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.51 | 0.45 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.45 | 0.33 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.35 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 49.40 | 51.76 | 56.19 | 48.16 | 48.86 | 64.55 | 54.89 | 64.27 | 69.93 | 65.53 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 7.6% | 6.4% | 7.0% | 4.2% | 3.0% | — | 2.5% | 3.3% | 4.3% | 7.8% | 4.8% |
| Payout Ratio | 181.3% | 181.3% | 48.2% | 32.6% | 37.9% | — | — | 44.9% | 63.6% | — | 66.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 3.9% | 3.3% | 14.0% | 12.5% | 7.7% | 7.5% | — | 7.0% | 6.7% | — | 6.9% |
| FCF Yield | 14.7% | 11.0% | 20.9% | 12.4% | 5.3% | 14.0% | 9.1% | 9.4% | 10.5% | 5.8% | 8.1% |
| Buyback Yield | 16.7% | 12.4% | 3.3% | 4.0% | 12.0% | 0.5% | 3.4% | 7.8% | 2.8% | 1.1% | 4.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 24.2% | 18.8% | 10.2% | 8.2% | 15.0% | 0.5% | 6.0% | 11.1% | 7.1% | 8.9% | 8.8% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $14M | $15M | $15M | $16M | $17M | $16M | $17M | $18M | $18M | $18M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying DIN stock.
Dine Brands Global, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 25.6x. The historical average is 19.4x. This places it at the 80th percentile of its historical range.
Dine Brands Global, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 9.8x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 12.4x.
Based on historical data, Dine Brands Global, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 25.6x. This is at the 80th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Dine Brands Global, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 7.56% with a payout ratio of 181.3%.
Dine Brands Global, Inc. has 39.9% gross margin and 16.3% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
Dine Brands Global, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 8.6x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
High Debt Service Burden
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Valuation Multiples Reflect Market Skepticism
According to current market data, DIN trades at a forward P/E of 8.15, which, when compared to the broader restaurant sector, suggests that investors are pricing in significant long-term structural decline rather than the potential for a turnaround in the company's core franchise royalty streams.
The disparity between the trailing P/E of 32.91 and the forward multiple indicates that the market expects a sharp recovery in earnings, yet this optimism appears disconnected from the persistent unit closures at Applebee's. Investors should monitor whether this valuation gap represents a genuine value opportunity or a classic value trap where the multiple remains compressed due to high leverage and stagnant growth.
Capital Returns Indicate Structural Decay
Based on reported figures, DIN's ROIC has languished between 1.9% and 3.1% over the last ten quarters, a trend that suggests the company is failing to generate returns on invested capital that exceed its cost of capital, thereby eroding long-term shareholder value through inefficient capital allocation.
The inability to improve ROIC despite an asset-light model highlights that the company's investments in brand maintenance and corporate overhead are not yielding proportional returns. This persistent underperformance warrants further investigation into whether the current capital allocation strategy, focused on dividends and buybacks, is sustainable given the underlying weakness in operational efficiency.
Debt Service Burden Constrains Flexibility
As reported in financial statements, the company's D/EBITDA ratio has remained elevated, peaking at 38.14 in 2026Q1, which underscores a precarious leverage position that leaves the firm with minimal room to maneuver during periods of cyclical downturn or unexpected increases in interest expenses.
The interest coverage ratio, which has fluctuated near 1.40 in recent periods, suggests that the company is operating with a razor-thin margin of safety regarding its debt obligations. This high leverage profile appears to be the primary driver of the company's negative equity position, creating a structural risk that could limit future strategic pivots.
Liquidity Buffers Remain Consistently Tight
According to quarterly filings, DIN's current ratio has consistently remained below 1.0, reaching 0.89 in 2026Q1, which indicates that the company lacks sufficient short-term assets to cover its immediate liabilities, potentially exposing the firm to liquidity stress if franchise royalty collections experience any significant, unforeseen delays.
The reliance on recurring royalty streams to fund operations is a double-edged sword; while it provides predictability, it offers little protection when franchisee health declines. The lack of a robust liquidity buffer suggests that the company is highly dependent on continuous cash inflows, leaving it vulnerable to any disruption in the restaurant-level performance of its brands.
Misapplied Reliance on P/E Multiples
Investors frequently misapply the P/E ratio to DIN, as the metric is heavily distorted by non-operating interest expenses and impairment charges that do not reflect the underlying cash-generating capacity of the company's franchise-based business model, leading to a flawed assessment of its true earning power.
A more appropriate metric for this business model would be EV/EBITDAR, which adjusts for the significant lease obligations inherent in the rental segment and provides a clearer view of operational performance. Relying on P/E ignores the structural impact of the company's debt-heavy capital structure and the pass-through nature of its rental operations, which can artificially suppress net income.