Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -4.7x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -2.9%. (2007–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $806M | $2.0B | $1.3B | $2.0B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $4.3B | $717M | $305M | $649M | $204M |
| Enterprise Value | $-174388308 | $1.0B | $286M | $-1044796969 | $-494558116 | $2.4B | $4.5B | $1.0B | $440M | $818M | $432M |
| P/E Ratio → | -4.67 | — | — | 4.63 | 1.64 | 4.14 | 33.74 | 24.38 | 7.80 | 6.99 | 4.82 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.21 | 2.99 | 1.25 | 0.86 | 0.65 | 1.84 | 6.37 | 2.05 | 1.01 | 1.84 | 0.89 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0.22 | 0.31 | 0.45 | 1.16 | 5.39 | 1.26 | 0.58 | 1.64 | 0.75 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | 4.65 | 2.45 | 23.67 | 47.06 | — | — | 8.67 | 6.55 |
| P/OCF | 14.36 | 35.50 | — | 1.23 | 1.21 | 4.84 | 20.52 | 6.97 | 3.19 | 4.55 | 2.07 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.52 | 0.28 | -0.45 | -0.11 | 1.41 | 6.61 | 2.99 | 1.46 | 2.32 | 1.89 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | -1.12 | -0.16 | 2.10 | 17.42 | 11.03 | 4.23 | 5.23 | 4.35 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | -1.33 | -0.16 | 2.25 | 23.79 | 22.04 | 5.20 | 6.36 | 7.05 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | -2.43 | -0.41 | 18.14 | 48.89 | — | — | 10.93 | 13.85 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -20.7% | -20.7% | -20.7% | 39.9% | 74.0% | 65.4% | 34.6% | 22.9% | 32.5% | 40.7% | 35.1% |
| Operating Margin | -40.6% | -40.6% | -54.8% | 33.9% | 66.0% | 62.6% | 27.8% | 13.6% | 27.0% | 36.5% | 28.6% |
| Net Profit Margin | -25.6% | -25.6% | -33.5% | 18.6% | 39.5% | 44.6% | 19.1% | 8.4% | 12.6% | 26.3% | 19.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -2.9% | -2.9% | -5.6% | 6.6% | 39.3% | 43.3% | 18.9% | 5.4% | 8.3% | 27.9% | 16.9% |
| ROA | -2.7% | -2.7% | -5.0% | 5.7% | 33.3% | 32.7% | 10.6% | 2.9% | 4.8% | 13.2% | 6.6% |
| ROIC | -4.1% | -4.1% | -10.2% | 18.0% | 90.0% | 54.3% | 15.1% | 4.6% | 10.0% | 18.2% | 9.9% |
| ROCE | -4.6% | -4.6% | -9.0% | 11.7% | 63.0% | 56.1% | 22.0% | 6.5% | 13.2% | 27.4% | 16.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | — | 0.30 | 0.67 | 0.38 | 0.58 | 0.90 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 0.01 | — | 0.95 | 4.02 | 1.93 | 1.47 | 2.45 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.17 | -0.17 | -0.47 | -0.53 | -0.27 | 0.21 | 0.58 | 0.26 | 0.43 | 0.84 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | -3.26 | -1.11 | -0.64 | 0.65 | 3.47 | 1.30 | 1.08 | 2.29 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | -7.08 | -2.86 | -5.54 | 1.82 | — | — | 2.26 | 7.30 |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | 51.33 | 7.05 | 4.57 | 7.86 | 7.90 | 4.82 |
Net cash position: cash ($980M) exceeds total debt ($0)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 5.41 | 5.41 | 5.05 | 4.28 | 6.64 | 3.17 | 0.63 | 0.39 | 1.07 | 0.66 | 0.29 |
| Quick Ratio | 5.07 | 5.07 | 4.76 | 4.07 | 6.41 | 2.57 | 0.46 | 0.30 | 0.97 | 0.57 | 0.24 |
| Cash Ratio | 4.15 | 4.15 | 4.04 | 3.63 | 4.77 | 1.82 | 0.27 | 0.12 | 0.58 | 0.28 | 0.06 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.31 | 0.61 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.29 | 0.35 | 0.47 | 0.35 |
| Inventory Turnover | 4.75 | 4.75 | 8.28 | 8.01 | 7.08 | 1.77 | 8.97 | 6.87 | 13.17 | 10.68 | 12.11 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 74.34 | 19.57 | 18.41 | 89.63 | 79.56 | 0.15 | 5.92 | 12.23 | 22.22 | 30.89 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | 21.6% | 61.0% | 24.2% | 3.0% | 4.1% | 12.8% | 14.3% | 20.7% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | 21.5% | 40.8% | 4.2% | 2.1% | — | — | 11.5% | 15.3% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 26.2% | 4.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 26.2% | 4.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $68M | $66M | $75M | $77M | $77M | $75M | $70M | $65M | $55M | $53M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 19 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying DQ stock.
Daqo New Energy Corp.'s current P/E ratio is -4.7x. The historical average is 9.7x.
Daqo New Energy Corp.'s return on equity (ROE) is -2.9%. The historical average is 12.9%.
Based on historical data, Daqo New Energy Corp. is trading at a P/E of -4.7x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Daqo New Energy Corp. has -20.7% gross margin and -40.6% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Prolonged negative gross margins
Trapped in a Cyclical Value Trap
According to recent SEC filings, DQ's P/B ratio of 0.16 and Forward EV/EBITDA of 0.19 signal extreme distress pricing, but these multiples are rendered meaningless by current negative earnings and a collapsing asset base.
The current valuation multiples do not reflect a traditional discount but rather a market pricing in the potential for permanent capital impairment. With a negative TTM P/E and a P/B well below 1.0, the market is valuing DQ's equity at a fraction of its book value, which itself is being eroded by sustained operating losses. This level of distress pricing suggests investors are applying a severe discount to the company's long-term viability, overshadowing any near-term earnings recovery hopes.
Operational Viability Severely Challenged
As reported in financial statements, DQ's gross margin has deteriorated to -132.0% in 2026Q2, indicating that the cash cost of producing polysilicon now exceeds the market price by a wide margin, calling into question the fundamental viability of its operations.
The plunge into deeply negative gross margins represents a catastrophic breakdown in the company's core earnings power. This is not a cyclical trough but a structural inflection where the company's cost of goods sold, likely inflated by fixed overheads and high energy input costs, is completely disconnected from prevailing market pricing. The operating margin of -159.7% confirms that these losses are compounding below the gross profit line, as revenue cannot cover even the direct costs of production, let alone SG&A or depreciation.
A Fortified Balance Sheet Under Siege
Based on DQ's reported figures, its current ratio of 5.81 remains exceptionally high, but the cash position has been depleted from over $2.7 billion to $555 million over two years, indicating the fortress is being actively liquidated to fund operational shortfalls.
While the absolute level of liquidity appears robust in a static analysis, the dynamic trend is critical. The company's ability to maintain a high current ratio is currently dependent on the liquidation of working capital, such as inventory and receivables, which provided over $980 million in cash inflow over the trailing twelve months. This suggests the liquidity cushion is a drawdown asset, not a renewable source, and its duration is directly tied to the length of the industry downturn.
Capital Employed is Being Destroyed
Daqo's ROIC has been consistently negative, reaching -1.4% in 2026Q2, demonstrating that the substantial capital invested in its manufacturing assets is generating losses rather than returns, a trend that has persisted for over six consecutive quarters.
The sustained negative ROIC indicates a profound failure to generate returns above the cost of capital. This is driven by the collapse in asset turnover, which has fallen to 0.01, meaning the company's $3.4 billion in property, plant & equipment is generating negligible revenue. For a capital-intensive manufacturer, this level of underutilization signals that the company's assets may be approaching obsolescence in value, especially if industry technology standards shift away from its current Siemens-process reactors.
The Peril of Price-to-Book in a Commodity Bust
The most commonly misapplied metric to DQ in its current state is the Price-to-Book ratio, which at 0.16 may suggest a deep value opportunity but instead obscures the potential for significant further asset write-downs as negative gross margins persist.
In a commodity super-cycle downturn, book value becomes an unreliable anchor. DQ's equity base, while currently large at $4.4 billion, is comprised of assets that are not earning their keep and may require impairment testing. Applying a P/B multiple here fails to account for the fact that the 'book' itself is likely overstated relative to the assets' true economic value in a world of chronic oversupply. A more appropriate metric would be a price-to-cash-flow analysis focused on the breakeven point, which would highlight the severe cash burn required to sustain the business at current polysilicon prices.