Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -3.2x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -95.0%. (1997–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $106M | $123M | $82M | $195M | $367M | $194M | $151M | $131M | $54M | $83M | $96M |
| Enterprise Value | $114M | $130M | $66M | $157M | $309M | $152M | $134M | $117M | $39M | $65M | $76M |
| P/E Ratio → | -3.23 | — | — | — | — | 234.90 | — | 77.58 | — | — | 23.43 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.70 | 1.74 | 1.19 | 2.99 | 6.33 | 3.73 | 3.17 | 2.61 | 1.16 | 2.06 | 2.45 |
| P/B Ratio | 5.48 | 6.35 | 1.95 | 3.11 | 4.80 | 3.41 | 4.69 | 4.27 | 1.88 | 2.75 | 3.73 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 40.54 | 91.42 | 34.44 | — | — | 98.05 |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | 36.96 | 66.87 | 30.85 | 259.84 | — | 72.02 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.84 | 0.95 | 2.40 | 5.34 | 2.92 | 2.82 | 2.34 | 0.85 | 1.61 | 1.93 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | 65.27 | 32.05 | — | — | 48.55 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | 391.90 | — | 87.25 | — | — | 175.81 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 31.72 | 81.34 | 30.83 | — | — | 77.41 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 42.5% | 42.5% | 41.4% | 40.4% | 43.9% | 41.8% | 44.1% | 46.8% | 43.2% | 41.4% | 46.1% |
| Operating Margin | -35.6% | -35.6% | -33.1% | -33.8% | -9.2% | -6.7% | -1.0% | 2.7% | -5.1% | -5.7% | 1.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | -41.5% | -41.5% | -29.7% | -35.0% | -5.3% | 1.6% | -4.1% | 3.4% | -0.9% | -1.9% | 10.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -95.0% | -95.0% | -39.1% | -32.9% | -4.6% | 1.9% | -6.2% | 5.7% | -1.4% | -2.7% | 16.5% |
| ROA | -34.9% | -34.9% | -21.6% | -21.9% | -3.1% | 1.1% | -3.1% | 2.9% | -0.7% | -1.5% | 8.6% |
| ROIC | -72.0% | -72.0% | -68.7% | -76.5% | -23.8% | -17.5% | -2.1% | 6.5% | -13.7% | -19.7% | 5.9% |
| ROCE | -54.9% | -54.9% | -38.1% | -28.4% | -7.0% | -6.5% | -1.1% | 3.5% | -6.4% | -6.5% | 1.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.43 | 1.43 | 0.34 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.42 | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.19 | 0.11 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | 6.62 | 2.65 | — | — | 1.86 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.37 | -0.39 | -0.61 | -0.75 | -0.74 | -0.52 | -0.45 | -0.51 | -0.61 | -0.79 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | -8.09 | -3.74 | — | — | -12.95 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | -8.83 | -10.08 | -3.60 | — | — | -20.64 |
| Interest Coverage | -35.98 | -35.98 | -80.30 | -89.28 | -14.93 | 6.31 | -3.77 | 7.25 | -18.02 | -46.07 | 6.86 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.54 | 1.54 | 1.85 | 2.84 | 4.17 | 3.75 | 2.11 | 2.41 | 2.40 | 2.45 | 2.70 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.36 | 2.30 | 3.63 | 3.34 | 1.74 | 1.94 | 1.97 | 2.04 | 2.16 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.55 | 0.55 | 0.79 | 1.58 | 2.91 | 2.63 | 1.15 | 1.19 | 1.16 | 1.24 | 1.46 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.90 | 0.78 | 0.65 | 0.54 | 0.59 | 0.70 | 0.84 | 0.83 | 0.72 | 0.80 |
| Inventory Turnover | 3.17 | 3.17 | 2.12 | 2.33 | 2.58 | 3.55 | 2.72 | 2.92 | 3.19 | 2.92 | 2.51 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 116.51 | 110.56 | 118.74 | 100.50 | 96.58 | 116.02 | 102.59 | 120.21 | 134.16 | 97.98 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 0.4% | — | 1.3% | — | — | 4.3% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 2.5% | 1.1% | 2.9% | — | — | 1.0% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $37M | $37M | $37M | $34M | $32M | $29M | $30M | $29M | $29M | $29M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 29 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying FOCL stock.
EDAP TMS S.A. American Depositary Shares's current P/E ratio is -3.2x. The historical average is 22.5x.
EDAP TMS S.A. American Depositary Shares's return on equity (ROE) is -95.0%. The historical average is -20.4%.
Based on historical data, EDAP TMS S.A. American Depositary Shares is trading at a P/E of -3.2x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
EDAP TMS S.A. American Depositary Shares has 42.5% gross margin and -35.6% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Negative equity plus sudden debt-funded survival
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Multiples Inflated by Equity Collapse
With trailing P/E at -6.60 and EV/EBITDA unavailable, investors are paying 2.73x sales and nearly 10x book for a business that lost money in every quarter of the record. The 9.93x P/B, above ISRG's 8.98x, appears to reflect a shrinking equity base rather than franchise quality, per EDAP's latest filings.
The book multiple deserves the most skepticism: with equity at -$3.2M, the 9.93x figure is a mathematical artifact of a denominator approaching zero, so any further losses will mechanically inflate the ratio rather than signal re-rating. The absence of forward P/E and forward EV/EBITDA suggests no usable consensus earnings base, meaning the P/S of 2.73x is effectively the only anchor left. Compared with loss-making peer Novocure at 4.64x book and -11.61x P/E, EDAP's valuation does not appear to price in the revenue reversal described in the income statement analysis, which leaves meaningful downside if the 56.9% sales decline proves structural rather than timing-driven.
Premium Gross Margin Masks Operating Bleed
Gross margin of 74.1% in 2026Q2 compares with 37.5% two years earlier, yet operating margin deteriorated to -115.9% on an $8.0M operating loss, and the -2.1% net margin was rescued by non-operating items. As reported in EDAP's quarterly statements, cost of sales fell faster than revenue rather than efficiency improving.
The gross margin expansion appears largely denominator-driven: with revenue down 56.9%, fixed manufacturing and warranty costs were absorbed by a much smaller sales base, and the volatility between 42.6% and 74.1% across the last four quarters is inconsistent with a durable pricing or mix shift. Stripping non-operating income, the true earning power is the operating line, which has been negative in all ten quarters and totals roughly $59M of cumulative operating losses. For an analyst, the operative metric is gross profit dollars minus controllable opex, and on that basis the company still shows no quarter in which commercial infrastructure was covered by product economics.
Returns Decaying as Capital Base Erodes
ROIC deteriorated from -11.7% in 2024Q4 to -49.9% in 2026Q2 while asset turnover halved to 0.09, indicating both margin decay and shrinking revenue per dollar of assets. Based on EDAP's reported figures, the negative ROE of -4.2% is itself unreliable because equity has turned negative at -$3.2M.
The driver is efficiency, not margins: with gross margin nominally higher, the collapse in ROIC traces to the asset turnover denominator producing almost no revenue against a base that still carried $13.0M of PP&E as recently as 2026Q1. The simultaneous write-off of PP&E to zero and goodwill to $735K will mechanically improve future ROIC by shrinking invested capital, so investors should treat any post-impairment recovery in this ratio as an accounting effect rather than evidence of compounding. There is no multi-year record of positive returns on invested capital in the supplied data, meaning the business has been a destroyer of capital across the entire observation window.
Debt Surge Meets Negative Equity Cushion
Total debt jumped roughly eighteen-fold from $2.3M in 2026Q1 to $41.7M in 2026Q2, while debt-to-equity became unmeasurable against negative equity and interest coverage stood at -1.28x. According to EDAP's balance sheet disclosures, this borrowing arrived as revenue fell 56.9%, which complicates the credit profile considerably.
With EBITDA negative, coverage ratios lose meaning, but the -1.28x reading versus -4.21x in 2026Q1 suggests the interest burden has grown just as operating cash generation weakened to -$3.7M in the same quarter. A debt raise of this magnitude alongside the asset write-downs identified in the balance sheet analysis is consistent with either a strategic transaction or a liquidity-driven recapitalization; the supplied data does not disclose terms, maturities, or covenants, so refinancing risk cannot be sized. Investors should monitor whether this borrowing is structured against receivables, given the 204-day DSO and $-to-unknown collectability, since that would materially change the secured position of the new creditors.
Runway Narrowing From Fortress to Adequate
The current ratio compressed from 2.62 in 2024Q1 to 1.60 in 2026Q2, with the quick ratio at 1.38, while cash declined 69% to $11.8M and free cash flow margin sat at -71.5%. As reported in EDBL's filings, working capital releases cushioned rather than cured the operating cash outflow.
The liquidity position looks adequate on a static basis but weakens under stress: at the 2026Q2 burn rate implied by the -$3.7M operating cash loss and -$1.6M of quarterly capex, the $11.8M cash balance would be drawn down within roughly five quarters, excluding any proceeds from the new $41.7M of debt, the use of which is not detailed in the supplied data. The current ratio also flatters the picture, since a 547-day inventory line is only liquid if it converts, and the collapse in deferred revenue from $7.8M to $923K suggests contracted backlog support is thin. The eight-fold rise in DPO to 816 days indicates payables are effectively funding the shortfall, a channel that typically cannot be stretched further without supplier friction.
P/E Misleads on Pre-Profit Device Makers
The P/E is the ratio most often misapplied here: at -6.60x it is directionally meaningless, and investors instead gravitate to P/S, which for EDAP's 2026Q2 revenue of $6.9M and collapsing deferred revenue may overstate the durable revenue base. Per EDAP's quarterly results, a gross-profit coverage metric is the more informative lens.
For a commercial-stage device company whose sales can swing 56.9% in a quarter, price-to-sales silently assumes the current revenue run-rate is recurring, which the 88% sequential drop in deferred revenue actively contradicts; the adjusted approach is EV/Sales discounted by contracted backlog, or alternatively gross profit dollars measured against quarterly operating expense, which shows the gap the business still must close. Book value multiples are equally hazardous in the opposite direction here, since the negative equity base makes the 9.93x P/B an artifact rather than a valuation statement. The bear case rests on the operating margin never having approached breakeven despite a 74% gross margin, while the bull case would require evidence that the 2026Q2 revenue collapse is a one-off ordering pattern rather than an eroding commercial position; the ratio-based evidence supplied does not yet distinguish between the two.