Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.1x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -138.1%. (1995–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $878852 | $14M | $9M | $41M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $49M | $62M | $72M | $92M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.06 | — | 127.01 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.17 | 2.80 | 0.98 | 4.91 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.17 | 2.72 | 0.52 | 3.25 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | 123.24 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 12.33 | 7.65 | 10.86 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | 629.39 | 50.16 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | 9.36 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -25.6% | -25.6% | -7.6% | 44.6% | 49.8% | 55.2% | 49.6% | 16.8% | 21.1% | 25.8% | 16.6% |
| Operating Margin | -68.8% | -68.8% | -24.8% | 5.1% | 19.6% | 48.3% | 40.9% | 5.3% | 9.0% | 16.4% | 7.3% |
| Net Profit Margin | -314.1% | -314.1% | 10.9% | -41.2% | 0.2% | 37.1% | 23.1% | 3.6% | 7.3% | 10.0% | 3.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -138.1% | -138.1% | 6.7% | -42.4% | 0.3% | 169.4% | 0.7% | 8.7% | 15.8% | 31.1% | 13.6% |
| ROA | -20.9% | -20.9% | 1.1% | -5.2% | 0.0% | 26.6% | 0.4% | 4.9% | 9.0% | 15.1% | 5.6% |
| ROIC | -3.9% | -3.9% | -2.4% | 0.8% | 5.0% | 51.4% | 0.7% | 8.0% | 14.0% | 32.0% | 13.4% |
| ROCE | -29.5% | -29.5% | -13.7% | 2.2% | 6.4% | 62.1% | 0.8% | 8.9% | 13.6% | 31.2% | 13.9% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 9.31 | 9.31 | 3.56 | 3.99 | 5.38 | 1.99 | 15.53 | 0.49 | 0.39 | 0.46 | 0.75 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | 554.42 | 27.84 | 12.96 | 1.70 | 5.46 | 1.84 | 1.27 | 0.81 | 1.73 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 9.25 | 3.53 | 3.94 | 5.18 | 1.62 | 14.81 | 0.30 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.43 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | 548.97 | 27.48 | 12.48 | 1.38 | 5.20 | 1.13 | 0.21 | 0.06 | 0.99 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | 3.23 | 1.22 | 9.19 | — | — | 0.13 | — |
| Interest Coverage | -2.16 | -2.16 | 1.25 | -0.35 | 1.28 | 28.64 | 4.38 | 8.79 | 15.44 | 36.38 | 13.29 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.28 | 0.12 | 1.39 | 0.67 | 2.35 | 3.29 | 2.79 | 2.52 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.28 | 0.16 | 1.19 | 0.07 | 2.01 | 3.13 | 2.71 | 2.52 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.29 | 0.02 | 0.46 | 1.18 | 1.12 | 0.68 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.57 | 0.12 | 1.23 | 1.22 | 1.43 | 1.49 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | 4.12 | 0.14 | 13.95 | 37.25 | 62.37 | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 110.88 | 3.79 | 34.90 | 9.23 | 27.21 | 9.60 | 93.76 | 90.52 | 75.40 | 83.52 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 0.8% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 16.4% | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 16.4% | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $4M | $3M | $3M | $3M | $3M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M |
Existential liquidity and regulatory
According to recent market data, GV trades at a P/S multiple of 0.17, which, when compared to historical norms, suggests that investors have largely abandoned expectations of a recovery in the company's core student recruitment and integrated service delivery model.
The current P/B ratio of 0.16 indicates that the market is pricing the company's assets at a significant discount to book value, likely anticipating future impairment charges on its heavy physical infrastructure. This valuation level implies that the market views the firm as a distressed entity rather than a growth-oriented education provider.
As reported in financial statements, the company's net margin has plummeted to -314.07%, a figure that underscores the severe decoupling of fixed operating costs from a rapidly shrinking revenue base in the competitive Toronto education and housing market.
The persistent inability to maintain positive gross margins suggests that the direct costs of maintaining campus facilities and staff are fundamentally misaligned with current enrollment volumes. This trend indicates that the company's earning power is currently non-existent, necessitating a radical shift in operational scale to achieve viability.
Based on GV's reported figures, the ROIC has deteriorated to -3.7% in the most recent quarter, marking a stark reversal from the positive returns observed in 2020 and highlighting the company's failure to generate economic value from its invested capital.
The decline in ROIC is primarily driven by the collapse in operating margins, which has rendered the company's asset base a liability rather than a productive engine. Investors should monitor whether management can divest underperforming assets to stem the ongoing destruction of invested capital.
According to recent SEC filings, the company's asset turnover ratio has fallen to 0.02, a significant decline from historical levels that suggests a severe underutilization of the firm's physical campus and student housing assets in the current environment.
The lengthening of the cash conversion cycle, evidenced by rising DSO figures, implies that the company is struggling to collect on its service offerings, further straining its already limited liquidity. This inefficiency suggests that the firm lacks the leverage necessary to manage its working capital effectively against its supplier and student base.
As reported in recent balance sheet disclosures, the current ratio has plummeted to 0.07, leaving the firm with a cash balance of only $334,910 to cover substantial short-term liabilities, which warrants immediate concern regarding the company's ability to remain a going concern.
The lack of a meaningful liquidity buffer leaves the company highly vulnerable to any further regulatory shocks or unexpected operational expenses. Under severe stress, the firm appears to have no internal capacity to absorb further losses without immediate external capital intervention.
The most commonly misapplied metric for GV is the P/E ratio, which obscures the company's true financial state because the firm's negative earnings render standard valuation multiples meaningless and fail to capture the underlying cash burn and regulatory risks inherent in its residency-proxy model.
Analysts should instead focus on the cash burn rate and the ratio of deferred revenue to total liabilities to assess the company's survival prospects. Relying on traditional earnings-based multiples in this context risks ignoring the existential threat posed by the current regulatory environment in Canada.
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying GV stock.
Visionary Holdings Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -0.1x. The historical average is 127.0x.
Visionary Holdings Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -138.1%. The historical average is 5.2%.
Based on historical data, Visionary Holdings Inc. is trading at a P/E of -0.1x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Visionary Holdings Inc. has -25.6% gross margin and -68.8% operating margin.