Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -1.3x · EV/EBITDA 83.0x · ROE -25.3%. (1999–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.7B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $4.5B | $4.0B | $5.6B | $5.1B | $7.4B | $7.7B |
| Enterprise Value | $9.5B | $9.9B | $9.9B | $6.6B | $5.4B | $7.3B | $7.8B | $7.8B | $6.2B | $8.3B | $8.6B |
| P/E Ratio → | -1.34 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 9.80 | 26.77 | 6.55 | 10.10 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.13 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.75 | 1.36 | 0.69 | 0.66 | 1.05 | 1.16 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.62 | 0.79 | 1.03 | 0.55 | 0.59 | 1.18 | 1.02 | 1.16 | 1.10 | 1.52 | 1.91 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 7.00 | — | 19.07 | 49.04 | 37.57 | 12.35 |
| P/OCF | — | — | 18.93 | 4.62 | 5.53 | 2.76 | — | 3.86 | 4.15 | 5.27 | 4.70 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.09 | 1.07 | 0.69 | 0.59 | 1.21 | 2.65 | 0.96 | 0.82 | 1.18 | 1.30 |
| EV / EBITDA | 83.00 | 30.89 | — | 16.90 | 18.95 | 15.90 | — | 5.87 | 8.50 | 5.91 | 5.22 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 9.56 | 8.91 | 8.49 | 6.84 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 11.30 | — | 26.55 | 60.65 | 42.14 | 13.89 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 33.9% | 33.9% | 24.7% | 24.1% | 21.5% | 14.7% | -20.0% | 33.8% | 33.0% | 37.1% | 41.9% |
| Operating Margin | -4.1% | -4.1% | -7.4% | -2.4% | -3.3% | -1.3% | -58.0% | 9.9% | 3.5% | 13.9% | 19.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -6.6% | -6.6% | -8.6% | -3.2% | -4.0% | -3.0% | -45.8% | 7.0% | 2.5% | 16.3% | 11.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -25.3% | -25.3% | -26.6% | -9.0% | -9.8% | -4.7% | -30.9% | 12.1% | 4.0% | 25.8% | 20.1% |
| ROA | -3.4% | -3.4% | -4.9% | -2.1% | -2.5% | -1.3% | -10.7% | 5.1% | 1.9% | 11.8% | 8.0% |
| ROIC | -2.7% | -2.7% | -5.7% | -2.3% | -3.3% | -0.8% | -17.4% | 9.4% | 3.5% | 13.6% | 19.5% |
| ROCE | -2.7% | -2.7% | -5.5% | -2.1% | -2.7% | -0.7% | -17.2% | 9.3% | 3.5% | 13.3% | 18.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 4.84 | 4.84 | 3.46 | 1.78 | 1.23 | 1.25 | 1.45 | 0.66 | 0.36 | 0.25 | 0.34 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 32.05 | 32.05 | — | 15.16 | 15.27 | 10.44 | — | 2.38 | 2.27 | 0.86 | 0.84 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 3.87 | 2.73 | 1.43 | 0.94 | 0.72 | 0.96 | 0.46 | 0.26 | 0.19 | 0.24 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 25.65 | 25.65 | — | 12.18 | 11.64 | 6.05 | — | 1.66 | 1.63 | 0.64 | 0.58 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 4.30 | — | 7.48 | 11.61 | 4.57 | 1.53 |
| Interest Coverage | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.27 | -0.16 | -1.11 | -4.76 | -11.16 | 12.52 | 8.55 | 15.95 | 12.23 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.74 | 0.74 | 1.10 | 0.60 | 0.51 | 0.95 | 1.25 | 0.67 | 0.61 | 0.50 | 0.70 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.69 | 0.69 | 1.06 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0.93 | 1.22 | 0.64 | 0.58 | 0.48 | 0.68 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.93 | 0.43 | 0.37 | 0.83 | 1.14 | 0.50 | 0.20 | 0.29 | 0.19 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.49 | 0.55 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.41 | 0.22 | 0.68 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.70 |
| Inventory Turnover | 31.05 | 31.05 | 44.21 | 66.96 | 82.60 | 69.55 | 49.96 | 66.16 | 65.82 | 80.22 | 80.89 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 14.98 | 13.69 | 12.76 | 12.63 | 12.52 | 12.10 | 10.42 | 10.06 | 12.75 | 9.47 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 10.2% | 3.7% | 15.3% | 9.9% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 14.3% | — | 5.2% | 2.0% | 2.7% | 8.1% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 4.1% | 9.7% | 7.6% | 5.3% | 1.7% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 4.1% | 9.7% | 7.6% | 5.3% | 1.7% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $369M | $347M | $333M | $324M | $318M | $278M | $298M | $315M | $330M | $342M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 26 years · Updated daily
Live VCP patterns, Cup & Handle overlays, support/resistance, and AI trade plans.
High-probability breakout stocks crossing their pivot across 5 pattern engines.
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying JBLU stock.
JetBlue Airways Corporation's current P/E ratio is -1.3x. The historical average is 23.3x.
JetBlue Airways Corporation's current EV/EBITDA is 83.0x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 13.0x.
JetBlue Airways Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is -25.3%. The historical average is 3.2%.
Based on historical data, JetBlue Airways Corporation is trading at a P/E of -1.3x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
JetBlue Airways Corporation has 33.9% gross margin and -4.1% operating margin.
JetBlue Airways Corporation's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 32.0x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Leverage compounding with unrelenting cash burn
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Leverage Worsening Through Equity Erosion
Debt-to-equity climbed to 6.99 in 2026Q3 even as total debt eased to $9.3B, according to JetBlue's quarterly balance sheets, while interest coverage deteriorated to -0.81x, meaning the earnings shortfall is now the primary driver of leverage rather than incremental borrowing.
The ratio's trajectory appears driven almost entirely by the equity denominator: retained earnings swung to -$106M in 2026Q3 from $1.4B in 2024Q2, so leverage is compounding through loss-making rather than new issuance or drawdowns. Negative interest coverage sustained across seven of ten quarters suggests debt service is being funded from the cash buffer or liquidity facilities rather than operating earnings, which investors should monitor as a refinancing sensitivity in a higher-rate backdrop. Debt/EBITDA readings above 200x are effectively uninformative multiples given depressed EBITDA, so the more decision-useful signal is the direction of absolute debt versus the pace of equity consumption.
Operating Losses Persist Below Waterline
Operating margin remained negative in eight of ten quarters, reaching -5.1% in 2026Q3 versus 2.3% in 2024Q2, as reported in JetBlue's quarterly income statements, and the -9.1% net margin reflects interest expense amplifying an operating deficit driven by direct costs.
The gap between a -5.1% operating margin and a -9.1% net margin implies non-operating items, plausibly interest on the $9.3B debt load, are widening the headline loss beyond what the flying operation itself generates, so the operating line is the more honest read of earning power. Gross margin volatility — 18.6% in 2025Q1, 52.7% in 2026Q2, then -5.1% in 2026Q3 — suggests maintenance timing and cost allocation are distorting any single-quarter view, which implies a multi-quarter average is needed before judging whether JetForward cost recovery is taking hold. With SG&A holding near $92M against $3.0B of direct costs, the strain sits in the cost per available seat mile rather than overhead, which would require fleet utilization or labor productivity improvement to structurally reverse.
Returns Locked Below Zero
ROIC has printed at or near zero for nine of ten quarters, ranging from 0.6% in 2024Q2 to -1.7% in 2026Q1, per JetBlue's computed return metrics, while ROE deepened to -17.6%, indicating invested capital is being consumed rather than compounded.
Because ROIC (-1.1%) is materially less negative than ROE (-17.6%), the divergence appears to be leverage amplifying equity losses rather than asset productivity collapsing outright, so the -25.3% ROE cited in recent snapshots should be read as a geared outcome of modest operating shortfalls. Asset turnover drifting from 0.18x to 0.16x over the period suggests the revenue base is not growing against the fleet and infrastructure base, which may indicate capacity injected without commensurate utilization — consistent with GTF engine groundings constraining flying. Compared with peers such as Sun Country at 6.9% ROIC and Allegiant at 4.6%, the gap looks structural rather than cyclical, rooted in the high fixed-cost Northeast cost structure rather than a single soft quarter.
Cheap Book Value, Pricey Cash Earnings
JBLU trades at 0.49x book and 0.12x sales yet 28.98x EV/EBITDA, based on current market multiples, an apparent contradiction reflecting $9.3B of debt against $1.3B of equity rather than genuine undervaluation of operating earnings on currently depressed EBITDA.
The sub-0.5x P/B multiple appears less a signal of deep value than a market judgment that the $1.3B equity base is being eroded, since book value has roughly halved from $2.7B in 2024Q2 while debt has stayed near $9-10B. Meanwhile, EV/EBITDA at 28.98x versus peers in the 6.6-7.3x range (Sun Country, Allegiant) suggests JetBlue is priced well above the group on cash earnings, implying the market is either underwriting a sharp EBITDA recovery or mispricing the enterprise. With the forward EV/EBITDA stepping up to 48.02x, consensus appears to model a slower recovery than bulls may assume, so investors should test valuation against normalized-cycle EBITDA rather than trough figures.
Working Capital Buffer Below One
The current ratio slipped to 0.70 and quick ratio to 0.63 by 2026Q2 from 1.10 and 1.06 at 2024Q4, as disclosed in JetBlue's quarterly filings, while the negative cash conversion cycle of -15 days reflects air traffic liability timing rather than genuine slack.
A sub-1.0 current ratio would be a conventional distress flag, but for airlines the customer pays before service delivery, so the -10 to -18 day cash conversion cycle mechanically flatters the quick ratio — the more probative figure is cash of $1.7B against $14.8B of total liabilities. Under a severe demand shock, the deferred revenue balance of roughly $2.7B represents obligations to fly, not free liquidity, so the stress test should center on whether operating cash flow can fund both maintenance capex and debt service without drawing down the buffer. DPO extending from 33-34 days in 2024 to 47-50 days by 2026, read alongside the DSO stability near 14-15 days, suggests the company is stretching suppliers rather than accelerating collections — a financing workaround that may not scale.
P/E Misfires On Loss-Making Carriers
The P/E of -1.70 is analytically meaningless for JetBlue given negative trailing earnings, so investors should instead anchor on EV/EBITDA and CASM-versus-RASM spreads, per conventional airline valuation practice, because equity-based multiples distort leverage-heavy carriers like this one.
A negative or near-zero P/E obscures the actual question for an airline mid-loss-cycle, which is whether unit revenue is recovering faster than unit costs, and it flatters apparent cheapness when losses simply make the denominator invalid — the same trap that makes 0.49x book look like a bargain while equity is shrinking. EV/EBITDA is the better lens here but still needs adjustment for operating leases and for lumpy maintenance timing, which is why trailing 28.98x and forward 48.02x should be sanity-checked against a normalized mid-cycle EBITDA rather than trough or inflated gross-margin quarters. The practical alternative is to track RASM less CASM-ex fuel alongside absolute debt reduction, since that combination would reveal whether the moat in JFK and Logan slots is converting into durable spread rather than being absorbed by structural cost.