Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 30.1x · EV/EBITDA 12.9x · ROE 30.1%. (2019–2026 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $774M | $786M | $975M | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $582M | $8M | $467M | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 30.06 | 1.47 | 1.52 | 1.03 | 1.32 | 2.12 | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 5.29 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.36 | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 9.56 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.46 | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | 537.71 | — | 1.51 | 9.65 | 1.32 | 2.52 | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 17.76 | 0.81 | 0.71 | 0.80 | 0.64 | 1.02 | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.17 | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 12.93 | 0.65 | 0.52 | 0.33 | 0.01 | 0.37 | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | 22.67 | 1.01 | 0.83 | 0.54 | 0.01 | 0.67 | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | 1.16 | 7.26 | 0.01 | 1.21 | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 68.0% | 68.0% | 70.1% | 64.0% | 64.8% | 66.4% | 70.7% | 70.4% | 71.4% |
| Operating Margin | 25.8% | 25.8% | 28.7% | 24.8% | 25.1% | 25.5% | 31.7% | 32.5% | 29.5% |
| Net Profit Margin | 18.1% | 18.1% | 20.2% | 17.6% | 17.0% | 16.4% | 13.9% | 14.9% | 14.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 30.1% | 30.1% | 29.5% | 26.1% | 24.9% | 26.5% | 25.9% | 28.5% | 28.3% |
| ROA | 18.2% | 18.2% | 19.7% | 18.5% | 17.7% | 15.3% | 13.6% | 17.4% | 15.5% |
| ROIC | 33.8% | 33.8% | 34.4% | 33.4% | 37.6% | 27.7% | 32.6% | 40.7% | 32.8% |
| ROCE | 36.3% | 36.3% | 37.6% | 33.2% | 32.9% | 36.1% | 50.8% | 49.1% | 43.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.22 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.80 | 0.11 | 0.43 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.35 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.86 | 0.13 | 0.47 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.00 | -0.10 | -0.06 | -0.29 | -0.24 | 0.72 | -0.01 | 0.36 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.15 | -0.11 | -0.52 | -0.40 | 0.77 | -0.02 | 0.40 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | -0.34 | -2.40 | -1.31 | -1.31 | 2.18 | -0.03 | 5.84 |
| Interest Coverage | 18.46 | 18.46 | 25.01 | 66.99 | 89.49 | 56.24 | 75.81 | 37.64 | 15.99 |
Net cash position: cash ($1.2B) exceeds total debt ($1.2B)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.06 | 1.06 | 1.14 | 1.55 | 1.85 | 1.79 | 0.93 | 1.39 | 1.30 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.14 | 1.55 | 1.75 | 1.75 | 0.93 | 1.02 | 0.74 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.72 | 0.49 | 1.22 | 1.17 | 0.69 | 0.36 | 0.14 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.94 | 0.90 | 0.98 | 0.94 | 0.90 | 0.80 | 1.07 | 1.11 |
| Inventory Turnover | 302.93 | 302.93 | 354.98 | 231.89 | 15.73 | 37.00 | — | 3.87 | 2.35 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 40.44 | 38.05 | 35.70 | 36.34 | 42.26 | 45.37 | 45.67 | 43.43 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | 44.7% | 65.8% | 45.9% | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | 67.8% | 68.9% | 60.4% | — | 76.9% | 19.1% | 65.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 3.3% | 68.1% | 65.8% | 97.2% | 75.9% | 47.2% | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 0.2% | — | 66.4% | 10.4% | 75.7% | 39.8% | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 3.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 44.9% | 68.9% | 45.9% | 0.0% | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $31M | $31M | $31M | $31M | $31M | $22M | $22M | $20M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 8 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying KARO stock.
Karooooo Ltd.'s current P/E ratio is 30.1x. The historical average is 1.5x. This places it at the 100th percentile of its historical range.
Karooooo Ltd.'s current EV/EBITDA is 12.9x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 0.4x.
Karooooo Ltd.'s return on equity (ROE) is 30.1%. This is above the typical threshold of 15-20% considered good for most companies. The historical average is 27.5%.
Based on historical data, Karooooo Ltd. is trading at a P/E of 30.1x. This is at the 100th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Karooooo Ltd. has 68.0% gross margin and 25.8% operating margin. Operating margin above 20% indicates strong pricing power and cost efficiency.
Karooooo Ltd.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 0.5x, indicating low leverage. A ratio below 2x is generally considered financially healthy.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Debt-funded capex outpacing free cash
Premium Pricing Against Margin Erosion
Karooooo carries a 33.5x trailing P/E and 9.9x book, versus Sapiens International's 33.7x P/E on 5.1x book, per current peer pricing data; the 1.73 PEG implies investors already underwrite continued 20% growth even as gross margin has slipped 580 basis points.
The P/S of 6.07 and EV/EBITDA of 15.02 sit below US-listed SaaS comparables such as Samsara but well above any multiple Geospace could command, suggesting the market grants Karooooo a partial quality premium without fully erasing what appears to be a South Africa-linked discount. The anomalously low forward P/E of 1.90 and forward EV/EBITDA of 0.85 look like a reporting-unit or currency-translation artifact rather than a genuine expectation of a ~20x earnings jump, and should not be relied on without normalization. Investors should treat the trailing P/E and P/B as the operative anchors, which means current pricing already presumes margin stabilization that the last four quarters of reported data do not yet confirm.
Mix Shift Erodes Gross Profit Quality
Gross margin has compressed from a 71.3% peak in 2025Q4 to 65.5% in 2027Q2, while operating margin fell from 31.6% to 25.7% over the same window, as reported in Karooooo's quarterly statements; net margin of 17.5% is the lowest in the ten-quarter series.
The parallel decline in gross, operating, and net margins points to mix-driven dilution from Carzuka and Logistics rather than one-off items, meaning the underlying Cartrack SaaS earning power is likely closer to the historical 70%-plus gross margin than the headline suggests. However, because operating margin fell almost as much as gross margin in 2027Q2, overhead leverage is not currently cushioning the mix shift, which tempers the case that this is purely a revenue-recognition-mix effect. For true earning power, analysts should anchor on a SaaS-segment gross margin and an operating margin excluding Carzuka's transactional COGS, since the consolidated figures now blend a subscription model with a vehicle-resale model of structurally different economics.
ROIC Decays as Asset Base Deepens
ROIC has declined from 10.4% in 2025Q4 to 8.5% in 2027Q2, per Karooooo's reported figures, while asset turnover has been pinned at 0.25–0.28x for ten quarters; the simultaneous rise in ROE to 8.6% appears to reflect equity reduction rather than improved operating returns.
With asset turnover flat and margins compressing, the ROIC decay is being driven almost entirely by the margin leg, which implies that the five-fold debt-funded expansion into capitalized telematics hardware and Carzuka inventory is not yet generating incremental returns above its cost. ROIC of 8.5% now sits materially below Sapiens International's 17.4%, a gap that looks structural rather than cyclical given the much higher asset intensity of Karooooo's model. The divergence between rising ROE and falling ROIC is a classic leverage artifact; investors should monitor whether ROIC inflects as the Southeast Asia installed base matures, or whether capital deployed into physical assets continues to dilute the franchise's returns.
Debt Build Compresses Coverage Buffer
Total debt has risen roughly five-fold to $1.4B, lifting D/E from 0.09 to 0.46 and compressing interest coverage from 53.1x in 2025Q1 to 13.1x in 2027Q2, per recent quarterly balance sheet disclosures; the D/E remains below Sapiens' peer-group norms only on a trending basis.
Coverage of 13.1x is still comfortable in absolute terms, but the speed of the build relative to the five-fold rise in debt-to-EBITDA from 0.56 to 2.10 suggests the buffer is thinning faster than earnings can rebuild it, particularly with net margin at a series low. Crucially, D/E of 0.46 now exceeds every peer in the comparison set except none on a trending basis, and given that operating cash flow is being consumed by capital expenditure rather than debt reduction, further borrowing appears the more likely funding path. The absence of disclosed maturity schedules in the supplied data warrants investigation, as refinancing risk would become the binding constraint well before interest coverage does.
Supplier Float Sustains Thin Liquidity
The current ratio has fallen from 1.52 in 2025Q1 to 0.64 in 2027Q2, with the quick ratio tracking identically at 0.64, per Karooooo's reported balance sheets; the -89 day cash conversion cycle, built on 136-day payables against 46-day receivables, suggests supplier terms rather than cash reserves are funding near-term obligations.
The identical current and quick ratios confirm negligible inventory dependence at the consolidated level, which is consistent with a subscription-led model, but it also means there is no inventory liquidation backstop if payables terms were to tighten. A sub-1.0 current ratio alongside rising debt is workable only while suppliers remain willing to extend 136-day terms; in a scenario where vendors demand faster settlement, the company would need to draw on its ~$650M cash balance or incur new facilities to bridge the gap. Given the fortress-equity history referenced in prior analysis, this appears to be a deliberate working-capital strategy rather than distress, but the trajectory should be watched closely if gross margin compression continues to slow internal cash generation.
P/E Misreads Capitalized Acquisition Costs
The 33.5x trailing P/E is the ratio most commonly misapplied to Karooooo, since capitalized hardware depreciation and currency translation both distort net income; with free cash flow margin at just 3.8% in 2027Q1 and unreported in eight of ten quarters, per cash flow disclosures, trailing earnings appear to overstate distributable economics.
Because device and installation costs are capitalized rather than expensed, reported net margin of 17.5% reflects an accounting treatment that front-loads costs onto the balance sheet, making P/E look richer on a cash basis than it does on an accrual basis — or conversely, making growth look cheaper than it truly is when paired with the 1.90 forward P/E artifact. A more reliable lens is an EV/EBITDA or SaaS-only revenue multiple adjusted to treat customer-acquisition capex as operating expense, which would likely raise the effective cost of the growth being purchased. Analysts applying P/E here risk double-counting the margin benefit of capitalization while ignoring that the $3.7B PPE base now represents 59% of assets, an economic reality the multiple simply cannot see.