Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -1.2x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -44.5%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $182M | $328M | $229M | $1.3B | $858M | $2.6B | $2.0B | $246M | $407M | $1.6B | $445M |
| Enterprise Value | $29M | $175M | $103M | $953M | $529M | $2.1B | $1.6B | $159M | $1.4B | $2.7B | $1.4B |
| P/E Ratio → | -1.18 | — | — | — | — | 23.70 | 38.69 | — | — | — | 35.71 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.17 | 0.31 | 0.16 | 0.80 | 0.44 | 0.93 | 0.80 | 0.17 | 0.22 | 0.92 | 0.25 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.46 | 1.51 | 1.41 | 3.49 | 1.33 | 3.44 | 4.57 | 1.38 | 1.93 | 0.55 | 0.16 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 37.99 | 10.99 | — | 0.69 | 3.31 | 0.67 |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | 31.60 | 10.16 | — | 0.44 | 1.86 | 0.43 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.17 | 0.07 | 0.61 | 0.27 | 0.76 | 0.63 | 0.11 | 0.76 | 1.57 | 0.80 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 10.81 | 16.24 | 12.64 | — | — | — | 77.67 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | 17.03 | 14.56 | — | — | — | 67.59 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 31.28 | 8.58 | — | 2.34 | 5.68 | 2.17 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 24.7% | 24.7% | 19.5% | 19.0% | 22.2% | 22.0% | 22.1% | 18.1% | 17.7% | 17.7% | 16.7% |
| Operating Margin | -5.9% | -5.9% | -13.7% | -7.6% | 1.4% | 4.0% | 3.9% | -8.6% | -11.8% | -2.7% | -0.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | -8.1% | -8.1% | -18.6% | -19.7% | -1.8% | 3.9% | 2.1% | -8.2% | -11.4% | -6.5% | 0.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -44.5% | -44.5% | -99.2% | -61.3% | -5.1% | 18.4% | 17.0% | -61.9% | -13.4% | -4.0% | 0.5% |
| ROA | -20.5% | -20.5% | -49.9% | -40.7% | -3.6% | 11.4% | 8.4% | -27.3% | -5.5% | -1.6% | 0.2% |
| ROIC | -91.0% | -91.0% | -296.8% | -46.9% | 6.6% | 57.1% | 160.3% | -14.6% | -6.2% | -0.9% | -0.3% |
| ROCE | -29.8% | -29.8% | -65.8% | -21.7% | 3.6% | 17.1% | 27.5% | -62.0% | -13.4% | -1.0% | -0.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 7.06 | 0.52 | 0.55 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 0.87 | 0.40 | 0.48 | — | — | — | 80.00 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.70 | -0.78 | -0.83 | -0.51 | -0.61 | -1.00 | -0.49 | 4.65 | 0.40 | 0.37 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | -6.71 | -3.49 | -3.54 | — | — | — | 53.81 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | -6.72 | -2.41 | — | 1.65 | 2.37 | 1.50 |
| Interest Coverage | -71.38 | -71.38 | -116.16 | -150.03 | — | 59.32 | 127.75 | -392.38 | -148.83 | -15.25 | 24.29 |
Net cash position: cash ($175M) exceeds total debt ($22M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.01 | 1.51 | 2.17 | 2.03 | 1.78 | 0.82 | 0.10 | 1.83 | 1.87 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.22 | 1.22 | 0.96 | 1.45 | 2.13 | 2.01 | 1.76 | 0.79 | 0.09 | 0.57 | 0.45 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.71 | 1.30 | 1.94 | 1.85 | 1.52 | 0.59 | 0.47 | 0.33 | 0.24 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 2.46 | 3.47 | 2.46 | 2.20 | 2.59 | 3.00 | 3.49 | 3.95 | 0.25 | 0.26 |
| Inventory Turnover | 152.48 | 152.48 | 97.21 | 97.03 | 230.15 | 418.61 | 311.32 | 204.66 | 100.25 | 0.53 | 0.52 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 7.28 | 4.15 | 4.54 | 3.35 | 2.81 | 3.35 | 6.96 | 7.20 | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | 0.0% | — | — | 0.0% | 21.2% | 5.1% | 12.5% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 444.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 4.2% | 2.6% | — | — | — | 2.8% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 2.6% | 9.1% | — | 145.7% | 30.2% | 150.2% |
| Buyback Yield | 3.4% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 36.4% | 0.7% | 0.2% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 3.4% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 57.6% | 5.8% | 12.7% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $60M | $47M | $45M | $44M | $43M | $42M | $35M | $30M | $25M | $25M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying NXH stock.
Neighborhood Intelligence, Inc. Common Stock's current P/E ratio is -1.2x. The historical average is 38.3x.
Neighborhood Intelligence, Inc. Common Stock's return on equity (ROE) is -44.5%. The historical average is -0.8%.
Based on historical data, Neighborhood Intelligence, Inc. Common Stock is trading at a P/E of -1.2x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Neighborhood Intelligence, Inc. Common Stock has 24.7% gross margin and -5.9% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Leverage spike versus cash depletion
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Gross Margin Rebuild Overshadows Operating Losses
Bed Bath & Beyond's gross margin recovered to 26.8% in Q2 2026 from 18.5% in Q1 2024, yet operating margin remains -11.9%, per the reported quarterly statements, indicating the 830 basis point merchandising gain has been fully absorbed by operating expenses rather than converting to earnings.
Gross margin improvement of this magnitude alongside a widening operating loss suggests the margin story is mix- and pricing-driven while the cost base has not been reset to the smaller revenue line. Net margin is a weaker read here than operating margin, since Q4 2024's -26.8% net margin against a -14.1% operating margin and Q2 2026's -10.9% against -11.9% show non-operating swings that distort period-to-period comparison. On that basis, operating margin appears to be the cleaner indicator of true earning power, and it has been negative in all ten quarters.
Returns Stay Deeply Negative Across Ten Quarters
Based on the ten-quarter ratio history, Bed Bath & Beyond's ROIC never turned positive, ranging from -67.0% in Q1 2024 to -15.1% in Q2 2026, a trajectory that suggests narrowing losses on a rebuilt capital base rather than genuine return generation.
The apparent ROIC improvement from -67.0% to -15.1% coincides with a 57% increase in total assets to $634.2 million, so the denominator effect of the asset build, not recovered earning power, may be doing much of the work. ROE of -18.9% in Q2 2026 remains materially negative despite retained losses of -$898.6 million shrinking the equity base, which would normally flatter the ratio. Investors should treat the trend as decay arrested but not reversed, since no quarter in the series produced a positive spread over any plausible cost of capital.
Debt Spike Reshapes Coverage Profile
Bed Bath & Beyond's debt-to-equity ratio leaped from 0.11 to 0.71 between Q1 and Q2 2026 as total debt reached $153.1 million, according to the latest balance sheet disclosures, while no interest coverage figure is reported for that quarter, leaving debt service capacity unquantified against persistent operating losses.
The single-quarter leverage jump reverses two years of a near-debt-free balance sheet, and with D/EBITDA reported at 4.36 as recently as Q4 2025, the company appears to be entering a materially more levered posture just as operating losses persist. Because interest coverage is unavailable across the series, comfort around debt service cannot be assessed from the data provided, and the shift warrants monitoring against the $42.9 million operating loss recorded in Q2 2026. Whether this proves a covenant or refinancing constraint is not determinable from the supplied figures.
Current Ratio Breaches One on Cash Drain
As reported in Q2 2026 filings, Bed Bath & Beyond's current ratio fell to 0.76 with a quick ratio of 0.30, the weakest readings in the ten-quarter series, implying near-term obligations are now covered by current assets at roughly three-quarters the required pace.
The widening gap between the current and quick ratios, from 1.24 and 1.19 in Q1 2024 to 0.76 and 0.30, signals that inventory has become the dominant source of current-asset coverage, reinforced by days inventory outstanding jumping to 25 from single digits. Under stress, specialty retail inventory typically realises below book, so the effective cushion may be thinner than the headline ratio implies. Cash of $29.3 million against $49.1 million of deferred revenue obligations suggests liquidity is increasingly dependent on working-capital timing rather than a cash buffer.
Loss-Making Equity Makes Earnings Multiples Moot
Bed Bath & Beyond trades at 0.31 times sales and 1.18 times book value while its trailing P/E of -3.04 reflects losses rather than cheapness, based on the current multiple set, a discount that peer Williams-Sonoma at 28.3 times earnings does not exhibit.
The absence of forward P/E, EV/EBITDA and P/FCF figures means the market is effectively pricing the equity on asset and sales residuals, not on a credible earnings stream, which is consistent with ten consecutive loss-making quarters. The 1.18 times book value deserves particular scrutiny given accumulated retained losses of -$898.6 million, since book value now appears supported by the recent property, plant and equipment build rather than by retained earnings. Against Williams-Sonoma's 57.8% ROE and 44.3% ROIC, the multiple gap looks structural rather than cyclical, and any re-rating would seem to require demonstrated positive operating margin first.
P/E Misapplied to Loss-Making Retail Model
The trailing P/E of -3.04, as shown in the current multiple table, is the ratio most commonly misapplied to Bed Bath & Beyond, since a negative denominator signals distress rather than valuation and obscures the true variable, which is inventory realisation risk.
A negative P/E conveys no information about cheapness or dearth, and mechanically comparing it to peers such as Williams-Sonoma at 28.3 times would produce a false impression of a deep discount. The more informative substitutes are EV/Sales adjusted for inventory realisation at markdown levels and, once EBITDA turns consistently positive, EV/EBITDA, which would capture the leverage swing to $153.1 million of debt that an equity-only multiple ignores. Similarly, the 1.18 times book value should be read alongside the -15.1% ROIC, since book multiples only signal value when the asset base earns a positive return.