Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -7.2x · EV/EBITDA 4.6x · ROE -9.7%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $931M | $2.3B | $1.7B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.8B | $3.7B | $2.8B |
| Enterprise Value | $5.2B | $6.5B | $6.1B | $6.6B | $6.6B | $6.0B | $6.5B | $6.9B | $7.6B | $8.4B | $7.7B |
| P/E Ratio → | -7.23 | — | — | — | 4.51 | 12.94 | 7.58 | — | 10.84 | 20.15 | 13.60 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0.26 | 0.36 | 0.38 | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.41 | 0.53 | 0.42 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.65 | 1.57 | 1.39 | 1.45 | 1.72 | 2.33 | 4.71 | 3.28 | 2.76 | 3.49 | 6.01 |
| P/FCF | 5.54 | 13.49 | — | 19.49 | — | 6.67 | 12.94 | — | 10.96 | 13.04 | 9.54 |
| P/OCF | 1.55 | 3.78 | 3.43 | 3.10 | 17.11 | 2.81 | 4.13 | 4.57 | 3.53 | 5.06 | 3.77 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.01 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 0.95 | 1.06 | 1.03 | 1.11 | 1.23 | 1.14 |
| EV / EBITDA | 4.61 | 5.80 | 6.08 | 5.07 | 6.33 | 6.10 | 5.96 | 6.20 | 6.63 | 8.70 | 7.43 |
| EV / EBIT | 8.17 | 22.28 | 16.41 | 16.05 | 6.30 | 11.00 | 10.47 | 137.20 | 14.17 | 15.55 | 12.21 |
| EV / FCF | — | 38.73 | — | 50.51 | — | 20.86 | 44.31 | — | 29.90 | 30.15 | 25.83 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 17.3% | 17.3% | 16.0% | 21.1% | 17.7% | 17.2% | 16.0% | 17.5% | 18.7% | 16.5% | 18.1% |
| Operating Margin | 9.9% | 9.9% | 8.0% | 11.4% | 8.5% | 8.5% | — | 9.9% | 10.3% | 7.7% | 9.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -2.0% | -2.0% | -1.6% | -1.4% | 8.5% | 2.3% | 4.1% | -6.0% | 3.7% | 2.6% | 3.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -9.7% | -9.7% | -7.2% | -6.3% | 49.6% | 24.3% | 51.6% | -50.7% | 25.0% | 23.7% | 36.2% |
| ROA | -1.4% | -1.4% | -1.2% | -1.1% | 6.5% | 1.7% | 2.7% | -4.1% | 2.6% | 1.9% | 2.3% |
| ROIC | 8.4% | 8.4% | 6.8% | 10.8% | 8.4% | 8.2% | — | 8.7% | 9.1% | 7.1% | 8.1% |
| ROCE | 9.3% | 9.3% | 7.5% | 11.6% | 8.5% | 7.7% | — | 8.8% | 9.5% | 7.3% | 8.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 3.46 | 3.46 | 4.30 | 2.84 | 3.09 | 5.83 | 12.82 | 9.86 | 5.27 | 5.05 | 11.29 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 4.46 | 4.46 | 5.15 | 3.82 | 4.54 | 4.88 | 4.73 | 5.02 | 4.65 | 5.45 | 5.16 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 2.93 | 3.69 | 2.31 | 2.58 | 4.96 | 11.42 | 8.88 | 4.76 | 4.58 | 10.25 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 3.78 | 3.78 | 4.42 | 3.11 | 3.79 | 4.15 | 4.22 | 4.52 | 4.20 | 4.94 | 4.69 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 25.24 | — | 31.02 | — | 14.19 | 31.36 | — | 18.94 | 17.11 | 16.28 |
| Interest Coverage | 0.86 | 0.86 | 1.11 | 1.20 | 4.37 | 2.54 | 2.33 | 0.16 | 2.06 | 2.03 | 2.31 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.15 | 1.23 | 1.10 | 1.36 | 1.21 | 1.25 | 1.07 | 1.06 | 1.09 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.77 | 0.77 | 0.70 | 0.77 | 0.74 | 0.92 | 0.77 | 0.72 | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0.62 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.24 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.73 | 0.76 | 0.72 | 0.69 | 0.70 | 0.71 | 0.70 | 0.73 |
| Inventory Turnover | 5.31 | 5.31 | 5.70 | 5.24 | 6.65 | 6.45 | 6.09 | 5.29 | 5.50 | 5.54 | 5.58 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 34.14 | 31.97 | 34.47 | 40.46 | 39.73 | 37.33 | 33.88 | 29.14 | 35.23 | 31.59 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.4% | 1.7% | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3.2% | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 22.1% | 7.7% | 13.2% | — | 9.2% | 5.0% | 7.4% |
| FCF Yield | 18.1% | 7.4% | — | 5.1% | — | 15.0% | 7.7% | — | 9.1% | 7.7% | 10.5% |
| Buyback Yield | 4.3% | 1.8% | 2.4% | 1.6% | 1.5% | 2.1% | 0.2% | 2.3% | 5.8% | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 4.3% | 1.8% | 2.4% | 1.6% | 1.5% | 2.1% | 0.6% | 3.9% | 5.8% | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $154M | $155M | $155M | $159M | $160M | $159M | $155M | $162M | $165M | $163M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying OI stock.
O-I Glass, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -7.2x. The historical average is 18.9x.
O-I Glass, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 4.6x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 8.0x.
O-I Glass, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -9.7%. The historical average is 6.2%.
Based on historical data, O-I Glass, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -7.2x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
O-I Glass, Inc. has 17.3% gross margin and 9.9% operating margin.
O-I Glass, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 4.5x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
European operational deterioration
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Margin Compression Signals Structural Stress
Gross margin fell to 12.8% in Q2 2026 from 17.5% a year earlier, according to OI's financial statements, while net margin plunged to -58.3%, reflecting severe cost pressures and one-time charges.
The 470-basis-point gross margin decline suggests that energy costs and lower furnace utilization are eroding pricing power, with operating margin at 7.8% indicating negative operating leverage. The net margin collapse to -58.3% is heavily distorted by a $900M goodwill impairment, but even excluding that, the underlying profitability appears strained. Investors should monitor whether 'Fit to Win' savings can offset European cost inflation, as the current margin trajectory implies limited earnings power.
ROIC Stagnation Amid Equity Erosion
ROIC has hovered between 0.9% and 2.3% over the past ten quarters, as per OI's reported figures, while ROE swung to -98.6% in Q2 2026, indicating that returns on capital are not compounding.
The stable but low ROIC suggests that the company is generating minimal economic profit relative to its capital base, with the recent equity collapse amplifying ROE volatility. The negative ROE is driven by a shrinking equity base rather than a sudden operational collapse, but it underscores that capital allocation has not created shareholder value. The high capital intensity of furnace operations and the need for continuous reinvestment likely cap ROIC unless MAGMA technology delivers a step-change in efficiency.
Working Capital Stretch Masks Cash Strain
Cash conversion cycle improved to 40 days in Q2 2026 from 42 days a year earlier, based on OI's data, but this masks a deteriorating cash position as DPO rose to 67 days.
The modest CCC improvement is driven by a slight reduction in DIO and a stable DSO, but the increase in DPO to 67 days suggests OI is stretching supplier payments to preserve cash. Asset turnover remains low at 0.20, reflecting the heavy fixed-asset base and declining revenue, which implies that efficiency gains are limited. The working capital improvements appear to be a liquidity management tactic rather than a sign of operational efficiency, and the shrinking cash balance warrants close monitoring.
Leverage Spikes as Equity Vanishes
Debt-to-equity surged to 9.25 in Q2 2026 from 2.70 a year earlier, as reported in OI's financial statements, while interest coverage fell to 1.51, indicating a strained debt service capacity.
The dramatic rise in D/E is primarily due to a 77% decline in equity, not an increase in absolute debt, which remained stable at $5.0B. Interest coverage of 1.51 is thin, and the negative coverage in prior quarters suggests that operating income is barely sufficient to service debt. The high D/EBITDA of 19.79 in Q2 2026, though inflated by depressed EBITDA, signals that refinancing risk may be elevated, especially if European operations continue to deteriorate.
Liquidity Buffer Thins Despite Stable Ratio
Current ratio held at 1.26 in Q2 2026, but cash dropped to $339M from $759M in Q4 2025, according to OI's balance sheet data, signaling a shrinking liquidity cushion.
The stable current ratio masks a significant decline in absolute cash, which is concerning given the company's high fixed costs and negative FCF in some quarters. The quick ratio of 0.77 indicates that inventory is a substantial component of current assets, and in a downturn, inventory may not be easily liquidated. With FCF near breakeven and no dividend, OI's liquidity position appears adequate for now but could become strained if European restructuring requires additional cash outlays.
Misapplied EV/EBITDA in a Distressed Cycle
EV/EBITDA of 4.76 appears cheap, but this multiple is misleading for OI because EBITDA is depressed by one-time charges and European losses, as per reported figures.
The market often uses EV/EBITDA to value packaging companies, but for OI, this metric obscures the impact of goodwill impairments and legacy liabilities that are non-cash but recurring in nature. A more appropriate measure would be EV/EBITDAR or EV/(EBITDA minus maintenance capex), which accounts for the high capital intensity and furnace relining costs. Investors should also consider EV/IC or EV/unit of production capacity to better reflect the asset base and its earning power, as the current multiple may overstate the company's true value.