Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -14.3x · EV/EBITDA 11.1x · ROE -5.4%. (2002–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $1.3B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $879M | $1.1B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $2.8B | $2.2B | $2.9B | $3.0B |
| Enterprise Value | $3.5B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $4.2B | $3.7B | $4.3B | $3.9B | $4.6B | $5.1B |
| P/E Ratio → | -14.31 | — | — | — | 7.71 | — | 8.77 | 16.85 | 17.04 | 21.32 | 28.26 |
| P/S Ratio | 2.18 | 1.84 | 1.99 | 1.52 | 2.01 | 4.31 | 3.83 | 5.26 | 4.23 | 4.97 | 5.48 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.84 | 0.69 | 0.71 | 0.51 | 0.61 | 1.27 | 1.08 | 1.54 | 1.30 | 1.44 | 1.40 |
| P/FCF | 151.00 | — | — | 16.93 | 12.07 | 19.06 | 25.36 | 26.74 | 17.02 | 17.49 | 24.25 |
| P/OCF | 9.00 | 7.38 | 5.72 | 4.18 | 5.26 | 9.41 | 10.59 | 13.46 | 10.97 | 11.74 | 12.91 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 5.86 | 6.19 | 5.14 | 5.60 | 7.86 | 6.86 | 8.03 | 7.43 | 7.96 | 9.10 |
| EV / EBITDA | 11.13 | 10.91 | 11.96 | 9.77 | 10.54 | 14.83 | 12.93 | 9.21 | 13.86 | 16.65 | 18.34 |
| EV / EBIT | 44.54 | 74.57 | 80.36 | 56.21 | 14.86 | 82.87 | 41.36 | 40.99 | 20.42 | 22.66 | 71.08 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | 57.23 | 33.63 | 34.74 | 45.49 | 40.78 | 29.88 | 28.04 | 40.28 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -20.7% | -20.7% | 58.9% | 59.3% | 59.9% | 60.1% | 59.8% | 60.4% | 60.2% | 61.6% | 60.6% |
| Operating Margin | 14.1% | 14.1% | 13.0% | 13.4% | 14.9% | 15.3% | 16.6% | 53.8% | 22.0% | 14.2% | 13.3% |
| Net Profit Margin | -14.8% | -14.8% | -13.9% | -8.4% | 26.0% | -0.2% | 43.5% | 43.0% | 24.8% | 23.3% | 19.4% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -5.4% | -5.4% | -4.8% | -2.7% | 8.1% | -0.1% | 12.5% | 13.0% | 7.0% | 6.4% | 4.9% |
| ROA | -2.1% | -2.1% | -1.9% | -1.2% | 3.7% | -0.0% | 6.4% | 6.4% | 3.4% | 3.2% | 2.4% |
| ROIC | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 1.7% | 2.0% | 6.4% | 2.4% | 1.5% | 1.3% |
| ROCE | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.2% | 2.6% | 8.4% | 3.2% | 2.0% | 1.7% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.52 | 1.52 | 1.58 | 1.22 | 1.10 | 1.05 | 0.86 | 0.82 | 0.98 | 0.87 | 0.93 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 7.49 | 7.49 | 8.49 | 6.90 | 6.82 | 6.72 | 5.75 | 3.20 | 5.98 | 6.29 | 7.32 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.52 | 1.51 | 1.21 | 1.09 | 1.05 | 0.86 | 0.81 | 0.98 | 0.87 | 0.92 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 7.49 | 7.49 | 8.12 | 6.88 | 6.76 | 6.69 | 5.72 | 3.17 | 5.96 | 6.26 | 7.30 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | 40.30 | 21.57 | 15.68 | 20.13 | 14.04 | 12.85 | 10.55 | 16.03 |
| Interest Coverage | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.52 | 3.24 | 0.98 | 1.61 | 1.69 | 3.14 | 2.96 | 1.10 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.15 | 0.82 | 1.09 | 2.15 | 1.89 | 1.39 | 1.27 | 0.94 | 1.03 |
| Quick Ratio | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.15 | 0.82 | 1.08 | 2.15 | 1.89 | 1.39 | 1.42 | 1.02 | 1.15 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.12 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | 73.78 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 2.5% | 3.0% | 5.5% | 10.6% | 9.2% | 4.6% | 5.2% | 3.8% | 8.3% | 4.3% | 3.0% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | 71.1% | — | 45.7% | 46.4% | 141.3% | 91.5% | 84.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 13.0% | — | 11.4% | 5.9% | 5.9% | 4.7% | 3.5% |
| FCF Yield | 0.7% | — | — | 5.9% | 8.3% | 5.2% | 3.9% | 3.7% | 5.9% | 5.7% | 4.1% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.9% | 1.5% | 0.6% | 13.4% | 2.1% | 0.3% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 2.6% | 3.2% | 5.6% | 10.8% | 9.6% | 5.4% | 6.7% | 4.4% | 21.7% | 6.4% | 3.3% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $124M | $124M | $124M | $124M | $124M | $126M | $126M | $131M | $145M | $146M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 24 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying PDM stock.
Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -14.3x. The historical average is 23.8x.
Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 11.1x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 13.9x.
Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -5.4%. The historical average is 4.5%.
Based on historical data, Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -14.3x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 2.45%.
Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. has -20.7% gross margin and 14.1% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 7.5x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Unverifiable leverage and refinancing risk
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Distribution Decoupled From Earned Cash
Piedmont's FFO payout ratio reads as unavailable in 2026Q3 alongside a negative $0.05 FFO per share, while distributions fell to roughly $6 thousand, and according to cash flow disclosures, that nominal payout coincides with an AFFO deficit near $77.6 million.
A payout ratio cannot be computed against negative FFO, so the near-zero distribution print should be read as restraint rather than coverage strength; the 2025Q1 reading of 65.4% against $0.38 FFO per share is the only meaningful benchmark in the series, and it has no analogue in recent quarters. The collapse of AFFO per share from $0.06 in 2026Q1 to negative $0.62 in 2026Q3 implies that even if management restored the prior distribution, the retained cash flow required to fund it no longer appears to exist, which investors should monitor against any resumption of dividends.
Debt Collapse Demands Verification
Piedmont's reported debt-to-equity ratio collapsed from 1.54 in 2026Q2 to 0.13 in 2026Q3, an unprecedented move for an office REIT, while interest coverage dropped out of the dataset entirely, and as disclosed in balance sheet filings, total debt fell from about $2.3 billion to $186 million.
A 92% single-quarter reduction in reported debt alongside a $500 million reduction in total assets is more consistent with reclassification or a large disposition than with orderly repayment, and without a disclosed maturity ladder the refinancing profile is effectively unobservable. Because interest coverage was 2.41x in 2026Q2 and is now unavailable, the leverage signal should be treated as mixed rather than improved; if the debt figure proves transitory, covenant headroom and the BBB/Baa2 rating assumption both warrant further investigation.
Multiple Compression Without FFO Support
Piedmont's P/FFO has compressed steadily from 13.38 in 2024Q2 to 11.60 in 2026Q3 even as FFO per share deteriorated, and with a P/E of -14.34 and price-to-book of 0.80, current valuation appears to price distress rather than income.
The declining P/FFO looks like cheapening on the surface, but because the denominator fell from $0.38 to negative $0.05 over the same window, the multiple is mechanically flattering rather than signalling value; a trailing P/FFO is close to meaningless when FFO is negative. Price-to-book at 0.80 against a portfolio carried at roughly $3.5 billion suggests the market is discounting book values materially, which may imply either anticipated impairment of legacy Northern assets or skepticism about the $9.61 price relative to private-market office cap rates — the 2.6% indicated yield, read against negative AFFO, offers no dependable income anchor.
NOI Margin Volatility Undermines Trend
Piedmont's reported NOI margin swung from 59.1% in 2024Q4 to negative 22.7% in 2026Q1, then to 100.0% in 2026Q2 and unavailable in 2026Q3, and as reported in financial statements, ROE has remained negative in all ten quarters between 0.6% and 2.8%.
Margins oscillating between negative and 100% indicate the underlying series is too volatile or too heavily adjusted to support a same-store NOI conclusion, so no organic-versus-acquisitive FFO attribution can be responsibly made from this data. What is consistent is that FFO growth has turned sharply negative — negative 113.2% in 2026Q3 versus 150.8% in 2024Q3 — which suggests the earnings base is contracting on a recurring basis rather than through one-time items, even though the negative gross margin of negative 20.7% remains dominated by non-cash depreciation and warrants forensic separation of impairment from cash operating costs.
Lagging Sunbelt Office Comparables
Against Highwoods' 6.7% return on equity and 19.8% net margin, Piedmont's negative ROE and negative 14.8% net margin place it materially behind its Sunbelt office peers, and per peer comparison data, its price-to-book of 0.80 sits below HIW's 1.38 but above PGRE's 0.36.
Piedmont's debt-to-equity of 0.13 in the latest quarter now reads far below HIW at 1.49 and PGRE at 0.92, but given the anomaly in the debt data this apparent deleveraging should not be read as a competitive advantage until verified. The peer set also shows that PDM's 2.6% indicated yield trails HIW at 6.5% and DEA at 9.1%, implying the market assigns Piedmont less distribution credibility than comparables — an inference that appears consistent with the negative AFFO trajectory rather than with any deliberate capital-return choice.
P/E and D/E Misapplied Here
The single most misapplied ratio for Piedmont is price-to-earnings at negative 14.34, which reflects roughly $3.5 billion of accumulated real estate depreciation rather than operating economics, and per standard REIT convention, P/FFO should replace it but is itself unusable while FFO per share is negative.
Because GAAP net income was negative in all ten quarters while FFO was positive in seven, P/E obscures the traditional depreciation distortion — yet the 2026Q3 convergence of negative net income, negative FFO and deeply negative AFFO means the usual adjustment no longer separates accounting from economics, so AFFO, which deducts tenant improvement and leasing commission outflows, is the appropriate lens. Debt-to-equity is similarly misleading for a REIT using book equity eroded by sustained losses; debt-to-gross-assets against the $3.5 billion asset base would better reflect leverage, though with total debt reported at $186 million the ratio cannot yet be trusted and warrants verification before any solvency conclusion is drawn.