Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 1.3x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE 6.9%. (2024–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $8M | $5M | — |
| Enterprise Value | $8M | $5M | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 1.32 | 0.85 | — |
| P/S Ratio | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.05 | 0.03 | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | — | — |
| Operating Margin | — | — | — |
| Net Profit Margin | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 6.9% | 6.9% | — |
| ROA | 6.6% | 6.6% | -0.0% |
| ROIC | -0.9% | -0.9% | — |
| ROCE | -1.1% | -1.1% | — |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.00 | 0.00 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.00 | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — |
Net cash position: cash ($296249) exceeds total debt ($250000)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.01 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.01 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.01 |
| Asset Turnover | — | — | — |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 75.6% | 117.2% | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $18M | $24M |
Binary deal execution failure
According to recent market data, the P/B ratio of 0.05 suggests a deep discount to book value, yet this metric is misleading as it fails to account for the restricted nature of trust assets which are inaccessible for general corporate operations or value creation for public shareholders.
The P/E ratio of 1.32 is essentially meaningless in this context, as it reflects non-operating interest income rather than sustainable earnings power. Investors should interpret these valuation multiples with extreme caution, as they do not reflect the underlying business performance but rather the market's skepticism regarding the sponsor's ability to execute a value-accretive merger.
Based on reported figures, the ROIC has remained consistently negative, hovering around -0.1% in recent quarters, which highlights the inherent difficulty of generating returns on invested capital when the entity lacks an operational business model and relies solely on passive interest income from its trust account.
The persistent negative ROIC indicates that the costs of maintaining the public listing and search infrastructure are currently outpacing the interest income generated by the trust. This trend suggests that the company is effectively destroying capital during its search phase, warranting further investigation into the sponsor's ability to pivot toward a high-return target.
As reported in financial statements, the current ratio has deteriorated significantly from 4.09 in 2025Q1 to 0.43 in 2026Q1, signaling that the company's liquid assets are no longer sufficient to cover its short-term liabilities as the search for a merger target continues to consume cash reserves.
This rapid decline in liquidity suggests that the company may soon face a funding gap that could necessitate dilutive capital raises or sponsor loans. Investors should monitor the cash burn rate closely, as the current trajectory implies that the company's financial flexibility is becoming increasingly constrained.
The most commonly misapplied metric for this business model is the Price-to-Book ratio, which obscures the reality that the majority of the company's book value is locked in a restricted trust account and cannot be deployed to support operations or drive growth in the current search phase.
Analysts should instead focus on the 'Trust Value per Share' and the 'Sponsor Skin-in-the-Game' as more accurate indicators of the floor value and alignment of interests. Relying on standard equity valuation ratios for a pre-combination SPAC often leads to an overestimation of the company's intrinsic value and a misunderstanding of its true risk profile.
Includes 30+ ratios · 2 years · Updated daily
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying PLMKW stock.
Plum Acquisition Corp. IV's current P/E ratio is 1.3x. The historical average is 0.9x. This places it at the 100th percentile of its historical range.
Plum Acquisition Corp. IV's return on equity (ROE) is 6.9%. The historical average is 6.9%.
Based on historical data, Plum Acquisition Corp. IV is trading at a P/E of 1.3x. This is at the 100th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.