Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -1.8x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE N/A. (2014–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $221M | $187M | $424M | $107M | $137M | $311M | $256M | $90M | $50M | $167M | $150M |
| Enterprise Value | $109M | $75M | $226M | $41M | $69M | $232M | $152M | $19M | $34M | $117M | $103M |
| P/E Ratio → | -1.76 | — | — | — | 11.30 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 215.85 | 66.95 | 10.90 | 4.11 | 1.24 | 3.65 | 15.40 | 13.53 | 54.96 | 806.64 | 18.55 |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | — | 1.46 | 13.79 | — | 10.76 | — | 3.22 | 2.73 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7.50 | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7.33 | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 26.74 | 5.80 | 1.58 | 0.62 | 2.72 | 9.17 | 2.91 | 37.22 | 566.76 | 12.79 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 4.35 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | 1.82 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 4.47 | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 98.2% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Operating Margin | -3099.9% | -3099.9% | -112.8% | -332.3% | 13.1% | -5.4% | -342.4% | -785.6% | -7200.7% | -30813.5% | -428.9% |
| Net Profit Margin | -4658.6% | -4658.6% | -199.0% | -844.9% | 31.9% | -30.2% | -415.0% | -829.0% | -7235.4% | -31556.0% | -448.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | — | — | 60.8% | -1137.9% | — | -3716.0% | -281.6% | -122.4% | -65.9% |
| ROA | -35.6% | -35.6% | -20.9% | -93.3% | 21.7% | -15.8% | -52.0% | -76.8% | -89.8% | -68.6% | -54.8% |
| ROIC | — | — | — | — | 43.1% | — | — | — | — | -910.9% | — |
| ROCE | -25.0% | -25.0% | -13.5% | -45.8% | 12.7% | -5.4% | -76.5% | -141.8% | -130.7% | -77.0% | -62.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | 0.40 | 1.57 | — | 2.30 | — | 0.41 | 0.22 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 2.40 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | -0.73 | -3.50 | — | -8.44 | — | -0.96 | -0.85 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | -4.33 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | -3.03 | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | -83.26 | 12.47 | -2.42 | -43.26 | -35.44 | -42.73 | -53.16 | -27.90 |
Net cash position: cash ($125M) exceeds total debt ($13M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 8.65 | 8.65 | 9.43 | 1.33 | 5.91 | 2.00 | 1.86 | 2.77 | 1.20 | 8.99 | 6.33 |
| Quick Ratio | 8.65 | 8.65 | 9.43 | 1.33 | 5.91 | 2.00 | 1.86 | 2.77 | 1.20 | 9.18 | 6.33 |
| Cash Ratio | 8.38 | 8.38 | 9.25 | 1.13 | 5.37 | 1.77 | 1.70 | 2.58 | 1.06 | 8.81 | 6.14 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.67 | 0.53 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.09 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 145.50 | 8.18 | 124.24 | 32.48 | 42.53 | 158.87 | 273.33 | — | 111.09 | 9.71 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 8.8% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 13.3% | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $26M | $24M | $5M | $4M | $3M | $3M | $1M | $621924 | $567362 | $291497 |
Includes 30+ ratios · 12 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RNAC stock.
Cartesian Therapeutics, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -1.8x. The historical average is 11.3x.
Based on historical data, Cartesian Therapeutics, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -1.8x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Cartesian Therapeutics, Inc. has 100.0% gross margin and -3099.9% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Pipeline-dependent valuation without revenue base
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Pipeline Optionality Priced Without Revenue Anchor
At a P/S of 70.28 and a trailing P/E of -1.33, Cartesian's valuation reflects investor pricing of pre-commercial pipeline potential rather than any measurable revenue stream, as reported in recent financial statements.
The 70.28x price-to-sales multiple has no conventional earnings anchor to support it; with revenue effectively at zero, this multiple is mathematically inflated and reflects the market pricing a binary outcome on lead asset conviction rather than fundamental cash-flow generation. The negative trailing P/E of -1.33 confirms losses, making earnings-based comparisons with profitable peers like TGTX (P/E ~20.7x) analytically meaningless. Investors should recognize that this valuation structure offers no downside support from recurring revenue and is entirely dependent on clinical and regulatory catalysts.
Zero Gross Margin Base Masks Deepening Operating Losses
Cartesian reported a 100% gross margin in eight of the last ten quarters purely because COGS was zero, while operating margins collapsed to -339.7% in 2026Q1 as R&D expense reached $20.4 million against no revenue, per the company's income statements.
The 100% gross margin figure is a statistical artifact of a zero-revenue, zero-COGS structure and carries no analytical value; the meaningful margin to assess is the operating margin, which has deteriorated from -2.3% in 2024Q1 to -339.7% in 2026Q1, indicating that every additional dollar spent on research deepens the operating deficit with no offsetting revenue. Net margins showing positive prints in 2025Q2 (+53.3%) and 2026Q2 (non-operating income) further confirm that non-operating items, not core operations, drive reported profitability. True earning power remains unestablished until the lead program generates commercial revenue.
Elevated Current Ratio Masks Finite Cash Runway
Cartesian's current ratio declined from 13.33 in 2025Q2 to 7.48 in 2026Q2 — a 44% drop — as cash reserves fell 33% from $219.2 million to $147.6 million, per reported balance sheet data.
The current and quick ratios are identical across all ten quarters, confirming zero inventory reliance and that the company's liquidity is entirely cash-driven. While a 7.48x current ratio remains nominally strong, the trajectory matters more than the level: cash has declined from $219.2M to $147.6M over roughly two years against cumulative FCF burn approaching $155 million, suggesting the runway is finite at current spending rates. Under a severe stress scenario — a clinical setback requiring a cash-preservation pivot — the company would likely need to curtail the $20.4M quarterly R&D program substantially to extend runway.
Sudden Debt Spike Compounds Negative Equity Position
Total debt surged 437% from $11.9 million in 2026Q1 to $63.9 million in 2026Q2, breaking a stable ~$12 million borrowing pattern, while accumulated retained losses of -$845.8 million drove equity to -$125.2 million, as reported in Cartesian's financial statements.
The interest coverage ratio of 19.51x in 2026Q2 is analytically misleading — it likely reflects non-operating income rather than any recurring EBITDA capacity, and should not be taken as evidence of comfortable debt service. With negative book equity of -$125.2 million, traditional leverage ratios (D/E, ROIC) break down entirely, as there is no equity base against which to measure. The sudden 437% debt increase in a single quarter against a zero-revenue business model warrants close monitoring: if the debt carries material covenants or maturity constraints, Cartesian may face refinancing risk well before its lead asset reaches commercial viability.
Why P/E Misleads for a Pre-Revenue Biotech Model
The P/E ratio — at -1.33x for RNAC — is the most commonly misapplied metric for this business model, as it fails to capture the binary, milestone-driven economics that define pre-commercial biotech valuation.
For a company with zero recurring revenue and deeply negative retained earnings, P/E is analytically meaningless: it cannot compare loss-making pre-revenue companies with profitable commercial-stage peers, and its negative value carries no directional signal about intrinsic worth. The more appropriate valuation frameworks here are (a) cash-adjusted enterprise value (EV less cash), which isolates what the market is paying purely for pipeline optionality, or (b) probability-adjusted peak sales estimates for the lead asset, discounted back to present value. The P/S of 70.28 is similarly distorted — with a near-zero revenue denominator, it is an arithmetic artifact rather than a meaningful premium indicator — and investors who apply conventional multiples to Cartesian risk drawing conclusions that the underlying financials cannot support.