Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.1x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -256.7%. (2003–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $3M | $2M | $67M | $134M | $225M | $906M | $2.8B | $207M | $330M | $6.4B | $7.7B |
| Enterprise Value | $-1989686 | $-2553841 | $52M | $101M | $187M | $838M | $2.8B | $208M | $326M | $6.4B | $7.7B |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.12 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | — | — | 1057.48 | 268.92 | 75.32 | 337.62 | 1748.50 | 232.59 | 62.18 | 1494.89 | 459.64 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.36 | 0.22 | 5.50 | 5.30 | 4.33 | 12.34 | 71.26 | 3003.12 | 108.52 | — | 2504.60 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | — | 813.93 | 203.29 | 62.54 | 312.24 | 1726.44 | 233.36 | 61.45 | 1495.62 | 459.55 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | — | -10328.5% | -929.0% | -102.1% | -77.9% | -10.4% | 22.3% | 5.5% | -11.1% | 23.0% |
| Operating Margin | — | — | -30382.4% | -5643.5% | -778.4% | -1234.5% | -630.0% | -954.3% | -42.1% | -147.3% | -7.3% |
| Net Profit Margin | — | — | -2752.5% | -6846.9% | -766.9% | -1234.7% | -671.0% | -993.0% | -301.3% | -178.3% | -7.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -256.7% | -256.7% | -9.3% | -88.3% | -36.6% | -58.8% | -54.6% | -568.9% | -525.9% | — | -46.0% |
| ROA | -170.3% | -170.3% | -4.7% | -63.3% | -34.5% | -55.2% | -48.1% | -210.3% | -467.2% | -182.9% | -18.8% |
| ROIC | -895.5% | -895.5% | — | -658.7% | -182.3% | -534.5% | -321.2% | — | — | -8606.7% | -114.0% |
| ROCE | -76.5% | -76.5% | -58.6% | -55.6% | -36.6% | -57.8% | -49.6% | -496.0% | -217.1% | -570.7% | -44.2% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 19.22 | 0.01 | — | 0.02 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.48 | -1.27 | -1.29 | -0.73 | -0.93 | -0.90 | 9.91 | -1.27 | — | -0.52 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | -14306.71 | -31.90 | -49.24 | — | — | -184.61 |
Net cash position: cash ($5M) exceeds total debt ($283742)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 5.60 | 5.60 | 5.11 | 11.37 | 23.19 | 19.81 | 25.26 | 0.83 | 1.90 | 0.28 | 1.72 |
| Quick Ratio | 5.60 | 5.60 | 5.11 | 10.57 | 22.23 | 18.41 | 23.90 | 0.37 | 1.26 | -1.09 | 1.72 |
| Cash Ratio | 4.96 | 4.96 | 4.84 | 7.76 | 21.87 | 17.99 | 23.02 | 0.27 | 1.50 | 0.17 | 0.42 |
| Asset Turnover | — | — | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.32 | 0.94 | 3.54 | 2.34 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | 1.50 | 2.82 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 0.62 | 3.03 | 1.58 | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | 160.22 | 62.26 | 131.85 | 174.27 | 29.17 | 17.91 | 15.98 | 91.59 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | 2.8% | — | — | — | — | 100.0% | 100.0% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 100.0% | 100.0% | 16.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 100.0% | 100.0% | 18.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $875190 | $6M | $5M | $5M | $4M | $4M | $367622 | $408903 | $408903 | $370998 |
Rapid cash depletion risk
According to recent financial data, the company's price-to-book ratio of 0.28 suggests that the market is pricing SBLX significantly below its stated book value, which is consistent with a firm currently functioning as a distressed shell rather than an operational electric vehicle manufacturer.
The lack of meaningful P/E or P/S multiples underscores the absence of core earnings or revenue to support a growth-based valuation. Investors should monitor whether the current market capitalization is merely tracking the remaining cash balance, as the valuation appears to have decoupled from any underlying industrial output.
As reported in historical financial statements, the company has consistently struggled with negative gross and operating margins, with recent figures indicating a total inability to achieve the economies of scale necessary to cover fixed overhead costs in the competitive micro-mobility sector.
The absence of positive gross margins suggests that the company's kit-assembly model is structurally flawed under current cost conditions. This persistent lack of earning power implies that any future profitability would require a fundamental pivot in the business model rather than incremental operational improvements.
Based on reported figures, the company's ROIC has remained deeply negative, frequently dropping below -75% in recent periods, which indicates that the firm is destroying shareholder value rather than compounding capital through its investments in AYRO vehicle platforms.
The trend of decaying returns on invested capital reflects the company's failure to convert R&D and manufacturing readiness into sustainable commercial success. This consistent destruction of capital warrants further investigation into whether the remaining assets can generate any positive return for shareholders.
According to historical data, the company's cash conversion cycle has been highly erratic, with days inventory outstanding reaching as high as 1,049 days, suggesting a severe inability to manage working capital effectively during periods of total commercial inactivity.
The extreme volatility in inventory and payables metrics indicates that the company's supply chain and distribution channels have effectively stalled. This lack of efficiency suggests that the firm is currently unable to leverage its supplier relationships to support a lean manufacturing process.
The most commonly misapplied metric for SBLX is the price-to-sales ratio, which is fundamentally misleading for a company that has experienced a 100% decline in revenue and currently lacks any active commercial operations to justify a growth-based valuation framework.
Investors should instead focus on the cash-to-burn ratio and liquidation value, as the company's current status as a distressed entity renders traditional growth multiples irrelevant. Relying on revenue-based valuation obscures the reality that the firm is currently a capital-depletion vehicle rather than an operational business.
Includes 30+ ratios · 23 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SBLX stock.
StableX Technologies, Inc. - Common Stock's current P/E ratio is -0.1x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
StableX Technologies, Inc. - Common Stock's return on equity (ROE) is -256.7%. The historical average is -75.6%.
Based on historical data, StableX Technologies, Inc. - Common Stock is trading at a P/E of -0.1x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.