Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.5x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE N/A. (2019–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $139M | $463M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $2.5B | $9.5B | $16.2B | — |
| Enterprise Value | $478M | $803M | $1.4B | $1.1B | $2.3B | $8.8B | $16.2B | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.46 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.19 | 0.63 | 1.45 | 0.85 | 1.60 | 7.96 | 23.31 | — |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | 10.61 | 8.44 | 12.91 | 55.14 | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 143.08 | 83.46 | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | 75.12 | 77.28 | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.09 | 1.78 | 0.90 | 1.46 | 7.40 | 23.27 | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 133.00 | 83.31 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 2.2% | 2.2% | 7.5% | -3.0% | -1.7% | 1.9% | 8.7% | 1.3% |
| Operating Margin | -34.3% | -34.3% | -32.7% | -35.4% | -35.4% | -17.0% | -9.1% | -20.3% |
| Net Profit Margin | -39.9% | -39.9% | -42.9% | -38.9% | -35.1% | -15.9% | -11.3% | -25.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | — | -243.8% | -107.2% | -36.9% | -66.2% | — |
| ROA | -27.7% | -27.7% | -27.5% | -29.7% | -28.1% | -11.4% | -8.3% | -18.2% |
| ROIC | -5050.4% | -5050.4% | -166.6% | -263.1% | -572.6% | -92.1% | -24.8% | — |
| ROCE | -167.1% | -167.1% | -79.7% | -85.7% | -76.0% | -29.8% | -19.0% | -54.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | 3.37 | 1.22 | 0.16 | 0.96 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | 0.73 | -0.73 | -0.91 | -0.10 | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | -10.08 | -0.15 | — |
| Interest Coverage | -2.21 | -2.21 | -4.18 | -10.78 | -72.90 | -19.71 | -2.72 | -2.64 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0.61 | 0.82 | 0.47 | 0.33 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.35 | 0.45 | 0.57 | 0.81 | 0.46 | 0.33 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 0.44 | 0.69 | 0.37 | 0.22 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.76 | 0.68 | 0.95 | 0.80 | 0.60 | 0.51 | 0.73 |
| Inventory Turnover | 62.14 | 62.14 | 60.20 | 57.99 | 29.84 | 124.53 | 119.32 | 413.97 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 12.76 | 15.44 | 14.49 | 27.24 | 26.73 | 30.78 | 18.97 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 0.7% | 1.2% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 1.2% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.2% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $35M | $35M | $15M | $12M | $10M | $8M | $5M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 7 years · Updated daily
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying UP stock.
Wheels Up Experience Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -0.5x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Based on historical data, Wheels Up Experience Inc. is trading at a P/E of -0.5x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Wheels Up Experience Inc. has 2.2% gross margin and -34.3% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Structural unit economic failure
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Margin Compression Reflects Operational Inefficiency
As reported in financial statements, the company's gross margin plummeted to -1.2% in 2026Q1, illustrating that the variable costs of flight operations are currently exceeding service revenue, a trend that suggests the business model lacks the necessary scale to absorb its high fixed-cost structure.
The persistent negative operating margins, which reached -35.1% in the most recent quarter, indicate that corporate overhead and technology investments remain significantly decoupled from revenue generation. This suggests that the company is struggling to achieve the operating leverage required to reach profitability, leaving it highly vulnerable to inflationary pressures in the aviation labor market.
Capital Destruction Through Asset Intensity
Based on reported figures, the company's ROIC has remained deeply negative, hitting -159.5% in 2025Q1, which highlights a consistent failure to generate returns on invested capital that exceed the cost of maintaining an asset-heavy fleet in a highly competitive and capital-intensive industry.
The erratic and consistently negative ROIC trends suggest that past capital allocation decisions, particularly regarding fleet expansion and M&A, have been value-destroying rather than compounding. Investors should monitor whether the recent Delta-led capital injection is being utilized to stabilize core operations or if it is merely funding further inefficient capital deployment.
Working Capital Cycles Indicate Liquidity Stress
According to recent SEC filings, the company's cash conversion cycle has remained volatile, with the 2026Q1 cycle of 8 days reflecting a precarious reliance on customer prepayments to fund ongoing operations rather than generating cash through efficient internal asset turnover or service delivery.
The low asset turnover ratio of 0.18 suggests that the company is not effectively utilizing its physical assets to drive revenue, which is a critical failure for an aviation services provider. This inefficiency, combined with the reliance on deferred revenue, implies that the company's liquidity position is highly sensitive to any slowdown in new member acquisition or flight demand.
Precarious Liquidity and Solvency Risks
As documented in periodic filings, the current ratio has deteriorated to 0.19 in 2026Q1, a level that indicates severe constraints on the company's ability to meet short-term obligations without the continuous support of external financing or strategic partners like Delta Air Lines.
The rapid decline in the quick ratio suggests that the company has minimal buffer to withstand even minor operational disruptions or unexpected spikes in fuel and maintenance costs. This liquidity profile warrants further investigation into the terms of the company's credit facilities and the potential for future dilutive capital raises to maintain solvency.
Misapplication of Revenue-Based Valuation Multiples
Based on the company's distressed financial profile, the P/S ratio of 0.41 is frequently misapplied by market participants who treat the firm as a growth-oriented logistics platform rather than a capital-intensive aviation operator facing structural unit economic failure.
Using revenue multiples obscures the reality that the company's top-line growth is currently tied to high-cost, low-margin flight services that do not contribute to cash flow. Analysts should instead focus on the burn-down rate of deferred revenue and the contribution margin per flight hour to better assess the company's true path to operational sustainability.