Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.1x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -114.4%. (2020–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $628716 | $4M | $1M | $7M | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $-3223224 | $-313893 | $-1925936 | $-1814360 | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.07 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 99.31 | 558.84 | 9.20 | 863.44 | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.07 | 0.65 | 0.28 | 0.83 | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | -49.58 | -12.31 | -211.93 | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -838.2% | -838.2% | 32.3% | -15.9% | — | -7.6% | 45.8% |
| Operating Margin | -97344.8% | -97344.8% | -4153.3% | -66963.7% | — | -520.5% | -652.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | -95739.2% | -95739.2% | -4304.8% | -63748.3% | — | -525.8% | -802.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -114.4% | -114.4% | -95.9% | -141.6% | — | — | — |
| ROA | -101.8% | -101.8% | -88.0% | -110.7% | -2392.9% | -1115.4% | -3543.4% |
| ROIC | -273.2% | -273.2% | -662.2% | — | — | — | — |
| ROCE | -111.4% | -111.4% | -91.4% | -148.8% | — | — | — |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.02 | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.71 | -0.65 | -1.03 | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | -105.63 | -105.63 | -249.73 | -351.84 | -112.35 | -22.49 | -7.15 |
Net cash position: cash ($4M) exceeds total debt ($377004)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 7.27 | 7.27 | 25.94 | 10.61 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
| Quick Ratio | 7.13 | 7.13 | 25.58 | 10.58 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Cash Ratio | 6.28 | 6.28 | 21.26 | 10.30 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.00 | — | 1.32 | 4.42 |
| Inventory Turnover | 0.63 | 0.63 | 1.75 | 0.41 | — | 6.32 | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 1767.29 | 508.33 | — | — | 2.74 | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $124142 | $80257 | $42519 | $45496 | $45496 | $45496 |
Existential liquidity and solvency
According to recent market data, VRAX trades at a price-to-sales ratio of 91.90, which appears disconnected from its negligible revenue base and suggests that investors are pricing the entity as a speculative shell rather than a functional commercial enterprise with a viable long-term growth trajectory.
The extreme P/S multiple is a mathematical artifact of the company's near-total revenue collapse rather than an indicator of high growth expectations. Investors should interpret this valuation as a reflection of the company's status as a potential reverse-merger candidate rather than an assessment of its underlying diagnostic business.
As reported in financial statements, VRAX recorded a gross margin of -838.21% in the most recent period, a figure that highlights a fundamental inability to align inventory procurement with market demand and suggests significant, recurring write-downs of obsolete diagnostic and PPE inventory assets.
This level of margin erosion implies that the company is effectively paying to distribute its products, which is unsustainable for any commercial entity. The operating margin of -97,344% further confirms that the current administrative cost structure is entirely disproportionate to the firm's negligible commercial output.
Based on reported figures, the company's cash conversion cycle has reached an extreme 5,866 days as of 2026Q2, indicating a total breakdown in the ability to convert inventory into cash and a reliance on external funding to cover basic operational requirements in a stagnant market.
The massive DSO and DIO figures suggest that the company is unable to collect on sales or clear inventory effectively, which exacerbates the cash burn. This inefficiency warrants further investigation into whether the reported distribution partnerships are actually active or merely dormant agreements.
As evidenced by quarterly filings, the current ratio of 11.35 appears deceptively healthy, yet it masks a rapid depletion of cash reserves from $9.4M in 2023Q4 to $3.3M, signaling that the company's liquidity position is deteriorating under the weight of persistent, heavy operating losses.
While the high current ratio suggests an ability to meet short-term obligations, the lack of incoming cash flow means this buffer is strictly finite. Investors should monitor the monthly burn rate, as the current trajectory suggests the company may face a liquidity crisis in the near term.
Based on an analysis of the business model, the price-to-sales ratio is the most commonly misapplied metric for VRAX, as it obscures the company's transition from a commercial diagnostic distributor to a distressed entity with negligible revenue and no clear path to sustainable operational profitability.
Using P/S to value VRAX is misleading because the denominator is so small that it renders the multiple meaningless for comparative analysis. Analysts should instead focus on the cash-to-burn ratio or the liquidation value of the remaining assets to assess the company's true worth as a public vehicle.
Includes 30+ ratios · 6 years · Updated daily
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying VRAX stock.
Virax Biolabs Group Limited's current P/E ratio is -0.1x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Virax Biolabs Group Limited's return on equity (ROE) is -114.4%. The historical average is -117.3%.
Based on historical data, Virax Biolabs Group Limited is trading at a P/E of -0.1x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Virax Biolabs Group Limited has -838.2% gross margin and -97344.8% operating margin.