Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -42.8x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -24.5%. (2011–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $5.6B | $4.2B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $2.6B | $5.1B | $5.1B | $2.4B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $707M |
| Enterprise Value | $5.9B | $4.6B | $5.5B | $5.0B | $2.6B | $4.6B | $5.2B | $2.3B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $659M |
| P/E Ratio → | -42.79 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 8.91 | 6.79 | 9.00 | 9.90 | 5.52 | 13.17 | 17.58 | 9.25 | 5.68 | 6.13 | 4.30 |
| P/B Ratio | 10.43 | 7.08 | 10.89 | 10.09 | 5.21 | 8.61 | 54.69 | 25.14 | 12.24 | 11.65 | 8.55 |
| P/FCF | 41.20 | 31.43 | 45.72 | 90.98 | 5507.78 | — | — | — | 109.93 | 120.80 | 200.86 |
| P/OCF | 37.67 | 28.74 | 43.07 | 83.18 | 220.39 | 715.63 | — | — | 65.19 | 81.54 | 96.29 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 7.39 | 10.04 | 10.06 | 5.42 | 11.88 | 17.71 | 9.20 | 5.50 | 5.87 | 4.01 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 34.17 | 50.96 | 92.48 | 5399.70 | — | — | — | 106.45 | 115.66 | 187.14 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 79.1% | 79.1% | 83.0% | 85.6% | 85.3% | 84.8% | 84.9% | 86.2% | 89.8% | 90.4% | 90.4% |
| Operating Margin | -23.5% | -23.5% | -19.4% | -26.3% | -24.8% | -27.6% | -26.8% | -29.9% | -10.8% | -6.2% | -9.5% |
| Net Profit Margin | -20.7% | -20.7% | -17.4% | -20.2% | -26.3% | -30.0% | -32.1% | -31.0% | -10.6% | -6.4% | -10.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -24.5% | -24.5% | -20.3% | -20.4% | -22.7% | -33.8% | -100.2% | -72.0% | -23.8% | -14.0% | -21.3% |
| ROA | -7.5% | -7.5% | -6.9% | -9.4% | -11.6% | -14.0% | -21.5% | -26.1% | -10.8% | -6.5% | -10.2% |
| ROIC | -11.0% | -11.0% | -10.0% | -19.3% | -32.3% | -71.2% | -54.8% | -72.0% | -32.5% | -21.8% | -34.2% |
| ROCE | -14.0% | -14.0% | -12.2% | -16.3% | -13.7% | -16.9% | -29.5% | -51.1% | -21.8% | -12.1% | -16.7% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.96 | 0.96 | 1.66 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.51 | 2.90 | 0.61 | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.62 | 1.25 | 0.17 | -0.10 | -0.84 | 0.41 | -0.13 | -0.39 | -0.50 | -0.58 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | 2.74 | 5.24 | 1.49 | -108.08 | — | — | — | -3.49 | -5.14 | -13.72 |
| Interest Coverage | -9.01 | -9.01 | -9.00 | -17.64 | -14.19 | -8.58 | -15.25 | -371.57 | -143.44 | -58.77 | -110.27 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.97 | 1.97 | 1.19 | 2.43 | 3.87 | 4.44 | 2.22 | 1.28 | 1.72 | 1.87 | 1.94 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.97 | 1.97 | 1.19 | 2.43 | 3.87 | 4.44 | 2.22 | 1.28 | 1.72 | 1.87 | 1.94 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.40 | 1.40 | 0.80 | 1.74 | 3.20 | 3.81 | 1.63 | 0.75 | 1.09 | 1.17 | 1.29 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.35 | 0.53 | 0.80 | 0.95 | 0.89 | 0.90 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 169.37 | 156.76 | 134.93 | 110.32 | 112.75 | 119.49 | 109.72 | 114.92 | 127.85 | 120.36 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 2.4% | 3.2% | 2.2% | 1.1% | 0.0% | — | — | — | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.5% |
| Buyback Yield | 2.1% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.9% | 2.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 2.1% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.9% | 2.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $129M | $112M | $109M | $109M | $105M | $94M | $91M | $87M | $82M | $79M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 15 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying VRNS stock.
Varonis Systems, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -42.8x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Varonis Systems, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -24.5%. The historical average is -51.4%.
Based on historical data, Varonis Systems, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -42.8x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Varonis Systems, Inc. has 79.1% gross margin and -23.5% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Persistent operating losses
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Gross Margin Erosion Clouds Path
Gross margin contracted to 75.3% in 2026Q2 from 83.6% in 2024Q4, as reported in financial statements, while operating margin improved to -22.6% from -32.1% over the same period, indicating persistent structural losses.
The 830 basis point decline in gross margin over six quarters suggests that the shift toward cloud-delivered SaaS is embedding higher infrastructure costs into the cost of revenue, a trend that may be partially offset by scale but warrants monitoring for permanence. Despite the improvement in operating margin from the trough of -44.6% in 2024Q1, the company remains deeply unprofitable, with net margin of -26.0% in 2026Q2, implying that the revenue acceleration is not yet translating into bottom-line leverage. The reported figures indicate that the core software delivery remains efficient, but the heavy investment in sales and R&D continues to outpace gross profit generation, leaving the company reliant on external funding to sustain operations.
Capital Returns Remain Deeply Negative
ROIC improved to -4.0% in 2026Q2 from -6.4% in 2024Q1, based on reported figures, but remains deeply negative, indicating that the company is destroying value on invested capital as it scales its SaaS model.
The improvement in ROIC is marginal and still reflects a business that is not generating returns above its cost of capital, a common feature during a transition to recurring revenue where upfront investments depress current returns. ROE of -10.4% in 2026Q2, while better than the -24.5% reported in the prior year, still indicates that shareholder equity is being eroded by ongoing losses, and the negative returns are driven by margin weakness rather than asset inefficiency, as asset turnover remains low at 0.11. The data suggests that the company is in a period of investment where returns on capital are expected to remain negative until the SaaS base reaches a scale that allows operating leverage to materialize, but investors should monitor whether the improving trend continues.
Working Capital Swings Distort Efficiency
DSO spiked to 104 days in 2026Q1 from 78 days in 2024Q2, as reported in financial statements, while DPO remained minimal, indicating that the company is extending payment terms to customers but not leveraging supplier financing, creating cash flow volatility.
The sharp increase in DSO suggests that the company is offering more favorable payment terms to drive SaaS adoption, which may be a competitive necessity but also ties up cash and increases the risk of collection issues. The near-zero DPO indicates that the company is not using supplier credit to fund its operations, which is unusual for a software firm and may reflect the nature of its cost structure, where a significant portion of costs are employee-related rather than inventory-based. The cash conversion cycle is not calculable due to missing DIO data, but the reported swings in working capital, as highlighted in the cash flow analysis, suggest that efficiency metrics are heavily influenced by billing seasonality and contract timing, making quarter-to-quarter comparisons less meaningful.
Debt-Fueled Transition Raises Stakes
Debt-to-equity rose to 1.16 in 2026Q2 from 0.68 in 2024Q1, according to reported figures, while interest coverage turned negative at -53.25, indicating that the company's growing debt load is becoming less comfortable relative to its operating losses.
The doubling of the D/E ratio over the past two years suggests that management is using leverage to fund the SaaS transition and recent acquisitions, a strategy that increases financial risk given the company's lack of profitability. The negative interest coverage in 2026Q2, driven by operating losses, implies that the company is not generating enough earnings to cover its interest expense, though the actual interest burden may be manageable given the low absolute debt levels. The reported figures indicate that the company's balance sheet is becoming more strained, and investors should monitor whether the company can refinance its obligations or generate sufficient cash flow to service debt as losses persist.
Liquidity Buffer Thins Despite Cash Rise
Current ratio fell to 1.65 in 2026Q2 from 2.44 in 2024Q2, as reported in financial statements, while cash increased to $233.6M, indicating a tighter liquidity position that may be vulnerable to stress.
The decline in the current ratio suggests that current liabilities are growing faster than current assets, likely due to increased deferred revenue and accrued expenses associated with the SaaS model, which is a positive sign for future revenue but reduces the liquidity cushion. The quick ratio of 1.65 in 2026Q2, which excludes inventory, is identical to the current ratio, indicating that inventory is not a factor in this business, and the company's liquidity is primarily dependent on cash and receivables. Given the company's negative operating margins and reliance on external financing, the current liquidity position appears adequate but not robust, and a severe downturn could strain the company's ability to meet its short-term obligations without additional capital raises.
P/E Misleads in Transition
The P/E ratio is commonly misapplied to Varonis because it is negative and meaningless given the company's GAAP losses; instead, investors should focus on EV/Sales or price-to-ARR, as reported figures show a forward P/E of 270.11 that obscures the underlying growth.
The negative trailing P/E and the extremely high forward P/E of 270.11 reflect the market's expectation of future profitability, but they provide little insight into the company's current valuation relative to its growth potential. A more appropriate metric is EV/Sales, which at 7.36 times trailing revenue, appears rich but may be justified if the company can achieve the operating leverage implied by its SaaS transition. The most commonly misapplied ratio is the P/E, as it fails to capture the value of the company's deferred revenue backlog and the recurring nature of its subscription revenue, which are better reflected in metrics like price-to-ARR or EV/forward revenue. Investors should adjust for the J-curve effect of the SaaS transition and focus on cash flow multiples, such as P/FCF of 34.04, which, while still elevated, provides a more meaningful comparison to peers.