Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.5x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -16.7%. (2020–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $4M | $2M | $126M | — | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $3M | $28107 | $126M | — | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.52 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 3.99 | 1.70 | 33.63 | — | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.40 | 0.44 | 3.53 | — | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.03 | 33.57 | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 7.7% | 7.7% | 35.5% | 65.9% | 69.3% | 78.4% | 65.4% |
| Operating Margin | -301.6% | -301.6% | -190.1% | -45.7% | -29.5% | 48.3% | 28.5% |
| Net Profit Margin | -298.8% | -298.8% | -231.4% | -46.8% | -24.7% | 36.7% | 25.5% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -16.7% | -16.7% | -40.3% | -55.2% | -33.4% | 142.2% | 75.7% |
| ROA | -14.4% | -14.4% | -33.5% | -33.2% | -14.1% | 60.2% | 18.9% |
| ROIC | -11.9% | -11.9% | -23.2% | -36.7% | -23.7% | 100.4% | 25.8% |
| ROCE | -16.7% | -16.7% | -32.7% | -51.0% | -33.5% | 142.2% | 38.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.31 | 0.23 | 1.46 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 0.21 | 1.68 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.43 | -0.01 | -0.57 | -1.15 | -1.13 | 1.07 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | -1.03 | 1.24 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | -5.62 | 8.84 |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Net cash position: cash ($2M) exceeds total debt ($0)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 11.11 | 11.11 | 7.29 | 2.48 | 0.99 | 1.92 | 1.25 |
| Quick Ratio | 11.11 | 11.11 | 7.29 | 2.48 | 0.99 | 1.92 | 1.25 |
| Cash Ratio | 4.37 | 4.37 | 0.50 | 1.72 | 0.92 | 1.48 | 0.21 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.23 | 0.09 | 0.53 | 0.61 | 1.07 | 0.74 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $892314 | $590000 | $590000 | $590000 | $590000 | $590000 |
Imminent liquidity depletion risk
According to recent market data, WAI trades at a P/S multiple of 3.93, which appears disconnected from the company's -301.60% operating margin and suggests that investors may be mispricing the firm as a growth entity rather than a distressed asset facing severe structural headwinds.
The current valuation multiples, including a P/B of 0.39, indicate that the market has largely written off the company's book value as a going concern. This pricing suggests that any potential recovery is not currently factored into the share price, as the market likely anticipates further equity dilution or asset impairment.
As reported in financial statements, the company's gross margin has collapsed to 7.66%, a figure that highlights the inability of the current service model to cover direct costs, let alone generate the operating leverage required to sustain a professional services firm in the competitive Chinese SME market.
The shift from historical profitability to a -301.60% operating margin suggests that the company's fixed-cost structure is entirely misaligned with its current revenue generation capacity. Investors should monitor whether management can implement a radical cost-cutting program, as the current trajectory implies that the core business model is fundamentally non-viable.
Based on historical performance data, WAI's ROIC has plummeted from 31.1% to -22.3%, illustrating a rapid transition from efficient capital compounding to significant value destruction that warrants deep skepticism regarding the company's ability to allocate resources effectively in its current state.
The decline in ROIC is primarily driven by the erosion of operating margins rather than asset turnover, suggesting that the firm is failing to extract value from its existing client relationships. This trend implies that the company's capital base is being consumed by operating losses rather than being reinvested into high-return growth initiatives.
As indicated by the reported asset turnover of 0.06, the company's ability to generate revenue from its asset base has deteriorated significantly, suggesting that the firm's high-friction consulting model is failing to achieve the necessary scale to optimize its working capital cycle.
The extremely high DSO of 579 days suggests that the company is struggling to collect on its advisory services, which may indicate either poor credit quality among its SME clients or a lack of leverage in enforcing payment terms. This inefficiency exacerbates the firm's liquidity crisis by trapping cash in uncollected receivables.
The P/S ratio is frequently misapplied to WAI, as it obscures the company's inability to convert revenue into gross profit, making the firm appear more valuable than its negative operating cash flow and deteriorating margins would otherwise suggest to a fundamental analyst.
Investors should instead focus on the cash burn rate relative to the remaining cash balance, as the P/S multiple fails to account for the company's high fixed-cost structure. A more appropriate metric would be the cash runway, which highlights the urgent need for a strategic pivot or external funding.
Includes 30+ ratios · 6 years · Updated daily
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying WAI stock.
Top KingWin Ltd's current P/E ratio is -0.5x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Top KingWin Ltd's return on equity (ROE) is -16.7%. The historical average is 12.1%.
Based on historical data, Top KingWin Ltd is trading at a P/E of -0.5x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Top KingWin Ltd has 7.7% gross margin and -301.6% operating margin.