Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -22.3x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE N/A. (2019–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $870M | $656M | $397M | $210M | $140M | $464M | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $845M | $631M | $389M | $204M | $106M | $382M | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -22.32 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 9.36 | 9.29 | 6.87 | 3.92 | 2.78 | 12.25 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | 13.91 | 3.73 | 8.77 | — | — |
| P/FCF | 401.24 | 122.64 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 129.20 | 97.36 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 8.94 | 6.74 | 3.80 | 2.11 | 10.09 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 118.00 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 90.2% | 90.2% | 89.7% | 90.5% | 91.5% | 90.1% | 95.3% | 94.1% |
| Operating Margin | -47.0% | -47.0% | -54.7% | -65.5% | -57.3% | -57.5% | -11.9% | 23.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | -49.2% | -49.2% | -58.3% | -68.7% | -54.4% | -61.8% | -10.2% | 18.5% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | -483.5% | -140.1% | -60.6% | -100.3% | — | — |
| ROA | -31.4% | -31.4% | -32.2% | -33.8% | -23.2% | -28.7% | -9.4% | 21.8% |
| ROIC | — | — | -16987.1% | -408.9% | -579.9% | — | — | — |
| ROCE | -74.7% | -74.7% | -61.2% | -54.8% | -38.5% | -47.1% | -34.2% | 95.6% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | 0.51 | 0.10 | 0.07 | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.48 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | -0.39 | -0.90 | -1.55 | — | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -1.26 |
| Debt / FCF | — | -4.64 | — | — | — | — | -4.62 | -0.84 |
| Interest Coverage | -171.39 | -171.39 | -115.56 | -149.69 | -308.21 | -37.59 | -43.68 | 25.08 |
Net cash position: cash ($34M) exceeds total debt ($9M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.13 | 1.13 | 1.17 | 1.26 | 1.86 | 2.51 | 1.03 | 1.19 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.13 | 1.13 | 1.17 | 1.26 | 1.86 | 2.51 | 1.03 | 1.19 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.74 | 0.89 | 1.56 | 2.02 | 0.42 | 0.73 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.61 | 0.54 | 0.52 | 0.44 | 0.31 | 0.74 | 1.17 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 99.21 | 131.36 | 85.87 | 57.43 | 167.11 | 170.97 | 81.78 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 0.2% | 0.8% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $42M | $39M | $36M | $33M | $22M | $32M | $22M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 7 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying AIP stock.
Arteris, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -22.3x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Based on historical data, Arteris, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -22.3x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Arteris, Inc. has 90.2% gross margin and -47.0% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Cash runway versus operating losses
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Premium Multiple Without Earnings Support
Based on reported figures, AIP trades at a price-to-sales multiple of 10.09 and a price-to-free-cash-flow multiple of 432.76, valuations that rely almost entirely on future royalty growth rather than current earnings power. The negative trailing P/E of -24.08 signals that the market is pricing expected operating leverage rather than demonstrated profitability. Investors should monitor whether revenue growth of roughly 22% to 48% can translate into margin improvement, since the current multiple leaves little room for execution slippage.
The 10.09 price-to-sales ratio sits well above the sub-4 multiples of Photronics and the near-zero growth profile implied by CEVA's negative earnings, yet it is less extreme than SiTime, which trades near 557 times earnings. Against its own short history, the multiple reflects the market rewarding recent bookings momentum and annual contract value growth of 39% year over year. The implication is that the valuation is effectively a bet on royalty stream durability, which the company has not yet demonstrated through sustained positive operating cash flow.
Gross Margin Strength Obscured by Opex
As reported in quarterly statements, gross margins held between 83% and 91% across the ten quarters while operating margins stayed between -38% and -58%, a gap indicating that operating expense growth has absorbed the entire IP licensing margin advantage. Based on reported figures, the latest operating margin of -43.9% reflects R&D rising from $10.7M to $16.4M over the period.
A gross margin near 87% is structurally consistent with pure IP licensing, but it is only meaningful if operating costs eventually scale below revenue growth, which has not occurred across the observed window. The persistent gap suggests that management is prioritizing design-win acquisition and engineering headcount over near-term breakeven. Analysts should treat gross margin as the measure of franchise quality and operating margin as the measure of execution, and the current spread argues for patience only if operating expense growth decelerates.
Negative Returns Reflect Unproven Compounding
According to reported ratios, return on invested capital reached only -2.1% in the latest quarter, with return on equity of -16.7% and return on assets of -4.9%, suggesting the business is not yet compounding capital. Based on reported figures, returns have remained negative across the sampled periods, with ROE swinging from -112.6% to -3.1%.
The erratic ROE series is partly distorted by the shift from a stockholders' deficit to positive equity following capital raises, which mechanically inflates the denominator and makes the trend difficult to read in isolation. Against peers, Semtech earns a 25.3% ROE and 11.2% ROIC, highlighting how far Arteris remains from value-creating returns. The underlying driver is operating margin rather than asset efficiency, since asset turnover is stable, so improvement depends on margin expansion rather than capital discipline alone.
Low Debt Load but Thin Coverage
Based on reported figures, the debt-to-equity ratio fell to 0.14 in the latest quarter, while interest coverage remains deeply negative at -120.28, indicating that debt service is not constrained by debt quantum but by the absence of operating earnings. The low leverage appears manageable, though the negative coverage ratio means the company cannot service debt from operations.
Leverage metrics look benign in isolation, but the D/E improvement from 2.11 in early 2026 reflects the equity raise rather than debt reduction, so the apparent deleveraging should not be credited to operating improvement. Coverage ratios are negative across all reported quarters, which means refinancing or covenant risk depends on the company's ability to access equity or maintain its cash buffer rather than on earnings. Investors should monitor whether debt levels remain modest as cash burn persists.
Current Ratio Thin Against Burn Rate
As reported in the balance sheet, the current ratio stood at 1.35 in the latest quarter, down from 1.57 the prior quarter, with quick ratio identical because inventory is negligible for an IP licensor. Based on reported figures, cash of $71.0M against total liabilities of $162.1M provides a buffer that appears adequate only if quarterly losses remain near current levels.
Because current assets are dominated by cash and receivables rather than inventory, the quick and current ratios converge, making the liquidity read straightforward but also highlighting how much depends on collection timing. Deferred revenue rising from $54.7M to $112.1M suggests contracted demand but also represents obligations that consume the liability side of the ratio. Under severe stress, a sustained operating loss near the implied annual run rate would erode the cash buffer within a horizon that warrants close monitoring.
P/S Misapplied to a Royalty Model
The price-to-sales ratio is the metric most commonly misapplied to AIP, because it treats upfront licensing revenue and long-tail royalties as economically equivalent. Based on reported figures, the 10.09 multiple obscures the timing difference between recognized license revenue and future per-unit royalties that may arrive years later.
A licensing company recognizing a large multi-year deal can report a sales spike that inflates the denominator in any single period, making P/S look cheap or expensive depending on timing. A more informative approach is to value the royalty backlog separately, using annual contract value and the design-win pipeline as the basis, and to adjust for stock-based compensation that the cash flow statement adds back. Investors should treat P/S as a directional screen rather than a valuation anchor for this business model.