Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 17.7x · EV/EBITDA 96.8x · ROE 289.7%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $137.1B | $165.5B | $114.5B | $158.0B | $113.4B | $118.4B | $121.8B | $185.0B | $189.0B | $180.1B | $100.2B |
| Enterprise Value | $180.6B | $209.0B | $154.9B | $197.9B | $156.0B | $168.7B | $177.9B | $203.1B | $195.2B | $182.3B | $101.4B |
| P/E Ratio → | 17.69 | 87.55 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 18.08 | 21.96 | 20.46 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.44 | 1.85 | 1.72 | 2.03 | 1.70 | 1.90 | 2.09 | 2.42 | 1.87 | 1.92 | 1.07 |
| P/B Ratio | 24.22 | 30.33 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 461.10 | 437.14 | 114.28 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | 35.64 | 49.51 | — | — | — | 13.97 | 15.70 | 12.71 |
| P/OCF | 128.69 | 155.41 | — | 26.51 | 32.28 | — | — | — | 12.34 | 13.50 | 9.55 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.34 | 2.33 | 2.54 | 2.34 | 2.71 | 3.06 | 2.65 | 1.93 | 1.94 | 1.08 |
| EV / EBITDA | 96.76 | 33.53 | — | 190.29 | — | — | — | 685.99 | 13.84 | 14.71 | 12.05 |
| EV / EBIT | 42.18 | 38.66 | — | 435.90 | — | — | — | — | 16.16 | 17.42 | 16.66 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | 44.64 | 68.14 | — | — | — | 14.42 | 15.89 | 12.86 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 4.8% | 4.8% | -3.0% | 9.9% | 5.3% | 4.9% | -9.8% | 5.8% | 19.4% | 18.5% | 15.5% |
| Operating Margin | 4.8% | 4.8% | -16.3% | -1.1% | -5.3% | -4.6% | -22.0% | -2.6% | 11.9% | 11.0% | 7.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | 2.5% | 2.5% | -17.8% | -2.9% | -7.4% | -6.7% | -20.5% | -0.8% | 10.3% | 9.0% | 5.4% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 289.7% | 289.7% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2545.0% | 1312.3% | 138.4% |
| ROA | 1.4% | 1.4% | -8.1% | -1.6% | -3.6% | -2.9% | -8.4% | -0.5% | 10.0% | 9.3% | 5.5% |
| ROIC | 7.5% | 7.5% | -27.4% | -2.5% | -8.5% | -5.9% | -40.1% | -18.1% | 192.6% | 323.2% | 137.0% |
| ROCE | 7.2% | 7.2% | -21.5% | -1.9% | -6.8% | -4.7% | -25.2% | -5.5% | 33.4% | 27.2% | 15.6% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 9.97 | 9.97 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 33.77 | 26.98 | 11.41 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 8.73 | 8.73 | — | 50.58 | — | — | — | 93.09 | 0.98 | 0.90 | 1.19 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 7.97 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 14.90 | 5.38 | 1.38 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 6.98 | 6.98 | — | 38.38 | — | — | — | 61.04 | 0.43 | 0.18 | 0.14 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | 9.00 | 18.63 | — | — | — | 0.45 | 0.19 | 0.15 |
| Interest Coverage | 1.95 | 1.95 | -3.48 | 0.18 | -0.97 | -0.86 | -5.71 | -2.13 | 25.43 | 29.07 | 19.90 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.32 | 1.14 | 1.22 | 1.33 | 1.39 | 1.05 | 1.08 | 1.16 | 1.25 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.42 | 0.31 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.46 | 0.26 | 0.31 | 0.37 | 0.38 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.29 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.20 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.53 | 0.43 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.57 | 0.86 | 1.02 | 1.04 |
| Inventory Turnover | 1.01 | 1.01 | 0.78 | 0.88 | 0.81 | 0.75 | 0.78 | 0.94 | 1.30 | 1.73 | 1.83 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 49.28 | 61.46 | 51.92 | 61.95 | 66.68 | 63.08 | 59.46 | 51.84 | 44.25 | 36.15 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 0.3% | 0.2% | — | — | — | — | 1.0% | 2.5% | 2.1% | 1.9% | 2.7% |
| Payout Ratio | 14.8% | 14.8% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 37.7% | 40.4% | 54.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 5.7% | 1.1% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.5% | 4.6% | 4.9% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | 2.8% | 2.0% | — | — | — | 7.2% | 6.4% | 7.9% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.4% | 4.8% | 5.1% | 7.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 3.9% | 6.8% | 7.0% | 9.7% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $762M | $647M | $606M | $595M | $588M | $569M | $568M | $586M | $611M | $644M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying BA stock.
The Boeing Company's current P/E ratio is 17.7x. The historical average is 26.0x. This places it at the 35th percentile of its historical range.
The Boeing Company's current EV/EBITDA is 96.8x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 13.8x.
The Boeing Company's return on equity (ROE) is 289.7%. This is above the typical threshold of 15-20% considered good for most companies. The historical average is 68.4%.
Based on historical data, The Boeing Company is trading at a P/E of 17.7x. This is at the 35th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
The Boeing Company's current dividend yield is 0.25% with a payout ratio of 14.8%.
The Boeing Company has 4.8% gross margin and 4.8% operating margin.
The Boeing Company's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 8.7x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Interest coverage below one
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Operating Recovery Trails Peer Margins
Boeing's operating margin recovered to just 0.6% in 2026Q3 from negative 32.3% at the 2024Q3 trough, yet its 9.0% gross margin trails RTX's 20.1% by roughly 11 points, as shown in the reported statements, suggesting manufacturing normalisation remains incomplete.
The gross margin is the more honest read of earning power here because it absorbs the abnormal production and rework costs that operating-margin comparisons across program-accounting regimes can blur; at 9.0% against a peer group near 20%, Boeing appears to be recovering volume without yet recovering cost control. The divergence between a positive 0.6% operating margin and a negative 0.5% net margin in 2026Q3 implies that below-the-line items, plausibly interest expense given 0.79x coverage, are still consuming the entire operating result. The 34.3% net margin printed in 2025Q4 alongside a negative operating margin should be treated as a non-recurring artefact rather than evidence of true earning power, so any adjusted earnings base should be built from operating income less unabsorbed abnormal costs.
Capital Base Yields Near Zero
ROIC has oscillated between negative 16.3% in 2024Q3 and 0.9% in 2025Q1 before settling at 0.2% in 2026Q3, according to recent filings, indicating the capital base is generating effectively no economic return versus Northrop Grumman's 10.2% and Lockheed Martin's 23.9%.
Read against its own ten-quarter history, Boeing appears to have stopped destroying capital but has not started compounding it, and the improvement from the 2024Q3 trough looks margin-driven rather than efficiency-driven, since asset turnover has only edged from 0.10 to 0.14 over the same window. The 150.6% ROE reported for 2025Q4 should be disregarded entirely, as it reflects a temporarily compressed equity base rather than genuine returns to shareholders, and the subsequent return to a negative 1.8% ROE in 2026Q3 confirms the instability of that denominator. Investors should also note that much of the equity repair appears to have come from acquisition-generated goodwill rather than retained earnings, which means even the ROIC denominator is flattered relative to the tangible capital actually deployed.
Interest Coverage Barely Above One
Debt-to-equity of 7.00 in 2026Q3, down from 9.97 at 2025Q4, still exceeds Lockheed Martin's 3.23, while interest coverage of 0.79 suggests reported earnings do not yet cover borrowing costs, per the latest balance sheet disclosures, leaving refinancing terms a key vulnerability.
The $12 billion of debt reduction since 2024Q2 has lowered refinancing exposure, but coverage has swung from negative 6.49 to 13.62 to 0.39 within four quarters, a range that implies debt service comfort is currently a function of one-off items rather than a stable operating earnings stream. At 0.79x in the most recent quarter, coverage below one suggests the company may be relying on its roughly $9.5 billion cash position to meet coupon obligations rather than on period earnings, which is a materially weaker posture than peers running 8-12% net margins. Because goodwill now accounts for roughly $17.8 billion of a $6.5 billion book equity base, the headline debt-to-equity ratio both overstates the cushion and, on a tangible basis, understates the effective leverage, so analysts should track net-debt-to-tangible-equity alongside the reported figure.
Inventory Days Dominate Working Capital
Boeing's cash conversion cycle stretched to 346 days in 2026Q3, with days inventory outstanding of 375 dwarfing 62 days of payables, as reported in the quarterly disclosures, implying nearly a full year of capital remains locked in unfinished aircraft before conversion to cash.
The improvement from a 493-day cycle in 2024Q2 to 346 days is meaningful, but decomposing it shows the gain is overwhelmingly an inventory story (DIO falling from 492 to 375) rather than a supplier-finance story, since DPO has actually shortened from 68 to 62 over the same period. Falling DSO from 69 to 33 days suggests customer collections are disciplined, but the inventory drawdown may reflect clearing previously parked aircraft rather than a structurally leaner production system, so investors should monitor whether DIO continues to fall under the FAA production ceiling. The combination of a shortening cycle and a still-sub-1.0x quick ratio of 0.34 indicates that working-capital release is a necessary but insufficient source of liquidity while inventory remains the dominant asset on the balance sheet.
Recovery Premium Outpaces Earnings Base
A trailing P/E of 67.81 and price-to-book of 23.49 sit far above Northrop Grumman's 18.96 and 4.75, while forward EV/EBITDA of 46.48 compares with NOC's 16.28, based on the quoted multiples, indicating the market is pricing delivery normalisation rather than current earnings power.
The trailing P/E is arguably flattering already, because it is calculated on net income that includes the roughly $9 billion non-operating swing in 2025Q4; on operating earnings alone, the multiple would appear considerably higher, which is the more relevant framing for a company with a 0.2% ROIC. The price-to-book of 23.49 should be treated cautiously since book equity of about $6.5 billion is itself flattered by $17.8 billion of goodwill and tangible equity is roughly negative $11.3 billion, making the book multiple largely uninformative rather than merely rich. The only multiple that appears usable, P/S of 1.49, prices each dollar of revenue at a level that presupposes a return toward mid-single-digit operating margins, which the current 0.6% operating margin and 1.9% FCF margin have not yet validated.
P/E Misreads Turnaround Earnings Base
The trailing P/E of 67.81 is the most commonly misapplied ratio for Boeing because reported net income includes a roughly $9 billion non-operating swing in 2025Q4, per income statement filings, meaning the multiple flatters earnings quality while operating returns remain near zero.
Because program accounting spreads historical costs across the aircraft backlog and abnormal production charges are expensed as incurred, reported earnings bear little relationship to current manufacturing economics, so a P/E computed on that base implicitly assumes a cost structure the quarter's 0.6% operating margin does not demonstrate. The adjustment that better fits this business model would be an EV/Sales or segment-derived EBITDA multiple normalised for abnormal costs and unabsorbed overhead, which would let the market price the delivery pipeline and the high-margin services annuity rather than an unstable bottom line. The same caution applies to ROE, printed at 150.6% in 2025Q4, which is distorted by a compressed equity denominator and should not be compared with Lockheed Martin's 78.8% as though the two measured the same thing.