Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 28.2x · EV/EBITDA 13.1x · ROE 3.7%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $190M | $135M | $133M | $146M | $175M | $165M | $165M | $157M | $217M | $420M | $320M |
| Enterprise Value | $238M | $183M | $200M | $210M | $230M | $264M | $258M | $137M | $184M | $370M | $292M |
| P/E Ratio → | 28.21 | 22.19 | — | — | 6.90 | 9.17 | — | — | 26.32 | 23.03 | 20.24 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.57 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.37 | 0.36 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0.35 | 0.47 | 0.93 | 0.74 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.16 | 0.82 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 1.02 | 1.05 | 0.88 | 1.14 | 2.20 | 1.77 |
| P/FCF | 23.47 | 15.09 | — | 118.29 | — | 43.35 | 5.39 | — | 20.84 | 20.13 | 18.24 |
| P/OCF | 14.11 | 10.02 | 32.95 | 7.80 | — | 11.35 | 4.50 | 15.96 | 7.55 | 11.56 | 8.20 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.54 | 0.61 | 0.54 | 0.47 | 0.61 | 0.77 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.82 | 0.68 |
| EV / EBITDA | 13.13 | 10.98 | — | 29.96 | 5.12 | 6.81 | 20.74 | 10.61 | 6.73 | 9.18 | 7.23 |
| EV / EBIT | 30.37 | 20.72 | — | — | 6.74 | 11.60 | — | — | 14.97 | 13.17 | 11.10 |
| EV / FCF | — | 20.38 | — | 169.93 | — | 69.35 | 8.43 | — | 17.65 | 17.73 | 16.65 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 56.3% | 56.3% | 54.4% | 52.9% | 51.1% | 51.3% | 51.6% | 50.1% | 60.7% | 60.8% | 61.2% |
| Operating Margin | 2.3% | 2.3% | -4.9% | -0.8% | 7.2% | 5.6% | -0.3% | -0.1% | 3.1% | 6.0% | 6.5% |
| Net Profit Margin | 1.8% | 1.8% | -2.9% | -0.8% | 13.5% | 4.2% | -3.1% | -0.4% | 1.8% | 4.0% | 3.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 3.7% | 3.7% | -5.5% | -1.7% | 36.5% | 11.2% | -6.2% | -1.0% | 4.3% | 9.8% | 8.8% |
| ROA | 1.8% | 1.8% | -2.7% | -0.8% | 15.8% | 4.4% | -3.1% | -0.7% | 2.8% | 6.4% | 5.6% |
| ROIC | 2.6% | 2.6% | -5.1% | -0.9% | 10.2% | 7.1% | -0.4% | -0.3% | 7.1% | 13.8% | 13.8% |
| ROCE | 3.0% | 3.0% | -5.8% | -1.0% | 11.8% | 8.5% | -0.4% | -0.3% | 6.7% | 13.1% | 14.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.59 | 0.82 | 0.88 | — | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 5.33 | 5.33 | — | 16.58 | 2.59 | 3.44 | 11.16 | — | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.18 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.29 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.28 | 0.61 | 0.59 | -0.11 | -0.17 | -0.26 | -0.16 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 2.85 | 2.85 | — | 9.10 | 1.22 | 2.55 | 7.48 | -1.53 | -1.22 | -1.25 | -0.69 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 5.29 | — | 51.64 | — | 26.01 | 3.04 | — | -3.19 | -2.40 | -1.60 |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | -478.00 | -112.09 | 897.37 | 690.61 | — | -289.00 | 215.14 | 120.13 | 47.70 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.89 | 1.89 | 1.93 | 2.03 | 1.95 | 1.34 | 1.36 | 1.89 | 1.82 | 1.91 | 1.83 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.09 | 1.09 | 1.18 | 1.22 | 1.10 | 0.76 | 0.89 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 1.26 | 1.13 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.77 | 0.77 | 0.82 | 0.90 | 0.79 | 0.39 | 0.54 | 0.51 | 0.69 | 0.92 | 0.76 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.04 | 0.97 | 1.05 | 1.20 | 1.02 | 0.84 | 1.64 | 1.57 | 1.54 | 1.55 |
| Inventory Turnover | 2.37 | 2.37 | 2.74 | 2.92 | 2.78 | 2.69 | 2.98 | 3.40 | 2.80 | 3.26 | 3.15 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 18.82 | 19.27 | 15.26 | 15.18 | 17.42 | 34.60 | 17.26 | 15.22 | 15.84 | 15.51 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 3.6% | 5.1% | 5.0% | 4.1% | 11.5% | 4.7% | 2.8% | 3.3% | 4.1% | 1.8% | 2.0% |
| Payout Ratio | 113.8% | 113.8% | — | — | 30.9% | 42.6% | — | — | 107.1% | 42.3% | 39.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 3.5% | 4.5% | — | — | 14.5% | 10.9% | — | — | 3.8% | 4.3% | 4.9% |
| FCF Yield | 4.3% | 6.6% | — | 0.8% | — | 2.3% | 18.6% | — | 4.8% | 5.0% | 5.5% |
| Buyback Yield | 1.1% | 1.6% | 1.1% | 2.9% | 8.6% | 3.4% | 1.3% | 4.7% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 2.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 4.8% | 6.7% | 6.0% | 7.0% | 20.2% | 8.0% | 4.1% | 8.0% | 6.8% | 1.9% | 4.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $9M | $9M | $9M | $9M | $10M | $10M | $10M | $11M | $11M | $11M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying BSET stock.
Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated's current P/E ratio is 28.2x. The historical average is 19.0x. This places it at the 84th percentile of its historical range.
Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated's current EV/EBITDA is 13.1x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 14.0x.
Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated's return on equity (ROE) is 3.7%. The historical average is 4.0%.
Based on historical data, Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated is trading at a P/E of 28.2x. This is at the 84th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated's current dividend yield is 3.63% with a payout ratio of 113.8%.
Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated has 56.3% gross margin and 2.3% operating margin.
Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 5.3x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Inventory intensity straining cash conversion
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Gross Recovery Meets Operating Drag
Bassett's operating margin improved to 3.5% in 2026Q3 from -10.1% in 2024Q2, yet net margin of 2.5% still trails peers, indicating the 57.5% gross margin gains are largely absorbed by fixed overhead, as reported in Bassett's recent quarterly filings.
Gross margin has recovered 500bp to 57.5%, but operating margin of 3.5% implies fixed SG&A now consumes more than 90% of gross profit, so net margin of 2.5% appears the more representative measure of current earning power rather than the headline gross figure. Versus Flexsteel's 7.2% net margin on a comparable revenue scale, Bassett's conversion looks structurally weaker than merely cyclical, which suggests the recent profitability improvement may be a reversion from crisis levels rather than a durable steady state.
Returns Stay Sub-Scale Despite Deleveraging
ROIC has recovered to 1.0% in 2026Q3 from -2.6% in 2024Q2, but remains far below Flexsteel's 21.0% peer level, suggesting Bassett's shrinking asset base has not yet translated into commensurate earning power, as computed from Bassett's reported balance sheets and income statements.
ROIC of 1.0% and ROE of 1.3% sit only marginally above a typical cost of capital, implying the company appears to be preserving rather than compounding value on a $312M asset base, with the improvement driven mainly by margin repair rather than efficiency. Asset turnover has crept from 0.22 to 0.26 while equity has been retired through dividends and buybacks, so the modest ROE uptick may partly reflect a smaller denominator rather than stronger operating returns, and investors should watch whether ROIC can clear mid-single digits before treating the trajectory as a genuine compounding signal.
Inventory Duration Anchors Working Capital
Cash conversion cycle stretched to 144 days in 2026Q3 from 122 days in 2024Q4, driven by inventory holding near 160 days versus DSO of 15, implying finished-goods warehousing dominates the working-capital profile, according to Bassett's quarterly operating metrics.
The 15-day receivable collection period against 160 days of inventory indicates the entire working-capital burden sits on the product side, consistent with a manufacturer operating branded retail showrooms where shelf stock must be carried. DPO has moved only from 31 to 32 days over the ten-quarter window, so supplier financing provides little offset, meaning the elevated cycle appears unlikely to compress materially without deliberate inventory reduction — an area where further slippage would likely pressure seasonal free cash flow.
Leverage Eases but Coverage Unseen
Bassett's debt-to-equity ratio fell to 0.50 in 2026Q3 from 0.64 in 2024Q4, yet D/EBITDA of 16.04 remains elevated versus Hamilton Beach's 0.23 D/E, suggesting balance-sheet improvement reflects debt paydown more than earnings recovery, per Bassett's recent disclosures.
The declining D/E trend alongside a shrinking asset base reads as deliberate deleveraging rather than distress, but D/EBITDA above 16x signals that the debt load is still large relative to the modest EBITDA a 3.5% operating margin generates, leaving limited cushion if the margin recovery reverses. Interest coverage is unavailable for nine of the ten quarters shown, so the pace of debt service remains difficult to assess from the supplied data, and the combination of elevated D/EBITDA with thin operating margins warrants monitoring for refinancing or covenant sensitivity.
Cheap Book Value, Pricey Earnings
BSET trades at 31.26x trailing earnings and 14.24x EV/EBITDA while sporting a 0.56x price-to-sales multiple, a combination suggesting depressed profits rather than a cheap franchise, with the 3.6% dividend yield compensating investors for limited growth, as compiled from current market data.
The 1.15x P/B versus Flexsteel's 3.02x and Hamilton Beach's 2.32x frames Bassett as a balance-sheet value proposition, though the 16% contraction in net PP&E complicates book comparisons because the asset base being valued is itself shrinking faster than it is being renewed. Forward multiples of 23.61x P/E and 12.75x EV/EBITDA discount to trailing levels, which embeds some earnings improvement, but with ROIC near 1% the pricing appears to rest on continued cost recovery rather than demonstrated returns on capital, leaving little margin for another demand-driven margin setback.
Trailing P/E Misreads Cyclical Base
Trailing P/E of 31.26x is the ratio most often misread for Bassett, because a cyclically depressed earnings base and prior operating losses inflate the multiple, whereas EV/EBITDA of 14.24x and a 0.56x P/S imply a different pricing story, per current market quotations.
Because net margin swung from -8.6% in 2024Q2 to 2.5% in 2026Q3, trailing P/E conflates cycle position with valuation: the same business reads as expensive in a trough and cheap in a recovery, so the 31.26x figure is largely an artifact of where in the cycle the twelve-month window sits. A normalized-earnings EV/EBITDA, adjusted for the roughly $8M cumulative gap between depreciation and capex that has flattered reported free cash flow, would arguably capture what investors are actually paying for the franchise; based on Bassett's own figures, the adjusted multiple would likely look less comfortable than the headline P/S suggests.