Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 3.4x · EV/EBITDA 55.0x · ROE 8.0%. (1997–2026 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $11M | $12M | $12M | $16M | $30M | $67M | $132M | $43M | $66M | $79M | $39M |
| Enterprise Value | $16M | $17M | $44M | $51M | $76M | $109M | $146M | $59M | $83M | $97M | $65M |
| P/E Ratio → | 3.42 | 3.58 | — | 29.14 | — | 8.04 | 10.41 | 7.59 | 9.94 | 15.13 | 13.66 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 0.38 | 0.56 | 0.71 | 0.37 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.66 | 1.42 | 3.27 | 1.46 | 2.56 | 3.88 | 2.56 |
| P/FCF | 7.58 | 7.91 | 4.33 | 2.01 | — | — | 35.82 | 11.91 | 26.05 | 10.16 | — |
| P/OCF | 5.53 | 5.77 | 3.74 | 1.82 | 513.17 | — | 16.83 | 10.12 | 16.82 | 8.58 | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.78 | 1.29 | 0.99 | 0.86 | 0.77 | 0.71 | 0.52 | 0.70 | 0.87 | 0.61 |
| EV / EBITDA | 54.95 | 56.60 | — | 128.14 | — | 8.85 | 8.30 | 6.94 | 8.29 | 11.27 | 10.61 |
| EV / EBIT | — | 1.30 | — | 14.49 | — | 9.00 | 8.20 | 6.80 | 9.70 | 10.86 | 12.88 |
| EV / FCF | — | 11.59 | 15.86 | 6.38 | — | — | 39.74 | 16.30 | 32.56 | 12.47 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 62.4% | 62.4% | 61.5% | 64.6% | 63.8% | 68.9% | 70.7% | 67.4% | 67.1% | 72.4% | 73.2% |
| Operating Margin | -3.6% | -3.6% | -19.8% | -4.1% | -2.9% | 7.2% | 7.8% | 6.2% | 7.2% | 6.6% | 4.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | 15.3% | 15.3% | -15.4% | 1.1% | -2.9% | 5.8% | 6.2% | 5.0% | 5.6% | 4.7% | 2.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 8.0% | 8.0% | -12.2% | 1.2% | -5.4% | 19.1% | 36.2% | 20.4% | 28.8% | 29.3% | 20.1% |
| ROA | 4.9% | 4.9% | -6.3% | 0.6% | -2.4% | 8.4% | 16.4% | 8.4% | 10.2% | 8.2% | 4.9% |
| ROIC | -1.0% | -1.0% | -6.7% | -1.8% | -2.1% | 10.6% | 24.0% | 12.0% | 15.9% | 13.9% | 10.1% |
| ROCE | -1.7% | -1.7% | -11.9% | -3.5% | -4.5% | 17.0% | 32.2% | 15.0% | 19.8% | 19.2% | 15.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.80 | 0.78 | 1.02 | 0.92 | 0.40 | 0.64 | 0.76 | 1.01 | 1.74 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 22.42 | 22.42 | — | 90.01 | — | 3.49 | 0.92 | 2.22 | 1.98 | 2.40 | 4.33 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.13 | 0.79 | 0.76 | 1.01 | 0.92 | 0.36 | 0.54 | 0.64 | 0.88 | 1.69 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 17.95 | 17.95 | — | 87.87 | — | 3.46 | 0.82 | 1.87 | 1.66 | 2.09 | 4.22 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 3.68 | 11.53 | 4.38 | — | — | 3.93 | 4.39 | 6.51 | 2.31 | — |
| Interest Coverage | 8.82 | 8.82 | -2.13 | 1.27 | -0.58 | 13.26 | 31.71 | 9.73 | 9.18 | 8.00 | 4.89 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.33 | 3.33 | 1.40 | 3.88 | 1.17 | 1.90 | 1.53 | 2.27 | 1.76 | 1.57 | 1.30 |
| Quick Ratio | 3.30 | 3.30 | 0.62 | 1.30 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.44 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.16 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.02 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.38 | 0.44 | 0.57 | 0.88 | 1.29 | 2.30 | 1.75 | 1.72 | 1.82 | 1.61 |
| Inventory Turnover | 40.75 | 40.75 | 0.45 | 0.41 | 0.54 | 0.62 | 1.16 | 1.23 | 1.17 | 1.16 | 0.84 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 14.41 | 22.70 | 13.85 | 12.08 | 9.34 | 5.97 | 10.30 | 10.01 | 9.50 | 9.99 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | 2.9% | 5.1% | 1.7% | 3.9% | 1.8% | — | 3.8% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | 41.3% | 17.9% | 29.4% | 18.4% | — | 51.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 29.2% | 27.9% | — | 3.4% | — | 12.4% | 9.6% | 13.2% | 10.1% | 6.6% | 7.3% |
| FCF Yield | 13.2% | 12.6% | 23.1% | 49.8% | — | — | 2.8% | 8.4% | 3.8% | 9.8% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 1.2% | 1.2% | 0.0% | 3.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 4.0% | 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.2% | 1.2% | 0.0% | 3.5% | 2.9% | 5.1% | 1.8% | 7.8% | 2.2% | 0.1% | 3.8% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $9M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying EDUC stock.
Educational Development Corporation's current P/E ratio is 3.4x. The historical average is 15.5x.
Educational Development Corporation's current EV/EBITDA is 55.0x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 11.2x.
Educational Development Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is 8.0%. The historical average is 13.9%.
Based on historical data, Educational Development Corporation is trading at a P/E of 3.4x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Educational Development Corporation has 62.4% gross margin and -3.6% operating margin.
Educational Development Corporation's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 22.4x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Consultant base attrition risk
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Distressed Valuation Amidst Revenue Decay
According to recent market data, EDUC trades at a P/S of 0.60 and a P/FCF of 8.96, metrics that appear to reflect a market pricing in significant terminal risk rather than a recovery, especially given the lack of a forward P/E multiple due to persistent operating losses.
The low P/S ratio suggests that investors are heavily discounting the company's revenue stream, likely due to the 36% contraction in sales and the uncertainty surrounding the PaperPie rebranding. While the P/FCF multiple might appear attractive in isolation, it is likely distorted by non-recurring cash inflows, making it an unreliable indicator of sustainable valuation for a business currently struggling to maintain its core operational scale.
Operating Margin Compression Masks Potential
As reported in financial statements, EDUC maintains a robust gross margin of 62.36%, yet the company's operating margin has deteriorated to -3.60%, suggesting that the fixed cost structure is no longer aligned with the current, significantly reduced volume of business activity.
The wide gap between gross and operating margins highlights an inability to leverage the distribution infrastructure, which appears to be a structural burden rather than a competitive asset at current revenue levels. Investors should monitor whether management can successfully right-size SG&A expenses, as the current negative operating margin indicates that the core business is not generating sufficient returns to cover its overhead.
Working Capital Inefficiency and Turnover
Based on quarterly filings, the company's Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO) has surged to 2944 days in 2026Q4, a dramatic increase that indicates a severe slowdown in inventory velocity and potential risks regarding the obsolescence of the current book catalog.
The ballooning DIO, when paired with a Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) that has reached 2692 days, suggests that capital is becoming increasingly trapped in stagnant inventory. This inefficiency warrants further investigation, as it implies that the company's distribution model is failing to move product at a pace that justifies the maintenance of such high inventory levels.
Liquidity Buffer Under Severe Stress
According to the 2026Q4 balance sheet, the quick ratio has fallen to 0.51, a level that suggests the company's ability to meet short-term obligations is increasingly dependent on the liquidation of inventory rather than readily available cash reserves.
This liquidity profile appears vulnerable, particularly given the company's reliance on a direct-sales model that is currently experiencing significant volatility. If the consultant base continues to contract, the company may face a liquidity crunch, as the current cash position provides little margin for error in covering fixed operational costs.
Misapplication of Traditional Retail Metrics
The most commonly misapplied metric for EDUC is the P/E ratio, which obscures the company's true financial health by including non-recurring gains from asset sales that do not reflect the underlying, and currently negative, earning power of the publishing and direct-sales operations.
Analysts should instead focus on 'Active Consultant Count' and 'Operating Cash Flow' to gauge the viability of the business model, as these metrics provide a more accurate picture of the company's operational momentum. Relying on P/E in this context is misleading, as it ignores the structural risks inherent in the direct-sales labor model and the potential for further margin erosion.