Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 32.4x · EV/EBITDA 7.3x · ROE 8.3%. (1997–2026 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $156M | $239M | $255M | $542M | $610M | $692M | $615M | $274M | $513M | $355M | $260M |
| Enterprise Value | $143M | $225M | $231M | $500M | $587M | $656M | $600M | $284M | $524M | $390M | $297M |
| P/E Ratio → | 32.41 | 48.45 | 81.50 | 23.14 | 34.41 | 37.46 | 45.28 | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.60 | 0.91 | 0.96 | 1.89 | 2.18 | 2.63 | 2.74 | 1.38 | 2.28 | 1.69 | 1.40 |
| P/B Ratio | 3.15 | 4.65 | 3.82 | 6.52 | 7.76 | 8.36 | 7.70 | 4.61 | 6.26 | 4.40 | 3.05 |
| P/FCF | 9.62 | 14.72 | 21.12 | 9.59 | 27.50 | 14.76 | 14.61 | 14.99 | 21.73 | 48.33 | 87.95 |
| P/OCF | 7.23 | 11.05 | 8.81 | 9.00 | 17.07 | 13.25 | 13.31 | 9.95 | 16.85 | 21.03 | 14.97 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.86 | 0.87 | 1.74 | 2.09 | 2.50 | 2.68 | 1.43 | 2.33 | 1.86 | 1.60 |
| EV / EBITDA | 7.26 | 31.45 | 12.44 | 11.07 | 15.10 | 17.22 | 25.28 | 19.36 | 37.42 | 54.42 | 128.79 |
| EV / EBIT | 19.92 | — | 38.15 | 14.63 | 21.39 | 27.64 | 73.43 | 91.12 | 177.77 | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 13.90 | 19.14 | 8.84 | 26.47 | 13.98 | 14.27 | 15.51 | 22.21 | 53.12 | 100.63 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 75.0% | 75.0% | 76.2% | 77.0% | 76.1% | 76.8% | 77.1% | 73.3% | 70.7% | 70.7% | 66.2% |
| Operating Margin | 2.7% | 2.7% | 2.1% | 11.5% | 9.4% | 9.0% | 3.6% | 1.5% | 1.2% | -1.6% | -4.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.1% | 8.1% | 6.3% | 7.0% | 6.1% | -4.8% | -0.5% | -2.8% | -3.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 8.3% | 8.3% | 4.1% | 28.9% | 22.0% | 22.7% | 19.6% | -13.3% | -1.3% | -7.1% | -8.0% |
| ROA | 2.1% | 2.1% | 1.2% | 9.2% | 7.0% | 7.2% | 6.0% | -4.4% | -0.5% | -2.8% | -3.6% |
| ROIC | 13.2% | 13.2% | 10.2% | 51.5% | 38.6% | 31.7% | 9.1% | 2.8% | 1.9% | -2.1% | -5.4% |
| ROCE | 9.4% | 9.4% | 6.2% | 34.2% | 26.4% | 21.7% | 7.5% | 2.7% | 2.2% | -2.7% | -6.7% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 0.41 | 0.62 | 0.48 | 0.56 | 0.55 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | 0.42 | 0.13 | 0.39 | 0.64 | 1.38 | 2.50 | 2.78 | 6.32 | 20.10 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.26 | -0.36 | -0.51 | -0.29 | -0.44 | -0.18 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.44 | 0.44 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -1.85 | -1.85 | -1.28 | -0.94 | -0.59 | -0.95 | -0.61 | 0.65 | 0.81 | 4.90 | 16.23 |
| Debt / FCF | — | -0.82 | -1.98 | -0.75 | -1.03 | -0.77 | -0.35 | 0.52 | 0.48 | 4.78 | 12.68 |
| Interest Coverage | 73.10 | 73.10 | 10.74 | 30.53 | 17.34 | 14.17 | 3.89 | 1.34 | 1.25 | -1.06 | -3.53 |
Net cash position: cash ($13M) exceeds total debt ($0)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.82 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 1.15 | 1.06 | 1.14 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.79 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 1.12 | 1.02 | 1.10 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.39 | 0.35 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.11 | 0.11 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.20 | 1.10 | 1.10 | 1.14 | 1.01 | 0.90 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 0.88 |
| Inventory Turnover | 11.29 | 11.29 | 12.29 | 16.53 | 15.91 | 17.28 | 20.54 | 17.85 | 18.97 | 19.45 | 18.67 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 94.61 | 93.50 | 109.29 | 106.61 | 100.76 | 115.08 | 103.74 | 118.60 | 125.45 | 131.22 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 3.1% | 2.1% | 1.2% | 4.3% | 2.9% | 2.7% | 2.2% | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 10.4% | 6.8% | 4.7% | 10.4% | 3.6% | 6.8% | 6.8% | 6.7% | 4.6% | 2.1% | 1.1% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 10.3% | 5.7% | 5.8% | 3.4% | 0.5% | 5.1% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 2.1% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 10.3% | 5.7% | 5.8% | 3.4% | 0.5% | 5.1% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 2.1% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $12M | $13M | $13M | $14M | $15M | $14M | $14M | $14M | $14M | $14M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying FC stock.
Franklin Covey Co.'s current P/E ratio is 32.4x. The historical average is 30.4x. This places it at the 59th percentile of its historical range.
Franklin Covey Co.'s current EV/EBITDA is 7.3x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 13.7x.
Franklin Covey Co.'s return on equity (ROE) is 8.3%. The historical average is 3.9%.
Based on historical data, Franklin Covey Co. is trading at a P/E of 32.4x. This is at the 59th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Franklin Covey Co. has 75.0% gross margin and 2.7% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Buybacks depleting liquidity buffer
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Muted Sales Multiple Amid Shrinking Book
Franklin Covey trades at 76.6x trailing earnings versus 11-20x for profitable education-services peers, yet its 0.78x EV-adjusted sales multiple is the lowest in the group, a divergence that appears driven by depressed trailing profit rather than any embedded growth premium.
The 76.6x trailing P/E is arithmetic noise from a twelve-month window that includes three quarters of operating losses; the more informative 13.07x EV/EBITDA and 9.16x forward figure suggest the market is pricing roughly stable, not recovering, cash earnings. The tension between a 3.59x price-to-book (versus 1.07-2.32x for STRA, LRN and LOPE) and a sub-1.0x sales multiple is itself diagnostic: book value has been halved by roughly $79.9M of buybacks against $64.8M of cumulative free cash flow, so the elevated P/B reflects a shrinking denominator rather than premium economics. On normalized earnings approximating the 2024Q4 run-rate, the multiple compresses meaningfully, so investors are effectively paying a mid-teens EV/EBITDA for peak-cycle earnings that, based on reported figures, have not been sustained.
Gross Margin Erosion Exposes Operating Leverage
Gross margin has contracted approximately 690 basis points from 78.1% in 2024Q4 to 71.2% in 2026Q3, while operating margin swung from 21.3% to a 0.3% loss within six quarters, indicating that the profitability decline originates in both delivery economics and a rigid overhead base.
The two margin lines tell different stories. Gross compression while COGS held near $17-19M per quarter implies mix or pricing pressure that volume decline alone does not explain; separately, SG&A parked in the $43-47M range across the entire ten-quarter window converted a $24M revenue swing into a full operating swing. Adjusting for volatile stock-based compensation ranging from $75K to $3.0M, the 7.2% operating margin and 4.5% net margin in 2026Q3 appear to represent a partial sequential recovery rather than a durable floor, since three of the prior five quarters printed losses or sub-3% margins. True earning power therefore looks materially below the 2024Q4 benchmark, and investors should treat any margin rebound as dependent on the company's ability to take cost out of a largely fixed SG&A structure.
Return Oscillation Signals No Compounding
ROIC has oscillated between -4.7% and 31.9% over ten quarters, landing at 13.1% in 2026Q3 versus a 14.7% reading in 2024Q3, a pattern that suggests returns are driven by quarterly revenue timing rather than a compounding improvement in invested-capital efficiency.
The sign reversals in ROIC and ROE are not a characteristic of a stable capital compounder; they reflect the same fixed-overhead operating leverage visible in the income statement, amplified by a declining asset base that has contracted 24% to $198.0M. ROE at 7.6% sits below ROIC at 13.1%, an inversion that in a buyback-heavy capital structure is better read as a function of the halved $42.9M equity base and unprofitable quarters than as evidence of superior asset efficiency. Asset turnover of 0.34 has barely moved across the window, so the return variance is essentially all margin-driven, implying that capital returns will remain volatile until the revenue plateau documented in the income statement breaks one way or the other.
Collections Improve as Supplier Terms Tighten
Days sales outstanding improved from 97 days in 2025Q1 to 68 days in 2026Q3, yet days payable outstanding simultaneously shortened from 40 to 31 days, compressing the cash conversion cycle to 64 days and suggesting better collections offset by less supplier financing.
The DSO improvement is a genuine positive relative to the working capital swings that clouded earlier quarterly cash flow, and it partly explains why the 2026Q2 operating cash flow print was so strong at a 22.1% FCF margin. However, the DPO compression runs against the pattern a cash-constrained issuer would typically exhibit, which may indicate reduced trade credit availability rather than a strategic choice and warrants investigation. Asset turnover of 0.28-0.35 is chronically low, meaning the business consumes a large asset base per revenue dollar, and with quarterly FCF margin collapsing from 21.8% to roughly zero in 2026Q3, the modest cycle improvement has not translated into durable cash conversion.
Debt Free But Equity Base Eroding
Franklin Covey carries effectively zero debt with interest coverage of 90.6x, yet its debt-to-equity ratio appears negligible only because equity has nearly halved to $42.9M and current ratio has slipped to 0.66, suggesting the balance sheet's safety derives from cash, not structure.
By conventional leverage metrics the company is unambiguously conservative: total debt was eliminated from $11.1M in 2024Q2 to zero, and $96.0M of deferred revenue represents an operating obligation rather than a contractually serviced liability. The more consequential dynamic is that the deleveraging and the $79.9M of buybacks were funded from the same cash pool that has fallen from $48.7M to $12.0M, leaving interest coverage at 90.6x as a somewhat meaningless statistic in the absence of any interest expense. Covenant and refinancing risk is effectively nil, but investors should recognize that the balance sheet's apparent strength rests on a shrinking liquidity buffer rather than on capital structure resilience.
Why Price-to-Book Misleads on This Model
The 3.59x price-to-book is the ratio most likely misapplied to Franklin Covey, since a $79.9M buyback program has halved the $83.1M equity base, mechanically inflating the multiple and making it appear to price in growth that reported revenue growth does not support.
For an asset-light consulting and training business where goodwill has never been impaired despite a 24% asset contraction and where the true assets are human capital and multi-year client relationships carried off the balance sheet, book value carries little informational content. A low P/B of 0.59x at peers like KELYA and GP reflects distressed equity, not cheapness, and FC's elevated reading reflects the same denominator effect in the opposite direction. The more appropriate lens is EV/Sales at 0.78x combined with normalized EV/EBITDA against peak-cycle earnings, which frames the real question: whether the sub-1.0x sales multiple prices a cyclical trough or a permanent step-down in the post-2024 revenue base. As reported in Franklin Covey's filings, that distinction, not the P/B, determines whether current levels represent value or a value trap.