Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 9.4x · EV/EBITDA 12.4x · ROE 8.0%. (2012–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $1.0B | $858M | $739M | $857M | $854M |
| Enterprise Value | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.8B | $2.6B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B |
| P/E Ratio → | 9.36 | 9.01 | 22.00 | 8.09 | 25.41 | 10.14 | 5.87 | 23.64 | 13.72 | 17.33 | 21.00 |
| P/S Ratio | 8.29 | 8.19 | 17.63 | 4.62 | 24.77 | 11.45 | 7.04 | 19.82 | 11.89 | 15.27 | 17.87 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.78 | 0.75 | 0.88 | 0.99 | 0.93 | 1.21 | 0.64 | 1.27 | 1.04 | 1.18 | 1.28 |
| P/FCF | 3.33 | 3.29 | 564.73 | 5.28 | 51.13 | — | 6.22 | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 3.33 | 3.29 | 564.73 | 5.28 | 51.13 | — | 6.22 | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 22.21 | 41.36 | 9.78 | 59.61 | 22.20 | 17.92 | 37.38 | 22.41 | 24.73 | 28.20 |
| EV / EBITDA | 12.43 | 12.38 | 47.63 | 9.25 | 56.55 | 19.46 | 14.79 | 42.82 | 24.86 | 27.16 | 32.33 |
| EV / EBIT | 12.24 | 12.38 | 47.63 | 9.25 | 56.55 | 19.46 | 14.79 | 42.82 | 24.86 | 27.16 | 32.33 |
| EV / FCF | — | 8.93 | 1324.84 | 11.18 | 123.04 | — | 15.84 | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 139.6% | 139.6% | 100.0% | 132.4% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Operating Margin | 182.2% | 182.2% | 86.8% | 105.8% | 105.4% | 114.1% | 121.1% | 87.3% | 90.1% | 91.0% | 87.2% |
| Net Profit Margin | 91.1% | 91.1% | 79.9% | 57.0% | 97.1% | 113.1% | 120.1% | 83.5% | 86.4% | 88.3% | 85.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 8.0% | 8.0% | 4.0% | 12.6% | 3.5% | 11.9% | 15.4% | 5.2% | 7.5% | 7.1% | 6.0% |
| ROA | 3.4% | 3.4% | 1.8% | 5.5% | 1.5% | 5.6% | 7.4% | 2.5% | 4.0% | 4.0% | 3.5% |
| ROIC | 5.3% | 5.3% | 1.5% | 7.8% | 1.3% | 4.3% | 5.7% | 2.0% | 3.2% | 3.2% | 2.8% |
| ROCE | 7.0% | 7.0% | 2.0% | 10.4% | 1.7% | 5.8% | 8.7% | 4.5% | 6.6% | 6.3% | 4.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.32 | 1.32 | 1.23 | 1.14 | 1.34 | 1.15 | 1.01 | 1.14 | 0.93 | 0.75 | 0.75 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 7.99 | 7.99 | 28.23 | 5.03 | 33.72 | 9.59 | 9.16 | 20.37 | 11.77 | 10.62 | 11.95 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.29 | 1.19 | 1.11 | 1.31 | 1.13 | 0.99 | 1.12 | 0.92 | 0.73 | 0.74 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 7.81 | 7.81 | 27.32 | 4.88 | 33.05 | 9.42 | 8.98 | 20.12 | 11.66 | 10.39 | 11.84 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 5.63 | 760.10 | 5.90 | 71.91 | — | 9.62 | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | 2.11 | 2.11 | 0.60 | 3.26 | 0.75 | 3.29 | 4.45 | 1.04 | 2.13 | 2.61 | 2.92 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.95 | 0.95 | 1.21 | 1.45 | 1.20 | 0.94 | 1.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.95 | 0.95 | 1.21 | 1.45 | 1.20 | 0.94 | 1.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.83 | 0.84 | 0.66 | 0.56 | 0.58 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 21.0% | 21.8% | 14.2% | 12.0% | 12.8% | 9.9% | 14.1% | 8.1% | 9.5% | 7.9% | 7.6% |
| Payout Ratio | 195.8% | 195.8% | 314.5% | 97.5% | 327.3% | 100.3% | 82.7% | 193.2% | 131.1% | 136.1% | 159.6% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 10.7% | 11.1% | 4.5% | 12.4% | 3.9% | 9.9% | 17.1% | 4.2% | 7.3% | 5.8% | 4.8% |
| FCF Yield | 30.0% | 30.4% | 0.2% | 19.0% | 2.0% | — | 16.1% | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 4.8% | 4.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 25.8% | 26.6% | 14.2% | 12.0% | 12.8% | 9.9% | 14.1% | 8.1% | 9.5% | 7.9% | 7.6% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $116M | $115M | $108M | $102M | $102M | $54M | $40M | $40M | $39M | $36M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 14 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying GSBD stock.
Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 9.4x. The historical average is 15.5x. This places it at the 27th percentile of its historical range.
Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 12.4x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 28.1x.
Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 8.0%. The historical average is 7.6%.
Based on historical data, Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 9.4x. This is at the 27th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 20.96% with a payout ratio of 195.8%.
Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc. has 139.6% gross margin and 182.2% operating margin. Operating margin above 20% indicates strong pricing power and cost efficiency.
Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 8.0x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Leverage amid credit deterioration
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Deep Discount Reflects Credit Fears
GSBD trades at a 0.82x P/B, a significant discount to peers like ARCC at 0.97x, suggesting the market is pricing in substantial credit deterioration and potential NAV erosion beyond what is currently reflected in tangible book value.
The 0.82x P/B valuation, down from 1.48x in early 2024, indicates the market is applying a material discount for perceived risk, likely driven by the sudden $31.2M in provisions and the 1.32x leverage ratio. This discount appears to price in further NAV declines, as the current P/B implies the market expects the tangible book value of $12.06 per share to be overstated relative to the true economic value of the portfolio. The valuation gap versus peers like ARCC suggests investors are demanding a higher risk premium for GSBD's specific credit profile and leverage.
ROE Collapse Driven by Provision Shock
ROE has collapsed from a positive 2.6% in 2025Q2 to just 1.7% in 2026Q2, a decline almost entirely attributable to the emergence of $31.2M in credit provisions that have overwhelmed the underlying net interest income generation.
The DuPont decomposition reveals a severe profitability strain: while the NIM has compressed from 2.0% to 1.4%, the primary driver of the ROE collapse is the provision expense, which consumed 92% of net income in 2026Q2. The negative ROE in 2026Q1 (-1.0%) and the near-zero result in 2026Q2 indicate that the core earnings power of the portfolio is being masked by credit costs. This suggests the bank's profitability is no longer driven by spread income but is now dictated by the pace of credit deterioration.
NIM Compression Amid Cost Volatility
The net interest margin has contracted by 60 basis points to 1.4% over the past two years, while the efficiency ratio has become highly volatile, spiking to 87.5% in 2026Q1 before settling at 57.5% in 2026Q2.
The NIM compression from 2.0% to 1.4% suggests the spread between asset yields and funding costs is narrowing, potentially due to competitive pressure on new originations or rising costs on the BDC's credit facilities. The extreme volatility in the efficiency ratio, from 5.3% to 87.5% and back to 57.5%, indicates that non-interest expenses, likely driven by management and incentive fees, are not scaling with the shrinking net interest income base. This creates a challenging operating leverage profile where costs remain high even as the core spread income declines.
Leverage Limits Growth Capacity
The debt-to-equity ratio of 1.32x, as reported in recent filings, places GSBD near the upper limit of typical BDC leverage, severely constraining its ability to fund new investments without issuing dilutive equity.
With a 1.32x leverage ratio and a declining equity base (down 12.5% from peak), GSBD has minimal capacity to absorb further portfolio losses or to grow its earning assets. The equity-to-assets ratio of 0.41 is below the 0.44-0.46 range maintained in 2024, indicating that the balance sheet is becoming more leveraged even as assets contract. This leverage level, combined with the credit stress, suggests that any further deterioration could force a deleveraging event, potentially through asset sales at unfavorable prices or a suspension of dividends.
Provision Surge Signals Credit Deterioration
After eight quarters of zero provisions, GSBD recorded $31.2M in loan loss provisions over the last two quarters, with $21.9M in 2026Q2 alone, a dramatic reversal that appears to reflect emerging non-accruals within the middle-market portfolio.
The sudden and material provision expense is the most critical signal in the financials, indicating that the advisor is now recognizing credit losses that were previously deferred. The magnitude of the provision, representing 92% of net income in 2026Q2, suggests the issues are not isolated but may be systemic within the portfolio. Investors should monitor the non-accrual rate closely, as the current reserve build may still be insufficient if the middle-market credit cycle continues to deteriorate, especially given the portfolio's concentration in floating-rate unitranche loans.
P/B Discount May Understate NAV Risk
The P/B ratio of 0.82x is the most commonly misapplied metric for GSBD, as it assumes the tangible book value of $12.06 per share is a reliable floor, while the sudden provision surge and Level 3 asset concentration suggest the true economic value may be lower.
Analysts often use P/B as the primary valuation anchor for BDCs, but for GSBD, this metric obscures the risk that the reported tangible book value is itself overstated. The $31.2M in provisions over two quarters indicates that the advisor is now marking down assets, but the full extent of unrealized losses in the Level 3 portfolio is not transparent. A more appropriate metric would be the price-to-net investment income ratio, adjusted for the sustainability of the NII, or a direct comparison of the P/B discount to the historical non-accrual rate. The current discount may not fully price in the potential for further NAV erosion if credit losses accelerate.