Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 17.8x · EV/EBITDA 9.3x · ROE -0.6%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $2.1B | $1.4B | $2.8B | $4.0B | $4.4B | $5.4B | $5.3B | $5.9B | $4.2B | $8.6B | $6.3B |
| Enterprise Value | $3.6B | $2.9B | $3.5B | $4.8B | $5.1B | $5.9B | $5.2B | $6.4B | $4.7B | $8.8B | $6.5B |
| P/E Ratio → | 17.79 | — | 19.18 | 45.15 | 11.75 | 14.11 | 219.95 | 12.58 | 7.58 | 15.69 | 14.17 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.19 | 0.41 | 0.32 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.01 | 0.67 | 1.31 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 2.13 | 2.14 | 2.12 | 1.56 | 3.00 | 2.57 |
| P/FCF | 279.67 | — | 10.80 | 14.83 | 12.64 | 9.29 | 5.94 | 7.69 | 10.08 | 24.73 | 11.59 |
| P/OCF | — | — | 9.02 | 11.50 | 10.38 | 8.36 | 5.61 | 7.19 | 8.73 | 21.36 | 10.49 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.30 | 0.21 | 0.42 | 0.33 |
| EV / EBITDA | 9.31 | 8.95 | 8.94 | 14.08 | 6.86 | 9.01 | 11.71 | 8.81 | 5.33 | 10.11 | 7.80 |
| EV / EBIT | 15.04 | 15.40 | 10.12 | 16.98 | 8.47 | 9.78 | 27.43 | 8.72 | 5.87 | 11.21 | 8.68 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | 13.60 | 17.96 | 14.71 | 10.23 | 5.91 | 8.35 | 11.24 | 25.48 | 12.00 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 16.7% | 16.7% | 17.3% | 17.8% | 18.0% | 16.4% | 15.7% | 16.2% | 16.3% | 16.6% | 17.0% |
| Operating Margin | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 3.3% | 2.8% | 2.1% | 3.1% | 3.6% | 3.7% | 3.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | -0.1% | -0.1% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 0.1% | 2.2% | 2.5% | 2.6% | 2.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -0.6% | -0.6% | 6.7% | 3.8% | 15.0% | 15.3% | 0.9% | 17.1% | 20.0% | 20.6% | 17.3% |
| ROA | -0.2% | -0.2% | 1.7% | 1.0% | 3.9% | 4.0% | 0.3% | 5.2% | 6.4% | 6.6% | 5.9% |
| ROIC | 5.6% | 5.6% | 7.7% | 6.1% | 15.8% | 15.9% | 9.8% | 15.0% | 19.0% | 20.4% | 20.5% |
| ROCE | 6.2% | 6.2% | 7.9% | 6.2% | 16.0% | 13.4% | 7.9% | 14.1% | 18.9% | 19.7% | 18.8% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.16 | 1.16 | 0.58 | 0.64 | 0.55 | 0.55 | 0.63 | 0.55 | 0.40 | 0.33 | 0.34 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 7.37 | 7.37 | 3.14 | 4.14 | 1.82 | 2.12 | 3.46 | 2.12 | 1.22 | 1.09 | 0.99 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.74 | 0.34 | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.22 | -0.01 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 4.69 | 4.69 | 1.84 | 2.45 | 0.97 | 0.83 | -0.04 | 0.70 | 0.55 | 0.30 | 0.27 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | 2.80 | 3.13 | 2.07 | 0.94 | -0.02 | 0.67 | 1.16 | 0.75 | 0.42 |
| Interest Coverage | 1.98 | 1.98 | 3.85 | 3.58 | 12.88 | 15.64 | 4.41 | 16.44 | 17.06 | 15.93 | 15.17 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.11 | 1.11 | 1.12 | 1.16 | 1.21 | 1.11 | 1.42 | 1.46 | 1.44 | 1.28 | 1.40 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.11 | 1.11 | 1.12 | 1.16 | 1.21 | 1.11 | 1.42 | 1.46 | 1.44 | 1.28 | 1.40 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.33 | 0.23 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.16 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.96 | 2.18 | 2.14 | 2.17 | 2.11 | 1.93 | 2.26 | 2.58 | 2.37 | 2.59 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 96.96 | 87.85 | 93.21 | 94.57 | 95.95 | 99.61 | 92.25 | 87.57 | 93.19 | 81.96 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 3.2% | 4.8% | 5.2% | 3.6% | 3.2% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.2% | 3.0% | 1.4% | 1.9% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | 100.5% | 162.5% | 37.4% | 35.7% | 542.4% | 27.8% | 22.9% | 22.7% | 26.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 5.6% | — | 5.2% | 2.2% | 8.5% | 7.1% | 0.5% | 8.0% | 13.2% | 6.4% | 7.1% |
| FCF Yield | 0.4% | — | 9.3% | 6.7% | 7.9% | 10.8% | 16.8% | 13.0% | 9.9% | 4.0% | 8.6% |
| Buyback Yield | 1.8% | 2.8% | 5.0% | 4.5% | 6.1% | 3.9% | 5.0% | 3.5% | 11.9% | 2.4% | 7.7% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 5.1% | 7.6% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 9.3% | 6.4% | 7.5% | 5.7% | 14.9% | 3.8% | 9.5% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $47M | $48M | $50M | $53M | $55M | $58M | $60M | $65M | $68M | $71M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying MAN stock.
ManpowerGroup Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 17.8x. The historical average is 17.9x. This places it at the 62th percentile of its historical range.
ManpowerGroup Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 9.3x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 9.6x.
ManpowerGroup Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -0.6%. The historical average is 13.0%.
Based on historical data, ManpowerGroup Inc. is trading at a P/E of 17.8x. This is at the 62th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
ManpowerGroup Inc.'s current dividend yield is 3.22%.
ManpowerGroup Inc. has 16.7% gross margin and 1.3% operating margin.
ManpowerGroup Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 7.4x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Gross margin erosion below cost of capital
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Gross Margin Compression Outpaces Operating Recovery
MAN's gross margin has declined 150 basis points from 17.4% in 2024Q2 to 15.9% in 2026Q3, per the company's reported statements, reflecting persistent bill-pay spread pressure that structural operating leverage has been unable to offset, keeping net margin below 1% throughout the period.
The operating margin recovery from -0.6% in 2025Q2 to 1.7% in 2026Q3 is largely a function of volume rebound rather than genuine pricing recovery, as the SG&A base has remained stubbornly elevated in the $670-711M range across all ten quarters despite gross profit fluctuations. The net margin of 0.7% in the most recent quarter means that any further gross margin deterioration — even 20-30 basis points — would likely push the bottom line back into negative territory given the fixed-cost drag investors should note that the Experis and Talent Solutions mix shift needed to structurally restore margins has not yet materialized in the reported gross margin trend.
Returns Remain Deeply Below Cost of Capital
MAN's ROIC has remained between -0.6% and 2.5% over ten quarters, ending at 1.8% in 2026Q3, per the company's reported filings, implying the firm is generating returns well below any reasonable estimate of its weighted average cost of capital and appears to be destroying economic value on a sustained basis.
The ROIC of 1.8% against an estimated 7-9% WACC for a global staffing firm translates to a persistent negative economic spread — meaning the company is not earning its cost of capital on invested assets, which directly explains the P/B of 0.94 and the market's reluctance to pay a premium. The return profile shows minimal operating leverage improvement: even when ROE peaked at 2.6-2.8% in the strongest quarters, the spread remained deeply negative, suggesting this is structural rather than cyclical underperformance. Investors should monitor whether any restructuring of the 2,200-office footprint begins to translate into measurable ROIC improvement above 2.5%; absent that, the negative economic spread warrants continued valuation discounting.
Deleveraging Masked by Cash Depletion
MAN cut D/E from 1.16 to 0.68 over three quarters by reducing debt roughly $900M, per its reported balance sheets, but the deleveraging was largely funded by drawing cash from $871M to $233M — a 73% decline — rather than through durable earnings generation, suggesting the improvement may be less robust than headline leverage metrics imply.
Interest coverage has recovered from a negative -0.61 in 2025Q2 to 3.43 in 2026Q3, and D/EBITDA has moderated from a peak of 31.7x to 14.2x, but both metrics remain elevated relative to what investment-grade staffing peers like Robert Half (D/E of 0.33) would typically sustain. With cumulative FCF negative at -$31.1M over ten quarters and no disclosed forward guidance to underwrite deleveraging capacity, the company appears to lack a clear earnings-driven path to further meaningful leverage reduction. Investors should monitor whether 2026 free cash flow stabilizes or whether continued cash draws further erode the remaining $233M buffer.
Minimal Buffer Against Immediate Payroll Obligations
MAN's current ratio of 1.05 in 2026Q3 represents one of the tightest positions in its reported history, per the company's quarterly filings, with the quick ratio identical at 1.05 and cash declining to $233M, leaving almost no margin of safety for a business whose most pressing near-term obligation is the gross payroll of placed associates across 75 countries.
The convergence of current and quick ratios at 1.05 is consistent with a low-inventory model, but it also means that any disruption in DSO collection — currently running at 89 days — could compress near-term liquidity in a downturn when clients extend payment terms. The working capital dynamics are particularly fragile: MAN's historical payables float swings (from +$221M to -$245M in a single quarter) suggest the company's cash position is subject to significant volatility that the thin cash buffer may not adequately absorb. With DSO at 89 days and DPO at 57 days, the 32-day negative cash conversion gap means MAN is effectively funding its clients' receivables — a structural position that amplifies liquidity risk if revenue growth decelerates further.
Forward P/E of 11x May Understate Earnings Risk
The forward P/E of 11.49 suggests MAN is priced for a recovery that assumes net margins normalize toward historical averages, but given the persistent 150 basis point gross margin compression and absent forward guidance, investors should instead anchor on EV/EBITDA of 10.6x and price-to-book of 0.94x — metrics that more accurately reflect the company's constrained economic profile.
The trailing P/E of -143.07 is analytically meaningless given near-zero TTM earnings, and the forward P/E implicitly assumes margin expansion that the reported gross margin trend has not supported over ten quarters. The P/B of 0.94x — below book value and far below peers like Kforce at 7.28x — suggests the market is pricing in permanent economic value destruction, but investors should consider that 72% of book value is goodwill ($1.5B) that has remained unimpaired despite persistently negative ROIC; if this goodwill is eventually written down, book value and therefore the true P/B floor would shift materially. The most useful adjusted metric here is EV/Sales at 0.11x compared to historical staffing peers, which frames the current valuation as a bet on whether gross margin compression is structural or merely cyclical.