Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 18.5x · EV/EBITDA 13.4x · ROE 22.1%. (1997–2026 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $57.1B | $68.6B | $90.1B | $145.4B | $165.2B | $191.4B | $219.6B | $156.9B | $124.8B | $119.1B | $89.7B |
| Enterprise Value | $60.6B | $72.0B | $93.7B | $147.5B | $169.9B | $195.5B | $222.5B | $161.6B | $123.9B | $118.7B | $89.7B |
| P/E Ratio → | 18.52 | 22.01 | 28.05 | 25.48 | 32.59 | 31.69 | 38.33 | 61.61 | 30.98 | 61.37 | 21.11 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.24 | 1.48 | 1.95 | 2.83 | 3.23 | 4.10 | 4.93 | 4.19 | 3.19 | 3.27 | 2.61 |
| P/B Ratio | 3.85 | 4.61 | 6.82 | 10.08 | 11.80 | 12.53 | 17.20 | 19.48 | 13.81 | 12.14 | 7.23 |
| P/FCF | 27.13 | 31.39 | 27.58 | 21.97 | 33.92 | 43.22 | 36.84 | 112.15 | 26.10 | 30.33 | 35.37 |
| P/OCF | 19.91 | 23.90 | 24.37 | 19.57 | 28.29 | 36.90 | 32.99 | 63.14 | 21.15 | 24.04 | 24.63 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.55 | 2.02 | 2.87 | 3.32 | 4.19 | 5.00 | 4.32 | 3.17 | 3.26 | 2.61 |
| EV / EBITDA | 13.40 | 15.84 | 20.77 | 20.61 | 25.09 | 26.01 | 28.77 | 38.16 | 22.55 | 22.74 | 16.40 |
| EV / EBIT | 15.94 | 18.97 | 22.45 | 21.19 | 26.21 | 28.16 | 32.08 | 51.87 | 25.95 | 26.70 | 18.88 |
| EV / FCF | — | 32.98 | 28.67 | 22.29 | 34.88 | 44.13 | 37.33 | 115.49 | 25.89 | 30.22 | 35.37 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 42.9% | 42.9% | 42.7% | 44.6% | 43.5% | 46.0% | 44.8% | 43.4% | 44.7% | 43.8% | 44.6% |
| Operating Margin | 8.2% | 8.2% | 8.0% | 12.3% | 11.5% | 14.3% | 15.6% | 8.3% | 12.2% | 12.2% | 13.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | 6.7% | 6.7% | 7.0% | 11.1% | 9.9% | 12.9% | 12.9% | 6.8% | 10.3% | 5.3% | 12.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 22.1% | 22.1% | 23.3% | 40.1% | 34.6% | 43.1% | 55.0% | 29.7% | 42.7% | 17.4% | 34.4% |
| ROA | 8.3% | 8.3% | 8.6% | 15.1% | 13.0% | 15.5% | 16.6% | 9.2% | 17.4% | 8.4% | 19.0% |
| ROIC | 16.2% | 16.2% | 16.7% | 26.9% | 23.3% | 28.6% | 36.6% | 22.5% | 41.1% | 30.6% | 30.2% |
| ROCE | 14.7% | 14.7% | 13.8% | 22.6% | 20.4% | 23.2% | 27.1% | 16.0% | 29.5% | 25.9% | 28.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.87 | 0.83 | 1.00 | 1.62 | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.31 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 2.43 | 2.43 | 2.44 | 1.67 | 1.79 | 1.68 | 1.66 | 3.07 | 0.63 | 0.73 | 0.70 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.23 | 0.27 | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.23 | 0.58 | -0.11 | -0.04 | -0.00 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.79 | 0.29 | 0.69 | 0.54 | 0.38 | 1.10 | -0.18 | -0.08 | -0.00 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 1.59 | 1.09 | 0.32 | 0.97 | 0.91 | 0.49 | 3.34 | -0.21 | -0.11 | -0.00 |
| Interest Coverage | 75.94 | 75.94 | 14.44 | 26.67 | 22.91 | 23.78 | 24.00 | 21.63 | 38.48 | 37.99 | 57.91 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.96 | 1.96 | 2.21 | 2.40 | 2.72 | 2.63 | 2.72 | 2.48 | 2.10 | 2.51 | 2.93 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.36 | 1.36 | 1.50 | 1.69 | 1.81 | 1.84 | 2.01 | 1.59 | 1.39 | 1.63 | 2.01 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.87 | 1.09 | 1.15 | 1.21 | 1.39 | 1.06 | 0.59 | 0.87 | 1.13 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.21 | 1.27 | 1.35 | 1.36 | 1.16 | 1.18 | 1.19 | 1.65 | 1.62 | 1.48 |
| Inventory Turnover | 3.53 | 3.53 | 3.54 | 3.79 | 3.42 | 3.00 | 3.59 | 2.87 | 3.85 | 3.89 | 3.77 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 46.66 | 37.18 | 31.46 | 29.44 | 36.47 | 36.58 | 26.83 | 39.86 | 35.08 | 39.07 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 4.2% | 3.5% | 2.6% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.0% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 1.3% |
| Payout Ratio | 77.4% | 77.4% | 71.5% | 38.1% | 39.7% | 30.4% | 28.6% | 57.2% | 33.1% | 64.3% | 26.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 5.4% | 4.5% | 3.6% | 3.9% | 3.1% | 3.2% | 2.6% | 1.6% | 3.2% | 1.6% | 4.7% |
| FCF Yield | 3.7% | 3.2% | 3.6% | 4.6% | 2.9% | 2.3% | 2.7% | 0.9% | 3.8% | 3.3% | 2.8% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.3% | 0.2% | 3.3% | 2.9% | 3.3% | 2.1% | 0.3% | 2.0% | 3.4% | 3.6% | 3.6% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 4.5% | 3.7% | 5.9% | 4.4% | 4.5% | 3.1% | 1.0% | 2.9% | 4.5% | 4.6% | 4.9% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
Live VCP patterns, Cup & Handle overlays, support/resistance, and AI trade plans.
High-probability breakout stocks crossing their pivot across 5 pattern engines.
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying NKE stock.
NIKE, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 18.5x. The historical average is 27.1x. This places it at the 10th percentile of its historical range.
NIKE, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 13.4x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 16.3x.
NIKE, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 22.1%. This is above the typical threshold of 15-20% considered good for most companies. The historical average is 25.6%.
Based on historical data, NIKE, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 18.5x. This is at the 10th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
NIKE, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 4.21% with a payout ratio of 77.4%.
NIKE, Inc. has 42.9% gross margin and 8.2% operating margin.
NIKE, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 2.4x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Structural margin compression amid weak cash conversion
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Multiples Price a Recovery Not Yet Evidenced
Based on current market pricing, NKE trades at 16.1x trailing earnings versus 20.8x forward, an unusual gap that appears to price in a recovery not yet visible in reported results; the 1.08x sales multiple looks inexpensive only against a decelerating revenue base.
The inversion between the trailing and forward P/E suggests the market is underwriting an earnings rebound that the last several quarters have not substantiated, with operating margin sitting at 7.9% versus 12.3% two years earlier; if normalized margins fail to recover toward the mid-9% range of 2024-2025, the forward multiple may prove optically cheap rather than genuinely so. Relative to peers, the 13.6x EV/EBITDA sits below On Holding's 16.8x but above Deckers' 6.9x — a positioning that appears to reflect NKE's scale and brand durability rather than superior unit economics, since Deckers currently converts at materially higher margins. The absence of a PEG figure and a reported dividend yield, as observed in the current quote data, further limits triangulation, so the P/S of 1.08x warrants monitoring in the context of the revenue contraction documented in recent filings.
Gross Margin Recovery Stalls Below Prior Norms
As reported in NIKE's quarterly income statements, operating margin has compressed from 12.3% in 2024Q4 to 7.9% in 2027Q1, with gross margin recovering only partially to 42.8% from the 40.2% trough, suggesting the margin reset is not fully reversible.
The gap between the 42.8% current gross margin and the 44.7-45.4% levels of 2024Q4 through 2025Q1 — versus peer gross margins in the 57-63% range at Deckers and On Holding — implies the compression is only partly explained by mix or channel shifts and may reflect deeper pricing or product-cost normalization. Net margin of 6.3% in 2027Q1 also diverges from peers at 18.7% (Deckers) and 6.8% (On Holding), a spread that suggests NIKE's scale advantage is not currently translating into earnings quality. The most representative measure of underlying earning power here appears to be gross profit per unit rather than operating margin, because the latter is distorted by an SG&A base that has remained near $4.0B per quarter — meaning reported operating margin swings overstate the sensitivity of the underlying business and understate structural weakness.
Capital Compounding Erodes Across Every Measure
According to NIKE's reported return metrics, ROIC has roughly halved from 6.8% in 2024Q4 to 3.5% in 2027Q1 and ROE from 10.5% to 4.7%, indicating capital compounding is weakening as the fixed SG&A base meets a shrinking revenue line.
Because asset turnover has fallen from 0.33x to 0.29x over the same window, the ROIC decline appears driven predominantly by the denominator — capital tied up in a slower-moving asset base — rather than by incremental margin failure alone, implying the efficiency channel is doing as much damage as pricing. The ROE trajectory is additionally flattered and distorted by equity movements that prior balance sheet analysis flagged as inconsistent, specifically the reported 2027Q1 equity figure that breaks the accounting identity, so ROE should be treated as directionally informative but not precise until that discrepancy is resolved. A sustained ROIC below 4% is well short of what would typically be required to justify the equity multiple on a compounding thesis, which makes the durability of NKE's reinvestment returns — not its current payout capacity — the central question for the valuation.
Inventory and Turnover Signals Deteriorating Cycle
As disclosed in NIKE's balance sheet data, days inventory outstanding has lengthened to 110 days in 2027Q1 from 101 days in 2024Q4, while asset turnover slipped to 0.29x from 0.33x, pointing to heavier working-capital absorption per dollar of sales.
Days inventory has oscillated between 98 and 124 days over the last ten quarters — with the 124-day peak in 2026Q4 coinciding with a 49.2% gross margin quarter that appears to have been clearance-driven — so the elevated cycle level suggests the inventory reset has stalled rather than completed. Days payable outstanding has conversely lengthened from 34 to 50 days, meaning suppliers are effectively financing part of that inventory build; this may extend NIKE's negotiating position, but it also compresses the cash conversion benefit and warrants monitoring as supplier confidence shifts. The cash conversion cycle at 106 days versus 99 days two years ago is the single clearest operational read that working capital, not just pricing, is now a drag on reported performance, consistent with the negative free cash flow margin recorded in 2027Q1.
Deleveraging Masked by EBITDA Compression
Based on NIKE's reported capital structure, D/E has improved from 0.87 to 0.73 alongside a $1.0B debt reduction, yet debt-to-EBITDA has spiked to 12.5x in 2027Q1 from 6.8x in 2024Q4, as EBITDA erosion rather than new borrowing drives the ratio.
The apparent contradiction between falling debt-to-equity and rising debt-to-EBITDA indicates that leverage is deteriorating on a cash-earnings basis even as the balance sheet delevers nominally — a pattern typical of companies where earnings, not debt, are the binding constraint. Interest coverage figures are internally inconsistent in the reported series, moving from 25.3x in 2024Q4 down to 5.8x in 2025Q4 and back to 63.4x in 2027Q1 without an obvious corresponding change in the debt stack, which suggests the coverage denominator or reporting basis shifted; these values therefore warrant verification before they are used to judge debt-service comfort. With a cash position that has declined roughly 30% to $6.9B while dividends continue near $600M per quarter, NIKE retains a substantial liquidity buffer, but the buffer is being drawn rather than grown, so covenant headroom appears adequate today while refinancing conditions become the more relevant lens for the next 12-24 months.
Trailing P/E Misleads on Normalized Economics
The trailing P/E of 16.1x is the ratio most likely to mislead here, since depressed earnings base it against cyclical resets; normalized EV/FCF or gross-profit-adjusted multiples better capture what the market is actually paying for brand-generated cash, according to reported figures.
Applied to a business whose EPS has swung from $0.99 to $0.14 and back to $0.48 within ten quarters, the trailing P/E simultaneously overstates the attractiveness of NKE — because the denominator is cyclical trough earnings — and understates it, because forward multiples embed a recovery that peers have not corroborated; the result is a number that supports almost any narrative an investor wishes to build. The most useful corrective is a gross-profit or free-cash-flow-based multiple paired with a normalized margin assumption, since NIKE's asset-light structure (capex at 0.7-1.8% of revenue) means brand-generated cash, not reported net income, is what the equity is actually claims on. Analysts should also be wary of reading the 3.38x P/B against peer book multiples until the equity figure anomaly noted in the balance sheet review is resolved, because the book-value denominator that makes the multiple look reasonable may itself be unreliable.