Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.7x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -90.9%. (2020–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $4M | $24M | $20M | $112M | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $10M | $29M | $42M | $134M | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.74 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.29 | 1.61 | 0.91 | 4.40 | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 1.14 | 6.23 | 2.14 | 6.16 | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | 12.48 | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | 8.42 | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.98 | 1.95 | 5.26 | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | 26.90 | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 9.6% | 9.6% | 24.4% | 9.4% | 36.0% | 34.4% | 26.8% |
| Operating Margin | -19.9% | -19.9% | -17.2% | -29.2% | 12.7% | 9.6% | 0.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | -40.2% | -40.2% | -40.5% | -46.9% | 8.6% | 2.8% | -3.2% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -90.9% | -90.9% | -64.0% | -77.8% | 46.6% | 17.9% | -17.2% |
| ROA | -21.2% | -21.2% | -18.4% | -19.5% | 7.2% | 2.1% | -1.9% |
| ROIC | -10.7% | -10.7% | -7.7% | -12.4% | 10.8% | 9.0% | 0.8% |
| ROCE | -22.5% | -22.5% | -14.0% | -24.1% | 20.9% | 11.9% | 0.8% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.69 | 1.69 | 2.80 | 1.43 | 3.39 | 5.39 | 3.69 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 4.84 | 7.17 | 15.78 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.44 | 2.48 | 1.21 | 2.98 | 4.94 | 3.17 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 4.26 | 6.58 | 13.57 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | 14.41 | — | 8.55 | 55.75 | — |
| Interest Coverage | -13.88 | -13.88 | -8.50 | -6.53 | 3.64 | 1.97 | 0.27 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.31 | 1.31 | 1.11 | 1.28 | 1.04 | 1.27 | 1.74 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.08 | 1.08 | 0.77 | 0.92 | 0.69 | 0.87 | 1.26 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.17 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.01 | 0.53 | 0.47 | 0.81 | 0.74 | 0.62 |
| Inventory Turnover | 5.31 | 5.31 | 2.53 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.86 | 2.76 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 106.52 | 70.60 | 104.43 | 56.41 | 60.95 | 128.19 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | 8.0% | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $17M | $17M | $14M | $13M | $13M | $13M |
Imminent liquidity and insolvency
As reported in recent financial statements, NWGL's gross margin has collapsed to 16.9% in 2024Q4, while the operating margin has deteriorated to -38.2%, signaling that the company's high fixed-cost structure is failing to generate sufficient returns to cover basic administrative and overhead expenses in the current market.
The persistent negative operating margins suggest that the company's integrated forest-to-floor model is currently a liability rather than a competitive advantage. Investors should monitor whether management can rationalize the cost base, as the current profitability profile appears unsustainable without a significant shift in product mix or scale.
Based on the company's reported figures, the ROIC has trended into negative territory, reaching -4.5% in 2024Q4, which indicates that the firm is currently destroying shareholder value rather than compounding it through its investment in forest concessions and processing facilities.
The decay in return on capital reflects the inability of the core forestry assets to produce adequate cash flows relative to the capital employed. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the company's long-lived assets, particularly its concession rights, are currently overvalued on the balance sheet.
According to the latest quarterly data, the cash conversion cycle has ballooned to 248 days, driven by high days inventory outstanding of 176 days, which suggests that the company is struggling to move its timber products through the supply chain efficiently in a contracting demand environment.
The extended CCC highlights a significant bottleneck in converting inventory into cash, which exacerbates the company's liquidity constraints. This inefficiency appears structural, as the company remains burdened by high fixed costs and slow-moving inventory that may be subject to further obsolescence or impairment risks.
As indicated by the most recent filings, the debt-to-equity ratio has risen to 2.80, which, when combined with a negative interest coverage ratio of -9.97, suggests that the company's ability to service its existing debt obligations is severely compromised under current operational conditions.
The high leverage relative to the company's dwindling cash reserves indicates that NWGL is in a precarious position regarding its debt service capacity. Investors should monitor for potential covenant breaches or the need for dilutive financing to maintain operations, as the current interest coverage is clearly unsustainable.
The most commonly misapplied metric for NWGL is the P/B ratio, which currently sits at 1.14, as it obscures the reality that the company's book value is heavily reliant on potentially impaired forest concessions and goodwill rather than liquid, productive assets capable of generating near-term cash.
Analysts should instead focus on the cash runway and the quality of the underlying biological assets, as the P/B ratio fails to account for the high probability of asset write-downs. Relying on book value in this context may lead to an overestimation of the company's floor value during a liquidity crisis.
Includes 30+ ratios · 6 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying NWGL stock.
CL Workshop Group Limited's current P/E ratio is -0.7x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
CL Workshop Group Limited's return on equity (ROE) is -90.9%. The historical average is -30.9%.
Based on historical data, CL Workshop Group Limited is trading at a P/E of -0.7x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
CL Workshop Group Limited has 9.6% gross margin and -19.9% operating margin.