Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -2.9x · EV/EBITDA 9.6x · ROE -41.1%. (2009–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $260M | $674M | $1.1B | $2.4B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.4B |
| Enterprise Value | $3.4B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $5.2B | $4.8B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.6B |
| P/E Ratio → | -2.93 | — | 18.19 | 18.59 | 15.54 | 16.19 | — | 15.02 | 17.56 | 16.55 | 25.93 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0.50 | 1.07 | 1.09 | 1.35 | 3.39 | 1.11 | 1.63 | 1.76 | 2.35 |
| P/B Ratio | 2.84 | 7.39 | 7.29 | 9.39 | 5.19 | 6.40 | 9.67 | 8.88 | 5.30 | 4.75 | 5.36 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | 69.38 | 10.14 | 9.23 | — | 24.74 | 16.95 | 44.70 | 46.45 |
| P/OCF | 0.89 | 2.32 | 3.40 | 6.48 | 4.80 | 6.23 | — | 5.21 | 6.09 | 7.56 | 10.19 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.82 | 1.97 | 2.37 | 2.45 | 2.68 | 7.74 | 2.51 | 1.92 | 2.06 | 2.59 |
| EV / EBITDA | 9.58 | 9.94 | 9.15 | 10.17 | 11.15 | 10.73 | — | 12.11 | 8.70 | 8.75 | 10.89 |
| EV / EBIT | 32.43 | 49.13 | 20.44 | 18.48 | 18.69 | 18.65 | — | 23.04 | 15.16 | 14.30 | 17.35 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | 154.01 | 22.89 | 18.29 | — | 55.81 | 20.02 | 52.46 | 51.26 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 85.7% | 85.7% | 85.3% | 32.8% | 84.3% | 84.3% | 82.8% | 82.8% | 82.6% | 82.7% | 82.1% |
| Operating Margin | 5.0% | 5.0% | 10.3% | 13.9% | 13.4% | 14.4% | -57.9% | 10.9% | 12.7% | 14.5% | 15.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -2.3% | -2.3% | 2.7% | 5.8% | 7.0% | 8.3% | -47.4% | 7.4% | 9.3% | 10.6% | 9.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -41.1% | -41.1% | 29.4% | 38.4% | 40.0% | 50.7% | -128.2% | 36.0% | 29.0% | 28.1% | 23.1% |
| ROA | -1.2% | -1.2% | 1.5% | 3.4% | 4.5% | 4.6% | -8.8% | 5.5% | 9.5% | 10.8% | 8.8% |
| ROIC | 2.4% | 2.4% | 5.2% | 7.4% | 7.7% | 6.9% | -9.2% | 7.9% | 15.8% | 17.1% | 16.8% |
| ROCE | 2.9% | 2.9% | 6.4% | 9.2% | 9.8% | 9.1% | -12.1% | 9.5% | 16.0% | 17.8% | 17.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 34.71 | 34.71 | 21.53 | 11.60 | 6.97 | 6.37 | 12.47 | 11.29 | 1.01 | 0.87 | 0.60 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 8.23 | 8.23 | 6.84 | 5.66 | 6.63 | 5.39 | — | 6.83 | 1.41 | 1.36 | 1.11 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 34.52 | 21.48 | 11.45 | 6.53 | 6.27 | 12.39 | 11.14 | 0.96 | 0.82 | 0.56 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 8.19 | 8.19 | 6.83 | 5.59 | 6.21 | 5.31 | — | 6.74 | 1.33 | 1.29 | 1.02 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | 84.63 | 12.75 | 9.05 | — | 31.07 | 3.07 | 7.76 | 4.81 |
| Interest Coverage | 0.53 | 0.53 | 1.51 | 2.15 | 3.07 | 3.47 | -6.93 | 7.04 | 12.21 | 18.99 | 21.10 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.27 | 0.37 | 0.46 | 0.43 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.23 | 0.57 | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.30 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.41 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.11 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.59 | 0.52 | 0.56 | 0.19 | 0.57 | 0.99 | 0.95 | 0.95 |
| Inventory Turnover | 7.53 | 7.53 | 7.90 | 39.82 | 6.80 | 5.08 | 3.15 | 6.77 | 8.06 | 7.14 | 8.25 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 9.46 | 5.00 | 7.41 | 8.77 | 18.17 | 58.59 | 2.34 | 3.64 | 6.34 | 2.14 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.3% | 1.0% | 0.6% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 15.7% | 9.9% | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 5.5% | 5.4% | 6.4% | 6.2% | — | 6.7% | 5.7% | 6.0% | 3.9% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | 1.4% | 9.9% | 10.8% | — | 4.0% | 5.9% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.7% | 0.3% | 16.3% | 12.8% | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 19.8% | 7.3% | 7.6% | 1.2% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.7% | 0.3% | 16.3% | 12.8% | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 20.8% | 7.8% | 7.6% | 1.2% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $35M | $40M | $44M | $49M | $49M | $44M | $34M | $40M | $43M | $43M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 17 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying PLAY stock.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -2.9x. The historical average is 30.7x.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 9.6x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 10.1x.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -41.1%. The historical average is 7.5%.
Based on historical data, Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -2.9x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc. has 85.7% gross margin and 5.0% operating margin.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 8.2x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Interest coverage below unity against refinancing wall
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Operating Margin Halves on Inelastic Cost Base
Operating margin compressed to 5.0% in 2026Q2 from 15.2% two years earlier, and net margin swung to -2.3% from 7.0%, per PLAY's reported ratio data, indicating the deterioration spans multiple quarters rather than reflecting a single-period distortion.
The pattern suggests operating margin is the metric that best reflects PLAY's true earning power, because it is the only line that has moved consistently with the revenue contraction while net margin has oscillated between -9.4% and +3.8% on swings in interest expense and stock-based compensation. The cost base appears to resist flexing downward — the prior income statement work shows operating costs rising to $517.1M even as revenue fell 2.4% — which would mean margin recovery depends on traffic recovery rather than on expense control. One data caveat warrants flagging: gross margin is reported at roughly 85% through 2025Q2 but at 9.9%–14.6% in the two most recent quarters, a discontinuity that looks like a presentation change rather than an operating event, and any gross-margin-based inference should therefore be suspended until the definition is clarified.
Returns Decay Toward Zero on Debt-Laden Asset Base
ROIC has slid from 2.0% in 2024Q1 to 0.6% in 2026Q2, while ROA turned negative at -0.3%, based on PLAY's quarterly ratio series, suggesting the company has moved from勉强 earning its cost of capital to destroying value on incremental invested capital.
The drivers appear to be both margin and efficiency: asset turnover fell from 0.16 to 0.13 over the same window, so the denominator (a $4.1B asset base carrying $3.0B of net PP&E and $742.6M of goodwill) is not shrinking alongside earnings. That combination matters because PLAY has nonetheless sustained heavy capital expenditure, and an ROIC near zero implies the recent expansion spend is not yet showing up in returns — a judgment that would only reverse if revenue stabilizes before the asset base fully depreciates. ROE of -13.3% in 2026Q2 should be read with care, since the equity base has compressed to $87.9M and the ratio is therefore driven as much by denominator collapse as by operating losses.
Negative Cash Cycle Fades as Supplier Terms Tighten
The cash conversion cycle of -9 days in 2026Q2 compares with -77 days in 2024Q1, driven almost entirely by DPO collapsing from 124 days to 25, according to PLAY's reported working capital ratios, indicating a material shift in payables posture.
Historically a negative cycle functioned as a form of free financing for PLAY, with suppliers effectively funding inventory and operations; the erosion of that float to near-neutral terms removes a modest but real liquidity subsidy precisely when coverage is tightest. The interpretation is not conclusive — the abrupt, simultaneous step-change in both DIO (from the mid-40s to single digits) and DPO (from the 110–135 range to 25) looks more like a reclassification or a change in period convention than a renegotiation of supplier terms, so investors should verify the disclosure basis before treating this as a signal of lost bargaining power. Asset turnover at 0.13 against a peer set of asset-light restaurant operators confirms the structural difference: PLAY's economics are dominated by fixed assets, not by working capital velocity.
Coverage Breach as Debt Outruns Earnings
Interest coverage fell to 0.71x in 2026Q2 versus 2.49x in 2024Q1, while D/EBITDA reached 35.61x, per PLAY's ratio disclosures, implying trailing operating earnings no longer comfortably service the interest burden on a reported basis.
The D/E figure of 40.79x is arithmetically inflated by the shrunken $87.9M equity base and is therefore the least informative of the three leverage measures; coverage and D/EBITDA are the pair that should anchor any covenant or refinancing assessment, and both have deteriorated in parallel with margin compression rather than with new borrowing. Because EBITDA is heavily supported by depreciation on a $3.0B fixed asset base, the D/EBITDA reading may understate economic strain if that depreciation reflects genuine maintenance requirements rather than accounting drag. With a current ratio of 0.30 and $16.0M of cash against a $517.1M quarterly cost base, refinancing conditions and the terms attached to the debt maturities appear to be the dominant swing factors, and this is the risk investors should monitor most closely.
Valuation Discount Mirrors Structural Return Gap
PLAY's 8.87x EV/EBITDA sits roughly 26% below Brinker at 11.99x and 50% below Texas Roadhouse at 17.92x, while its 0.6% ROIC compares with 22.7% and 14.5% respectively, suggesting the discount is performance-anchored rather than sentiment-driven.
The gap looks structural rather than temporary: peer ROIC spreads of 4.1% (BJRI) to 22.7% (EAT) alongside positive net margins of 3.5%–8.4% contrast with PLAY's zero-return capital base and negative latest-quarter margins, and no mean-reversion case is visible without an operating inflection. The forward multiples deserve skepticism — a 60.0x forward P/E against a negative TTM P/E of -5.41x implies aearnings rebound that the seven-quarter revenue contraction does not yet corroborate, so the more defensible relative anchor remains EV/EBITDA. Notably, PLAY's 2.88x P/B does not screen as cheap against BJRI at 3.55x once the return differential is considered, which is an underappreciated feature of the current pricing.
Why P/E Misreads This Capital Structure
The most commonly misapplied ratio for PLAY is P/E, which is negative on a trailing basis and near 60x forward because net income is dominated by interest expense and stock-based compensation rather than by operating performance, obscuring the core economics entirely.
For a lease- and capital-intensive entertainment operator with $3.0B of net PP&E and $3.6B of debt, financing structure and depreciation policy distort every earnings-based multiple, so EBITDA-level measures are more stable — yet even the 8.87x EV/EBITDA should be paired with an EV/EBITDAR view given the operating lease obligations typical of this format, because rent is economically equivalent to the debt service that is already depressing coverage. The more appropriate diagnostic set is same-store sales trajectory, capex as a percentage of revenue (which fell from 31.8% to 15.6%, indicating a pullback that will eventually pressure maintenance quality), and maintenance-versus-growth capex split, none of which any headline multiple captures. Judged on those metrics rather than on the apparent P/E discount, the investment case appears considerably more dependent on top-line stabilization than the multiples alone would suggest.