Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 39.4x · EV/EBITDA 13.6x · ROE 7.4%. (1997–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $15.3B | $19.2B | $16.7B | $11.3B | $6.5B | $6.8B | $7.7B | $4.7B | $3.6B | $3.2B | $3.7B |
| Enterprise Value | $20.1B | $24.0B | $20.7B | $15.4B | $6.7B | $8.4B | $8.2B | $5.1B | $4.1B | $3.8B | $4.1B |
| P/E Ratio → | 39.37 | 49.46 | 44.88 | 64.32 | 20.22 | 45.01 | 45.16 | 31.58 | 29.48 | 43.38 | 40.00 |
| P/S Ratio | 3.27 | 4.12 | 3.90 | 3.06 | 3.73 | 4.81 | 5.57 | 3.58 | 3.06 | 3.33 | 3.24 |
| P/B Ratio | 2.53 | 3.17 | 2.92 | 2.04 | 5.02 | 6.37 | 7.58 | 5.20 | 4.28 | 4.34 | 5.28 |
| P/FCF | 20.85 | 26.27 | 25.51 | 56.88 | 16.54 | 24.88 | 35.73 | 16.16 | 35.34 | 29.91 | 25.90 |
| P/OCF | 15.33 | 19.32 | 17.93 | 20.68 | 13.97 | 21.47 | 29.75 | 14.17 | 24.81 | 21.93 | 20.58 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 5.15 | 4.84 | 4.20 | 3.89 | 5.90 | 5.95 | 3.89 | 3.49 | 3.91 | 3.61 |
| EV / EBITDA | 13.56 | 16.24 | 15.25 | 16.55 | 11.82 | 24.47 | 23.38 | 16.77 | 16.21 | 23.70 | 23.04 |
| EV / EBIT | 24.32 | 32.48 | 26.46 | 31.12 | 14.52 | 34.50 | 30.17 | 22.12 | 20.72 | 32.81 | 29.90 |
| EV / FCF | — | 32.85 | 31.66 | 78.08 | 17.22 | 30.50 | 38.14 | 17.59 | 40.32 | 35.09 | 28.84 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 35.8% | 35.8% | 46.8% | 48.3% | 55.2% | 57.4% | 55.3% | 51.0% | 54.4% | 54.7% | 44.4% |
| Operating Margin | 17.7% | 17.7% | 17.8% | 12.8% | 26.2% | 17.0% | 19.1% | 16.9% | 15.8% | 11.1% | 12.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | 9.3% | 9.3% | 9.6% | 5.6% | 18.4% | 10.7% | 12.4% | 11.3% | 10.4% | 7.7% | 8.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 7.4% | 7.4% | 7.4% | 6.1% | 27.1% | 14.6% | 17.7% | 17.1% | 15.4% | 10.4% | 12.9% |
| ROA | 3.6% | 3.6% | 3.5% | 2.8% | 9.9% | 5.1% | 7.4% | 7.0% | 6.0% | 4.1% | 6.8% |
| ROIC | 6.0% | 6.0% | 5.9% | 6.3% | 16.3% | 8.7% | 13.8% | 12.6% | 10.5% | 6.7% | 11.7% |
| ROCE | 7.9% | 7.9% | 7.2% | 7.4% | 17.9% | 10.0% | 14.8% | 13.4% | 11.4% | 7.2% | 12.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.80 | 0.87 | 0.59 | 1.74 | 0.79 | 0.86 | 0.89 | 1.11 | 0.90 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.72 | 3.72 | 3.36 | 5.11 | 1.33 | 5.47 | 2.27 | 2.54 | 2.94 | 5.17 | 3.53 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.79 | 0.70 | 0.76 | 0.21 | 1.44 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.60 | 0.75 | 0.60 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 3.25 | 3.25 | 2.96 | 4.49 | 0.47 | 4.51 | 1.48 | 1.37 | 2.00 | 3.50 | 2.35 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 6.57 | 6.15 | 21.20 | 0.68 | 5.62 | 2.41 | 1.43 | 4.97 | 5.18 | 2.94 |
| Interest Coverage | 3.80 | 3.80 | 3.35 | 2.32 | 8.01 | 6.55 | 7.63 | 5.62 | 4.43 | 3.02 | 24.45 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.10 | 1.10 | 1.29 | 1.35 | 1.21 | 1.30 | 1.08 | 1.36 | 1.37 | 1.31 | 1.50 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.02 | 1.02 | 1.18 | 1.21 | 1.08 | 1.12 | 0.91 | 1.23 | 1.11 | 1.21 | 1.38 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.43 | 0.62 | 0.55 | 0.54 | 0.72 | 0.54 | 0.69 | 0.82 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.39 | 0.36 | 0.31 | 0.61 | 0.39 | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.57 | 0.48 | 0.70 |
| Inventory Turnover | 21.48 | 21.48 | 16.41 | 10.39 | 7.53 | 5.88 | 7.13 | 9.94 | 4.71 | 11.50 | 21.99 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 60.84 | 63.01 | 30.69 | 39.11 | 30.61 | 36.13 | 33.70 | 35.15 | 29.27 | 14.68 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 2.6% | 1.8% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.8% | 2.1% | 2.2% | 1.9% |
| Payout Ratio | 52.1% | 52.1% | 49.9% | 144.3% | 36.0% | 68.3% | 53.9% | 55.4% | 62.3% | 97.0% | 76.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 2.5% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 1.6% | 4.9% | 2.2% | 2.2% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 2.3% | 2.5% |
| FCF Yield | 4.8% | 3.8% | 3.9% | 1.8% | 6.0% | 4.0% | 2.8% | 6.2% | 2.8% | 3.3% | 3.9% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 2.6% | 1.8% | 1.5% | 1.9% | 2.7% | 2.1% | 2.2% | 2.9% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $187M | $185M | $168M | $112M | $111M | $110M | $110M | $109M | $108M | $107M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 29 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RBA stock.
RB Global, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 39.4x. The historical average is 31.7x. This places it at the 75th percentile of its historical range.
RB Global, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 13.6x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 16.3x.
RB Global, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 7.4%. The historical average is 15.3%.
Based on historical data, RB Global, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 39.4x. This is at the 75th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
RB Global, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 1.48% with a payout ratio of 52.1%.
RB Global, Inc. has 35.8% gross margin and 17.7% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
RB Global, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 3.7x, indicating high leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Integration and leverage risks
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Premium Pricing on Integration Hopes
RBA trades at 45.98x trailing P/E versus Copart's 18.18x, implying the market prices in substantial synergy realization from the IAA merger, as per recent market data.
The forward P/E of 21.77x suggests investors expect a sharp earnings inflection, but the PEG of 7.42x indicates that the current growth rate does not justify the multiple on a growth-adjusted basis. The EV/EBITDA of 15.29x is above Copart's 12.59x, which may reflect a premium for the combined marketplace's data assets, yet it also embeds a high bar for execution. Given the integration risk and the cyclicality of auction volumes, the valuation appears to be pricing in a smooth synergy capture that has yet to be fully demonstrated.
Margin Mix Distorts Underlying Power
Gross margin swung from 45.6% in Q1 2026 to 17.1% in Q2 2026 due to principal sales, yet operating margin held at 17.1%, as reported in the latest quarterly data.
The collapse in gross margin is a mix effect from higher principal inventory sales, not a deterioration in fee-based economics. Operating margin of 17.1% in Q2 2026, though down from 26.0% in Q4 2025, remains respectable and suggests that the core service business is generating stable fees. However, the net margin of 10.9% is being suppressed by amortization of acquired intangibles and integration costs, which may continue for several quarters. Investors should focus on service revenue and adjusted EBITDA to gauge true earning power, as GAAP net income understates the marketplace's profitability.
Returns Suppressed by Acquisition Overhang
ROIC averaged 1.6% over the last ten quarters, far below Copart's 20.1%, reflecting the heavy capital base from the IAA acquisition, as per reported financials.
The low ROIC is a direct consequence of the $7 billion IAA purchase, which added substantial goodwill and intangibles without immediately generating proportional earnings. While ROE has improved to 2.4% in Q2 2026 from 1.3% in Q4 2024, it remains well below the peer average, indicating that the company is still in the early stages of earning back its cost of capital. The trajectory suggests gradual improvement as synergies materialize, but the pace of return on capital expansion will be a key test of management's capital allocation discipline.
Working Capital Swings Reflect Auction Timing
Cash conversion cycle swung from 24 days in Q2 2026 to -75 days in Q1 2026, driven by a DPO spike to 156 days, as per the latest quarterly data.
The extreme volatility in CCC is a function of the timing of principal inventory purchases and the associated payables, not a structural improvement in working capital management. The negative CCC in Q1 2026 indicates that RBA is effectively using supplier financing, but this is likely a temporary artifact of auction event timing. Asset turnover remains low at 0.11x, reflecting the heavy asset base of physical yards and intangibles, which is typical for a marketplace with significant infrastructure. Investors should monitor DSO trends, which have ranged from 42 to 79 days, as a signal of collection efficiency in the principal sales business.
Deleveraging Progress but Debt Remains High
Debt-to-equity improved to 0.49 in Q2 2026 from 0.91 in Q4 2025, yet D/EBITDA of 8.28x remains elevated, as per recent balance sheet data.
The rapid reduction in total debt from $5.5B to $2.9B is a positive sign, but the absolute level of leverage is still substantial relative to EBITDA. Interest coverage of 5.29x in Q2 2026 is adequate but leaves limited room for a downturn in auction volumes or a rise in rates. The reported D/E may understate true leverage if operating leases and other off-balance-sheet obligations are considered, which warrants caution. While the deleveraging trend is encouraging, the company remains exposed to refinancing risk and covenant headroom should be monitored.
Liquidity Buffer Strengthens but Stress Test Looms
Current ratio improved to 1.31 in Q2 2026 from 1.10 in Q4 2025, with cash of $524.9M, as per the latest balance sheet.
The improvement in the current ratio is partly due to a reduction in short-term debt and a build-up of cash, but the quick ratio of 1.22 suggests that inventory is not a major liquidity concern. However, the business is cyclical, and a severe downturn in used equipment prices could compress margins and strain liquidity if auction volumes decline. The $524.9M cash balance provides a modest buffer, but it is small relative to the $2.9B debt load, indicating that the company would need to rely on credit markets in a stress scenario. Investors should monitor the availability of undrawn credit facilities and the maturity profile of long-term debt.
Gross Margin Misleads in Principal Sales
The most misapplied ratio is gross margin, which swung to 17.1% in Q2 2026 from 45.6% in Q1 2026, obscuring the underlying fee-based profitability, as per reported figures.
Analysts often compare RBA's gross margin to Copart's, but the inclusion of principal inventory sales distorts the metric. A more appropriate measure is the service revenue margin or the take rate on GTV, which isolates the commission-based earnings power. The volatility in gross margin is a function of the mix between agency and principal transactions, not a change in the competitiveness of the marketplace. Investors should adjust for principal sales by focusing on service revenue and gross profit per lot to assess true margin trends.