Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 35.7x · EV/EBITDA 28.8x · ROE 27.1%. (2013–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $859M | $988M | $2.5B | $3.5B | $2.0B | $6.5B | $4.6B | $2.7B | $1.4B | $802M | $502M |
| Enterprise Value | $1.6B | $1.8B | $3.2B | $4.3B | $2.7B | $7.3B | $4.9B | $2.9B | $1.5B | $750M | $449M |
| P/E Ratio → | 35.69 | 42.22 | 100.57 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 1.00 | 1.15 | 3.01 | 4.46 | 2.90 | 12.15 | 11.18 | 8.35 | 5.93 | 3.99 | 3.19 |
| P/B Ratio | 5.40 | 6.39 | 143.52 | — | — | — | 64.32 | 32.82 | 16.58 | 33.18 | 11.94 |
| P/FCF | 5.94 | 6.84 | 15.11 | 34.72 | 34.41 | 144.85 | — | — | — | 94.72 | 108.82 |
| P/OCF | 5.64 | 6.49 | 14.81 | 33.27 | 25.44 | 120.65 | 941.58 | — | 238.64 | 60.33 | 55.09 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.06 | 3.82 | 5.50 | 3.94 | 13.55 | 11.89 | 8.78 | 6.24 | 3.73 | 2.85 |
| EV / EBITDA | 28.78 | 31.04 | 40.35 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | 141.80 | 43.57 | 61.53 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 12.24 | 19.17 | 42.84 | 46.64 | 161.51 | — | — | — | 88.62 | 97.30 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 70.3% | 70.3% | 70.3% | 70.2% | 68.7% | 68.4% | 70.5% | 72.1% | 70.9% | 71.7% | 74.8% |
| Operating Margin | 1.3% | 1.3% | 4.2% | -10.4% | -16.3% | -22.4% | -18.0% | -14.1% | -21.7% | -24.3% | -31.2% |
| Net Profit Margin | 2.7% | 2.7% | 3.0% | -19.2% | -18.2% | -27.3% | -24.0% | -16.5% | -22.8% | -22.6% | -31.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 27.1% | 27.1% | 144.1% | — | — | — | -127.8% | -63.2% | -99.7% | -137.4% | -89.0% |
| ROA | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.6% | -10.4% | -9.4% | -13.2% | -12.5% | -8.8% | -13.2% | -17.2% | -20.7% |
| ROIC | 1.1% | 1.1% | 3.8% | -9.5% | -13.8% | -18.3% | -19.0% | -17.8% | -58.9% | — | — |
| ROCE | 1.1% | 1.1% | 3.6% | -9.2% | -13.5% | -17.3% | -15.8% | -13.1% | -25.3% | -50.7% | -46.2% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 6.65 | 6.65 | 57.49 | — | — | — | 6.49 | 3.18 | 2.00 | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | 18.04 | 18.04 | 12.74 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 5.05 | 38.59 | — | — | — | 4.06 | 1.70 | 0.86 | -2.13 | -1.26 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 13.71 | 13.71 | 8.55 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | 5.41 | 4.06 | 8.12 | 12.23 | 16.66 | — | — | — | -6.09 | -11.52 |
| Interest Coverage | 3.89 | 3.89 | 4.78 | -1.31 | -10.14 | -8.51 | -3.01 | -3.02 | -10.16 | -61.44 | -374.25 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.20 | 1.20 | 1.25 | 1.11 | 0.96 | 0.92 | 1.34 | 1.27 | 1.51 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.20 | 1.20 | 1.25 | 1.11 | 0.96 | 0.92 | 1.34 | 1.27 | 1.46 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.67 | 0.55 | 0.48 | 0.88 | 0.84 | 1.10 | 0.48 | 0.49 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.44 | 0.71 | 0.65 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.77 | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 70.90 | 72.76 | 77.37 | 81.01 | 99.60 | 98.99 | 98.16 | 112.05 | 133.80 | 113.96 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 2.8% | 2.4% | 1.0% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 16.8% | 14.6% | 6.6% | 2.9% | 2.9% | 0.7% | — | — | — | 1.1% | 0.9% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $65M | $63M | $61M | $59M | $55M | $51M | $49M | $46M | $43M | $41M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 13 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RPD stock.
Rapid7, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 35.7x. The historical average is 71.4x.
Rapid7, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 28.8x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 35.7x.
Rapid7, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 27.1%. This is above the typical threshold of 15-20% considered good for most companies. The historical average is -81.2%.
Based on historical data, Rapid7, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 35.7x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Rapid7, Inc. has 70.3% gross margin and 1.3% operating margin.
Rapid7, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 18.0x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
High leverage with growth stagnation
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Valuation Disconnect Reflects Deep Discount
Rapid7 trades at a significant discount to its primary peer Tenable, with a forward EV/EBITDA of 5.32 versus Tenable's 102.56, suggesting the market is pricing in a near-total lack of growth and the risk of value erosion from its high debt load.
The forward P/E of 8.68 and P/S of 1.05 are extraordinarily low for a cybersecurity software company, indicating the market has severely discounted future cash flows due to the negative revenue growth trajectory and balance sheet strain. This valuation appears to assume no recovery in growth and potential permanent impairment of the asset base, given the high goodwill concentration. Investors should note that the current valuation implies the business is being priced more like a distressed asset than a platform software company with recurring revenue.
Margin Compression at Structural Inflection
Operating margin has deteriorated from a peak of 6.5% in Q3 2024 to just 1.4% in Q2 2026, indicating that the high fixed-cost structure is now overwhelming the business as revenue growth stalls, according to the company's financial statements.
The gross margin of 68.9% is structurally lower than pure-play SaaS peers like Qualys (whose 29.6% net margin suggests a different cost profile), likely reflecting the heavier labor component of Rapid7's managed services. The near-zero operating margin demonstrates an inability to generate meaningful profit at current scale, meaning further growth is required to achieve leverage. Without a clear path to revenue acceleration, the current margin profile suggests the business model may not be economically viable at its present size.
Capital Returns Near Zero Across Cycle
ROIC has averaged a mere 0.3% over the last four quarters, fundamentally below any reasonable cost of capital and indicating that the substantial invested capital base is not generating economic value.
The company's ROIC trend from -0.0% in Q1 2025 to 0.3% in Q2 2026 shows a slight improvement but remains in the realm of capital destruction. This poor return profile is a direct function of the low operating margin and the massive asset base, which includes over $590M in goodwill from past acquisitions. The consistent underperformance of ROIC versus the implied cost of debt and equity suggests that past capital allocation decisions have failed to create shareholder value.
Current Ratio Masks Structural Shortfall
The current ratio stands at 0.80 in Q2 2026, meaning current liabilities exceed current assets and indicating a structural liquidity shortfall that is being managed through cash accumulation rather than operational cash flow.
While cash and equivalents have grown to $425.6M, providing a nominal buffer, the sub-1.0 current ratio for multiple quarters suggests the company relies on ongoing receivables collections and possibly deferred revenue to meet short-term obligations. This configuration becomes precarious if sales cycles lengthen or customers delay payments, as the company lacks the asset flexibility to cover its immediate liabilities from liquid resources alone. The liquidity position appears adequate only under the assumption of stable, uninterrupted cash collections.
The Illusion of Asset Turnover
The most commonly misapplied ratio is asset turnover, which at 0.12x for Q2 2026 appears catastrophically low, but this metric is heavily distorted by over $590M in non-amortizing goodwill that inflates the asset base without contributing to revenue generation.
Using asset turnover to assess Rapid7's operational efficiency is misleading because the denominator includes a massive goodwill balance from acquisitions that are no longer contributing to growth. A more accurate measure would be to focus on the net revenue retention rate and ARR per customer, which directly measure the productivity of the core installed base and platform cross-sell success. The true operational challenge lies not in turning over a bloated asset base, but in demonstrating that the company can re-accelerate growth from its existing customer relationships.