Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 75.0x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -33.4%. (2019–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $1.4B | $822M | $3.7B | $1.3B | $944M | $3.5B | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $1.7B | $1.1B | $3.8B | $1.3B | $913M | $3.0B | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 75.02 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 2.08 | 1.21 | 5.47 | 2.17 | 2.01 | 10.25 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 3.98 | 2.31 | 8.29 | 2.62 | 1.74 | 5.33 | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | 85.29 | 47.76 | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.60 | 5.64 | 2.24 | 1.94 | 8.86 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 15.2% | 15.2% | 19.6% | 17.5% | 14.7% | 11.9% | -3.9% | 16.0% |
| Operating Margin | -16.4% | -16.4% | -14.1% | -20.9% | -41.1% | -39.5% | -64.2% | -25.6% |
| Net Profit Margin | -19.7% | -19.7% | -13.4% | -19.4% | -40.5% | -45.1% | -64.0% | -24.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -33.4% | -33.4% | -19.5% | -22.1% | -31.9% | -88.6% | — | — |
| ROA | -16.3% | -16.3% | -10.5% | -12.8% | -22.8% | -29.8% | -43.3% | -17.6% |
| ROIC | -14.1% | -14.1% | -13.2% | -17.7% | -41.9% | -55.6% | — | — |
| ROCE | -15.8% | -15.8% | -12.7% | -15.3% | -24.9% | -28.5% | -48.6% | -19.8% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.74 | 0.63 | 0.56 | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.75 | 0.26 | 0.09 | -0.06 | -0.72 | — | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | -7052.63 | -7052.63 | -357.10 | -881.85 | -2277.27 | -1757.94 | -348.56 | -770.78 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.09 | 1.09 | 2.02 | 3.02 | 4.77 | 10.66 | 3.19 | 7.95 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.07 | 1.07 | 2.01 | 2.99 | 4.75 | 10.64 | 3.17 | 7.92 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.75 | 0.75 | 1.85 | 2.81 | 4.57 | 9.93 | 2.83 | 7.57 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.86 | 0.79 | 0.68 | 0.52 | 0.45 | 0.83 | 0.71 |
| Inventory Turnover | 241.59 | 241.59 | 273.72 | 233.02 | 289.82 | 331.64 | 369.87 | 276.99 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 2.83 | 2.76 | 2.25 | 2.59 | 21.33 | 11.57 | 7.08 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 1.3% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $118M | $114M | $112M | $110M | $109M | $88M | $108M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 7 years · Updated daily
Live VCP patterns, Cup & Handle overlays, support/resistance, and AI trade plans.
High-probability breakout stocks crossing their pivot across 5 pattern engines.
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SG stock.
Sweetgreen, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 75.0x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Sweetgreen, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -33.4%. The historical average is -39.1%.
Based on historical data, Sweetgreen, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 75.0x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Sweetgreen, Inc. has 15.2% gross margin and -16.4% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Persistent operating losses and leverage
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Premium Multiple Against Loss-Making Base
Based on reported figures, SG trades at 75.0x trailing earnings and 2.08x sales, a premium to SHAK's 68.9x P/E and 17.8x EV/EBITDA, pricing in margin recovery that TTM results do not yet show. The EV/EBITDA multiple is unavailable on a trailing basis, so the market is leaning on forward estimates.
The 3.98x price-to-book ratio sits well above SHAK's 5.43x only in relative terms, yet SG's negative ROE of -33.4% means the book multiple reflects an equity base being eroded rather than compounded. Compared with CAVA's 108.1x P/E, SG screens cheaper on earnings but still embeds a significant growth premium. Investors should treat the forward EV/EBITDA of 39.6x as conditional on automation-driven margin gains that have not yet appeared in reported gross margin of -18.1%.
Gross Margin Collapse Overwhelms Operating Base
As reported in the latest quarter, gross margin turned to -18.1% and operating margin to -18.1%, down from 22.5% gross margin in 2024Q2, indicating that unit-level cost absorption has deteriorated sharply over two years.
Operating margin of -18.1% and net margin of -17.5% suggest the store base is not covering food, labor and occupancy costs, let alone corporate overhead. Peer context is unfavorable, as SHAK and CAVA retain positive net margins of 3.2% and 5.4%, which points to a structural rather than cyclical gap. Earnings quality is further complicated by a 2026Q1 net margin of 77.9% driven by non-operating items, so headline net income should not be used as a proxy for earning power.
Negative Returns Eroding Invested Capital
Based on SG's reported figures, ROIC has remained negative across all ten quarters, reaching -3.5% in 2026Q3, while ROE of -6.8% and ROA of -3.5% show no sustained compounding in the capital base.
ROIC has hovered between roughly -2.3% and -5.0% without a clear recovery trend, which indicates capital deployed into restaurant infrastructure is not yet generating returns above its cost. The sustained negative figures, alongside an equity base that has contracted, suggest decaying rather than compounding returns. Investors should monitor whether margin repair from the Infinite Kitchen rollout can lift ROIC toward positive territory, as current figures do not yet support that thesis.
Rising Debt Against Shrinking Equity
According to reported financials, SG's debt-to-equity ratio climbed to 1.00 in 2025Q4 from 0.66 in 2024Q2, with D/EBITDA unavailable in recent periods and interest coverage deeply negative at -3072.8x in 2026Q3.
Negative operating income makes interest coverage ratios mathematically meaningless as a measure of debt service comfort, and the negative values in the series reflect a loss-making denominator rather than a capacity to pay. The rising leverage ratio, driven mainly by equity contraction rather than debt growth, suggests the balance sheet is weakening. Refinancing and covenant risk cannot be assessed fully from the supplied data, so this warrants further investigation through the debt footnotes.
Liquidity Cushion Thinning Under Burn
As reported in balance sheet data, SG's current ratio fell from 2.72 in 2024Q2 to 1.27 in 2026Q3 and quick ratio to 1.24, indicating a narrowing buffer as cash declined toward $119.8M against persistent free cash burn.
The current ratio remains above 1.0 but has compressed by more than half over ten quarters, which suggests the liquidity position is being consumed by operating and capital outflows. Because the quick ratio is nearly equal to the current ratio, inventory dependence is low, so the liquidity question is really one of cash runway against burn rate. Under a severe stress scenario, the reduction in cash without an offsetting earnings recovery would likely pressure the company's flexibility, though this is an inference from reported trends rather than a disclosed outcome.
Lagging Peers on Profitability and Returns
Based on peer comparison data, SG's ROE of -33.4% and net margin of -19.7% trail every peer in the set, with only Krispy Kreme showing comparably negative figures, while SG's P/B of 3.98x sits below CAVA's 8.95x.
SG's net margin gap versus SHAK, CAVA, BROS and PTLO appears structural, as it persists across multiple periods and is anchored in gross margin pressure rather than a one-off charge. The valuation premium relative to PTLO and BROS on a price-to-book basis is not supported by returns, suggesting the market is pricing a turnaround option. Whether the gap closes depends on evidence of restaurant-level margin repair, which has not yet appeared in the reported ratios.
Misapplied Metric: Trailing P/E on Loss Base
The trailing P/E of 75.0x is the metric most commonly misapplied to SG, since earnings are distorted by non-operating swings such as the 2026Q1 net income of $125.8M against an operating loss of -$31.7M.
A P/E multiple obscures the operating reality because net income has been inflated by items unrelated to restaurant economics in at least one quarter. A more defensible framework would use restaurant-level profit margin and EV-to-sales against store-level throughput, which isolates the unit economics that the automation thesis depends upon. Investors should treat the P/E figure as unreliable for valuation until operating income turns consistently positive.