Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -5.5x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -158.4%. (2019–2024 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $244M | $152M | — | — | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $228M | $136M | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -5.48 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 67.73 | 42.28 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 5.87 | 7.67 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 37.93 | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 10.2% | 10.2% | 28.2% | 20.8% | 15.1% | 18.8% | 12.0% |
| Operating Margin | -334.3% | -334.3% | -35.7% | -1.6% | -2.3% | 4.3% | -3.4% |
| Net Profit Margin | -589.9% | -589.9% | -29.4% | 0.6% | -0.7% | 6.7% | -2.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -158.4% | -158.4% | -21.2% | 3.4% | -4.9% | 33.2% | -17.9% |
| ROA | -70.6% | -70.6% | -16.3% | 1.4% | -2.0% | 12.9% | -6.2% |
| ROIC | -422.9% | -422.9% | -157.4% | -8.4% | -16.6% | 13.9% | -9.5% |
| ROCE | -88.2% | -88.2% | -24.8% | -6.7% | -12.8% | 18.3% | -20.6% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.36 | 0.52 | 0.37 | 1.24 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | 1.40 | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.79 | -0.99 | -0.15 | -0.31 | -0.20 | 0.64 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | -0.74 | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | -5.33 | — | -0.48 | — |
| Interest Coverage | -1732.94 | -1732.94 | -89.49 | -6.48 | -14.30 | 42.57 | — |
Net cash position: cash ($17M) exceeds total debt ($2M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.23 | 1.23 | 8.25 | 1.27 | 1.44 | 2.17 | 1.43 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.23 | 1.23 | 8.25 | 1.27 | 1.44 | 2.17 | 1.43 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.54 | 0.54 | 7.60 | 0.49 | 0.68 | 0.53 | 0.32 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.07 | 0.36 | 2.49 | 3.15 | 1.79 | 2.11 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 2110.90 | 72.53 | 50.39 | 39.82 | 127.74 | 124.97 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | 395.7% | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $15M | $11M | $13M | $14M | $14M | $13M |
Unsustainable Operating Burn Rate
According to recent market data, SUPX trades at a P/S ratio of 67.65, a valuation that appears disconnected from its legacy fit-out operations and suggests investors are pricing in speculative AI growth that remains unsupported by the company's current financial performance or historical revenue trajectory.
The extreme P/S multiple implies that the market is attempting to value the firm as a high-growth software entity rather than a distressed construction services provider. Investors should monitor whether this premium is justified by future software licensing revenue, as the current valuation provides no margin of safety for the underlying business model.
As reported in financial statements, the company's gross margin of 10.16% highlights a structural inability to command pricing power, while the operating margin of -334.33% indicates that corporate overhead is vastly decoupled from the current revenue scale, rendering the current business model fundamentally unprofitable.
The thin gross margins suggest that SUPX acts primarily as a low-value-add project coordinator, leaving it highly vulnerable to inflationary pressures in labor and materials. Without a pivot to high-margin software licensing, the current cost structure appears unsustainable and warrants further investigation into the company's long-term viability.
Based on historical data, the company's ROIC has trended into deeply negative territory, reaching -141.4% in 2024Q4, which indicates that management is currently destroying shareholder capital rather than compounding it through their ongoing strategic pivot and legacy fit-out operations.
The persistent decay in returns on invested capital suggests that the firm's recent investments have failed to generate meaningful economic value. Investors should be wary of the company's ability to reverse this trend, as the current capital allocation strategy appears to be consuming resources without improving operational efficiency.
According to recent filings, the company's DSO has fluctuated significantly, reaching 338 days in 2024Q4, which reveals a severe struggle to manage its cash conversion cycle and collect payments from clients in the cooling Hong Kong property market.
The extended collection period suggests that the company lacks leverage over its customers, potentially leading to liquidity constraints despite the current cash balance. This inefficiency in working capital management further exacerbates the firm's reliance on external capital to fund its massive operating losses.
The most commonly misapplied metric for SUPX is the P/S ratio, which obscures the reality that the firm remains a legacy construction business; analysts should instead focus on the cash burn rate and gross margin to assess the sustainability of the company's operations.
Applying software-based valuation multiples to a business with 10% gross margins is fundamentally flawed and ignores the high probability of continued operational distress. Investors should prioritize cash runway analysis over revenue multiples to determine the true risk profile of this entity.
Includes 30+ ratios · 6 years · Updated daily
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SUPX stock.
SuperX AI Technology Limited's current P/E ratio is -5.5x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
SuperX AI Technology Limited's return on equity (ROE) is -158.4%. The historical average is -27.6%.
Based on historical data, SuperX AI Technology Limited is trading at a P/E of -5.5x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
SuperX AI Technology Limited has 10.2% gross margin and -334.3% operating margin.