Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -9.5x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -57.0%. (1997–2026 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $187M | $246M | $125M | $39M | $36M | $41M | $52M | $12M | $22M | $18M | $47M |
| Enterprise Value | $156M | $215M | $117M | $34M | $28M | $32M | $38M | $9M | $19M | $11M | $48M |
| P/E Ratio → | -9.49 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 10.69 | — | 2.70 |
| P/B Ratio | 3.48 | 5.04 | 10.82 | 2.24 | 1.92 | 1.73 | 1.70 | 1.25 | 3.02 | 1.43 | 24.00 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 9.61 | — | 2.78 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 99.3% | — | 16.9% |
| Operating Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -376.6% | — | -10.2% |
| Net Profit Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -398.1% | — | -11.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -57.0% | -57.0% | -141.6% | -38.0% | -35.8% | -51.4% | -61.9% | -63.0% | -81.1% | -186.4% | -79.0% |
| ROA | -45.8% | -45.8% | -86.7% | -29.5% | -29.5% | -47.4% | -60.2% | -60.9% | -78.9% | -153.9% | -36.4% |
| ROIC | -131.7% | -131.7% | -126.6% | -47.3% | -54.9% | -71.3% | -78.7% | -72.8% | -114.1% | -145.4% | -32.5% |
| ROCE | -51.6% | -51.6% | -56.4% | -31.6% | -37.5% | -52.4% | -61.4% | -67.2% | -76.3% | -112.5% | -70.8% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | — | — | — | — | 0.85 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.63 | -0.70 | -0.32 | -0.41 | -0.38 | -0.45 | -0.29 | -0.31 | -0.60 | 0.77 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -71229.04 | -30.47 |
Net cash position: cash ($31M) exceeds total debt ($96223)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 51.97 | 51.97 | 10.11 | 14.41 | 22.26 | 8.71 | 22.74 | 20.16 | 17.54 | 28.94 | 1.21 |
| Quick Ratio | 51.97 | 51.97 | 10.11 | 14.41 | 22.26 | 8.71 | 22.74 | 20.16 | 17.54 | 28.94 | 0.87 |
| Cash Ratio | 49.48 | 49.48 | 9.28 | 12.31 | 20.65 | 8.02 | 22.04 | 17.42 | 13.71 | 26.73 | 0.06 |
| Asset Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.27 | — | 3.65 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 15.31 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $15M | $11M | $9M | $8M | $7M | $5M | $2M | $2M | $1M | $977849 |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying USAU stock.
U.S. Gold Corp.'s current P/E ratio is -9.5x. The historical average is 19.3x.
U.S. Gold Corp.'s return on equity (ROE) is -57.0%. The historical average is -42.8%.
Based on historical data, U.S. Gold Corp. is trading at a P/E of -9.5x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Cash burn without revenue offset
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Capital Erosion Across Asset Base
ROIC has remained negative in every quarter through 2027Q1, printing -19.8% versus -8.0% in 2024Q4, per U.S. Gold Corp.'s reported figures; this persistent capital destruction reflects an asset base that generates no operating income to offset corporate overhead.
The swing from -8.0% to a trough of -42.3% in 2025Q3, followed by a partial recovery to -19.8%, does not signal improving capital efficiency but rather a shrinking denominator as losses eat into invested capital. With asset turnover unavailable and no revenue line, ROIC here is essentially a mirror of cumulative loss severity, implying that returns will remain structurally negative until commercial production begins.
Overhead Growth Without Revenue Base
Net and operating margins remain structurally undefined with zero revenue across all ten quarters, while SG&A has climbed to $3.9M in 2027Q1 from $884.7K in 2025Q2, according to recent SEC filings, leaving losses entirely a function of spending discipline.
Because gross margin cannot be computed absent revenue, the only meaningful profitability read is the trajectory of operating losses against a fixed zero top line, which suggests overhead is scaling ahead of any production milestone. The 2025Q4 net loss of -$7.8M versus a -$3.2M operating loss further implies non-operating charges distorted that period, so investors should treat reported net margin as unreliable for trend purposes.
High Current Ratio Masks Finite Runway
The current and quick ratios both stand at 37.15 in 2027Q1 with no inventory on the balance sheet, as reported in U.S. Gold Corp.'s financial statements, yet cash has fallen roughly 25% from its 2026Q3 peak, so the buffer appears to be shrinking.
The identical current and quick ratios confirm the liquidity profile is entirely cash-driven, with no inventory or receivables to provide secondary cushioning under stress. At an implied burn approaching $8M per quarter per recent free cash flow figures, even a 37x current ratio may represent only a handful of quarters of runway, making the ratio a poor standalone safety signal without a corresponding revenue or financing milestone.
Book Premium Versus Negative-Return Peers
USAU trades at 3.53x book value, close to Americas Gold and Silver's 3.86x and Marygold's 3.57x, per peer data assembled for this note, while its -19.8% ROIC sits in the same negative territory as both, suggesting pricing rests on asset optionality rather than demonstrated returns.
Unlike Gulfport Energy's 14.8% ROIC and 1.67x book multiple, which reflect cash-generative operations, USAU's peer set consists largely of loss-making miners where book value is itself being diluted by retained losses deepening to -$115.2M. The fact that USAU's P/B sits near peers despite a comparable ROIC deficit implies the market is pricing a development pathway rather than current economics, a gap that warrants scrutiny if permitting or financing timelines slip.
Multiples Devoid of Earnings Anchors
With a TTM P/E of -9.99 and no EV/EBITDA or EV/Sales figure calculable on negative EBITDA and zero revenue, per market data for this note, USAU's 3.53x price-to-book multiple is the only meaningful valuation reference available to investors.
The negative P/E conveys no valuation information beyond confirming losses, while the absence of forward multiples means the market is not pricing an earnings inflection it can currently model. In this context, P/B becomes the de facto anchor, but it should be read against the $44.9M equity base funded by fresh issuance rather than retained value creation, implying the multiple may be flattered by dilution rather than asset appreciation.
P/E Misreads Pre-Production Gold Developers
The negative trailing P/E of -9.99 is the ratio most commonly misapplied to USAU's pre-production model, as it penalizes the company for spending ahead of revenue; analysts should instead benchmark EV per resource ounce or cash runway against development-stage peers.
Because a pre-production miner has no earnings to divide into price, P/E either prints meaningless negatives or forces comparisons to producing peers like Goldgroup Mining whose 41% ROIC reflects live operations, making the ratio actively misleading for USAU. The more diagnostic metrics here are cash runway implied by the declining balance and the P/B multiple judged against the pace of equity dilution, both of which better capture whether the balance sheet can fund the company to first pour.