Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 13.3x · EV/EBITDA 9.7x · ROE 19.4%. (1998–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $11.3B | $17.2B | $19.9B | $12.8B | $13.0B | $12.6B | $6.2B | $3.9B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $5.8B |
| Enterprise Value | $17.7B | $23.6B | $22.7B | $15.3B | $15.3B | $14.5B | $7.7B | $7.0B | $3.4B | $3.3B | $5.6B |
| P/E Ratio → | 13.28 | 20.26 | 17.09 | 12.24 | 12.13 | 8.32 | 11.72 | 13.24 | 10.90 | 10.45 | 20.16 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.66 | 1.00 | 1.48 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 1.03 | 0.65 | 0.45 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.73 |
| P/B Ratio | 2.03 | 3.10 | 6.22 | 4.89 | 5.14 | 6.02 | 2.65 | 2.28 | 1.83 | 1.74 | 3.00 |
| P/FCF | 23.48 | 35.71 | 39.09 | 13.63 | 23.27 | 9.66 | 4.67 | 21.05 | 6.78 | 12.45 | 17.18 |
| P/OCF | 6.99 | 10.62 | 15.18 | 8.39 | 14.08 | 7.82 | 4.00 | 9.74 | 4.89 | 4.54 | 7.63 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.37 | 1.69 | 1.18 | 1.23 | 1.18 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.71 |
| EV / EBITDA | 9.74 | 12.98 | 12.11 | 9.11 | 8.35 | 6.17 | 7.21 | 10.13 | 4.57 | 4.65 | 8.24 |
| EV / EBIT | 13.32 | 17.75 | 14.44 | 11.10 | 10.32 | 7.07 | 10.12 | 16.09 | 7.72 | 6.57 | 12.13 |
| EV / FCF | — | 48.99 | 44.58 | 16.25 | 27.36 | 11.09 | 5.80 | 37.25 | 6.67 | 12.31 | 16.71 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 32.9% | 32.9% | 35.9% | 34.9% | 34.6% | 38.3% | 31.8% | 29.2% | 28.9% | 29.0% | 29.9% |
| Operating Margin | 7.7% | 7.7% | 11.0% | 9.9% | 11.8% | 16.5% | 7.7% | 4.3% | 5.3% | 5.6% | 5.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | 4.9% | 4.9% | 8.7% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 12.4% | 5.5% | 3.4% | 3.8% | 3.8% | 3.6% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 19.4% | 19.4% | 40.1% | 40.7% | 45.1% | 68.4% | 26.0% | 16.4% | 16.6% | 16.7% | 15.5% |
| ROA | 6.1% | 6.1% | 11.8% | 11.4% | 11.6% | 18.1% | 7.4% | 5.5% | 7.6% | 7.8% | 7.5% |
| ROIC | 11.1% | 11.1% | 20.0% | 19.5% | 25.0% | 39.1% | 12.9% | 8.5% | 17.8% | 19.5% | 19.6% |
| ROCE | 13.2% | 13.2% | 21.1% | 19.9% | 23.1% | 35.3% | 15.2% | 10.4% | 16.3% | 17.6% | 17.9% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.40 | 1.40 | 1.40 | 1.63 | 1.67 | 2.15 | 1.35 | 1.79 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 4.26 | 4.26 | 2.39 | 2.54 | 2.30 | 1.92 | 2.95 | 4.51 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.01 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.15 | 0.87 | 0.94 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.64 | 1.75 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.08 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 3.52 | 3.52 | 1.49 | 1.47 | 1.25 | 0.79 | 1.40 | 4.40 | -0.07 | -0.05 | -0.23 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 13.28 | 5.49 | 2.62 | 4.09 | 1.43 | 1.12 | 16.20 | -0.10 | -0.13 | -0.47 |
| Interest Coverage | 20.68 | 20.68 | 29.67 | 23.72 | 15.53 | 35.48 | 15.58 | 25.47 | 43.40 | 63.30 | 79.28 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.53 | 1.53 | 1.76 | 1.78 | 1.88 | 1.88 | 1.47 | 1.16 | 1.41 | 1.41 | 1.43 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.67 | 0.74 | 0.81 | 1.04 | 0.71 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.26 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.55 | 0.65 | 0.73 | 0.97 | 0.65 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.12 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.99 | 1.29 | 1.39 | 1.38 | 1.36 | 1.24 | 1.32 | 2.01 | 2.04 | 1.95 |
| Inventory Turnover | 2.35 | 2.35 | 2.57 | 2.97 | 2.86 | 3.30 | 3.34 | 2.81 | 3.29 | 3.57 | 3.39 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 11.54 | 5.95 | 3.34 | 2.35 | 2.09 | 2.27 | 2.46 | 1.91 | 2.74 | 3.57 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 3.7% | 2.4% | 1.8% | 2.7% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 1.7% | 2.5% | 2.6% | 2.2% | 1.2% |
| Payout Ratio | 48.7% | 48.7% | 31.0% | 33.6% | 15.6% | 8.9% | 20.3% | 33.1% | 27.9% | 22.6% | 23.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 7.5% | 4.9% | 5.9% | 8.2% | 8.2% | 12.0% | 8.5% | 7.6% | 9.2% | 9.6% | 5.0% |
| FCF Yield | 4.3% | 2.8% | 2.6% | 7.3% | 4.3% | 10.3% | 21.4% | 4.8% | 14.8% | 8.0% | 5.8% |
| Buyback Yield | 3.1% | 2.0% | 1.3% | 5.1% | 3.5% | 9.1% | 0.0% | 10.2% | 9.3% | 8.4% | 2.5% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 6.7% | 4.4% | 3.1% | 7.8% | 4.8% | 10.1% | 1.7% | 12.7% | 11.8% | 10.6% | 3.7% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $85M | $83M | $86M | $99M | $110M | $93M | $89M | $99M | $108M | $112M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 28 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying DKS stock.
DICK'S Sporting Goods, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 13.3x. The historical average is 17.8x. This places it at the 35th percentile of its historical range.
DICK'S Sporting Goods, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 9.7x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 9.0x.
DICK'S Sporting Goods, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 19.4%. The historical average is 24.8%.
Based on historical data, DICK'S Sporting Goods, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 13.3x. This is at the 35th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
DICK'S Sporting Goods, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 3.67% with a payout ratio of 48.7%.
DICK'S Sporting Goods, Inc. has 32.9% gross margin and 7.7% operating margin.
DICK'S Sporting Goods, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 4.3x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Acquisition integration and margin dilution
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Valuation Discount to Peers Amid Integration
DKS trades at a forward P/E of 11.10 and EV/EBITDA of 8.94, a notable discount to its historical multiples and the broader specialty retail sector, suggesting the market is pricing in significant integration risk and margin dilution from the Foot Locker acquisition.
The current forward P/E of 11.10 represents a substantial discount to the trailing P/E of 14.02, indicating the market expects earnings to grow but is applying a significant risk discount. This valuation appears to be pricing DKS more like a traditional big-box retailer than a premium operator, especially when compared to Academy Sports' (ASO) forward P/E of 7.88, which reflects its smaller scale and lower growth profile. The PEG ratio of 1.19 suggests the market is not fully pricing in the potential for the acquisition-driven growth to be sustainable, warranting investigation into whether the discount is a temporary overreaction or a permanent re-rating of the business model.
Margin Compression from Acquisition Mix
Operating margins have compressed from a peak of 13.5% in 2024Q2 to 7.9% in 2026Q2, a trend that appears to be driven by the integration of the lower-margin Foot Locker business, which is diluting the profitability of the core DKS operations.
The gross margin volatility, ranging from 28.4% to 37.1% over the past ten quarters, suggests the business is navigating a complex mix of promotional pressures, input cost fluctuations, and the integration of a new revenue stream. The more concerning trend is the sustained compression in operating margins, which have nearly halved from their 2024 peak, indicating that the incremental revenue from the Foot Locker acquisition is currently carrying higher associated costs. This margin profile suggests that the accretive nature of the deal is not yet materializing in the financials, and investors should monitor whether the company can restore operating leverage as integration progresses.
ROIC Dilution from Asset Base Expansion
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) has declined from a peak of 6.4% in 2024Q2 to 2.6% in 2026Q2, a trend that appears to be driven by the significant expansion of the asset base from the Foot Locker acquisition, which has not yet generated proportional returns.
The decline in ROIC is a direct consequence of the near-doubling of total assets to $18.2B, driven by the acquisition, while net income has not scaled proportionally. This suggests that the company is in a period of capital absorption, where the newly acquired assets are not yet contributing to returns at the same rate as the legacy business. The ROE has also compressed from 12.9% to 5.6% over the same period, indicating that the acquisition has diluted shareholder returns in the near term. Investors should monitor whether the 'House of Sport' format and the integration of Foot Locker can drive asset turnover back toward historical levels to restore capital efficiency.
Working Capital Strain from Integration
The Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) has expanded to 91 days in 2026Q2 from 73 days in 2025Q4, driven primarily by a sharp increase in Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO) to 137 days, suggesting potential inventory management challenges during the Foot Locker integration.
The expansion of the CCC is a red flag for operational efficiency, as it indicates that cash is being tied up in the business for longer periods. The increase in DIO from 108 days to 137 days in a single quarter suggests that inventory levels are building faster than sales, which could be a result of the acquisition's inventory consolidation or a mismatch in demand forecasting. This trend, combined with a stable Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) of 9 days, indicates that the company is maintaining its leverage with customers but is facing challenges in managing its inventory and supplier payment terms. The working capital swings have been a major source of cash flow volatility, and this trend warrants close monitoring.
The Misapplied ROIC Metric
The most commonly misapplied ratio to DKS's current business model is Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), which is being artificially depressed by the large, non-operating asset base from the Foot Locker acquisition and does not reflect the underlying cash-generating power of the core DKS operations.
ROIC is typically used to measure the efficiency of a company's core operations, but in DKS's case, the metric is being distorted by the significant goodwill and intangible assets ($837.0M) and the expanded property, plant, and equipment ($8.7B) from the acquisition. This makes the current ROIC of 2.6% appear artificially low and does not provide a clear picture of the operational efficiency of the legacy DKS business or the potential of the 'House of Sport' format. A more appropriate metric for analysis would be a segmented ROIC that isolates the core DKS operations from the acquired Foot Locker business, or a focus on operating cash flow return on assets, which would better reflect the cash-generating ability of the combined entity without the distortion of acquisition accounting.