Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 22.0x · EV/EBITDA 5.7x · ROE 0.8%. (1998–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $227M | $221M | $277M | $230M | $236M | $181M | $322M | $234M | $281M | $206M | $306M |
| Enterprise Value | $408M | $402M | $521M | $174M | $187M | $131M | $263M | $149M | $170M | $181M | $249M |
| P/E Ratio → | 22.02 | 48.00 | 2.04 | 6.79 | 7.64 | 14.64 | 59.42 | — | 5.18 | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 6.77 | 6.12 | 5.17 | 10.56 | 6.52 | 2.54 | 5.88 | 5.36 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.40 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 1.25 | 1.49 | 1.28 | 5.03 | 2.80 | 2.82 | 21.33 | 5.52 |
| P/FCF | 3.71 | — | — | 11.15 | 5.87 | 10.60 | — | — | 4.03 | — | 14.09 |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | 11.15 | 5.87 | 10.40 | 14613.88 | — | 4.02 | — | 13.87 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.23 | 0.33 | 5.12 | 4.87 | 3.73 | 8.65 | 4.14 | 1.54 | 5.18 | 4.36 |
| EV / EBITDA | 5.72 | 5.69 | 3.40 | 9.65 | 7.62 | 7.33 | 63.45 | — | 3.16 | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | 14.48 | 10.52 | 3.90 | 4.05 | 6.94 | 7.58 | 118.63 | — | 3.21 | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | 8.43 | 4.67 | 7.66 | — | — | 2.44 | — | 11.47 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 18.8% | 18.8% | 95.2% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 99.7% | 99.4% | 99.5% | 99.8% | 99.4% | 99.7% |
| Operating Margin | 1.6% | 1.6% | 7.6% | 52.9% | 63.5% | 50.7% | 7.3% | -59.7% | 47.8% | -129.7% | -26.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | 0.3% | 0.3% | 4.1% | 100.2% | 79.7% | 35.6% | 17.7% | -55.8% | 49.0% | -129.4% | -69.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 0.8% | 0.8% | 17.2% | 19.9% | 20.5% | 12.2% | 7.3% | -21.9% | 99.4% | -139.4% | -55.5% |
| ROA | 0.3% | 0.3% | 8.1% | 16.7% | 16.8% | 9.2% | 4.9% | -14.8% | 54.9% | -58.2% | -37.7% |
| ROIC | 2.7% | 2.7% | 18.9% | 11.4% | 18.3% | 27.6% | 78.0% | — | — | — | -38.1% |
| ROCE | 3.3% | 3.3% | 22.9% | 9.7% | 14.8% | 14.4% | 2.2% | -17.6% | 64.9% | -78.6% | -17.6% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.55 | 0.55 | 0.57 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | 4.39 | 4.39 | 2.10 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.33 | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.32 | 0.43 | -0.31 | -0.31 | -0.36 | -0.91 | -1.02 | -1.11 | -2.55 | -1.03 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 2.56 | 2.56 | 1.59 | -3.11 | -1.97 | -2.82 | -14.01 | — | -2.06 | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | -2.72 | -1.20 | -2.94 | — | — | -1.59 | — | -2.62 |
| Interest Coverage | 2.95 | 2.95 | 13.89 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.83 | 1.83 | 1.72 | 8.93 | 8.94 | 9.22 | 8.47 | 9.05 | 8.85 | 2.52 | 4.47 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.16 | 1.16 | 1.04 | 8.93 | 8.94 | 8.42 | 8.47 | 9.05 | 8.85 | 2.52 | 4.47 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.29 | 8.30 | 8.35 | 8.29 | 6.78 | 7.57 | 8.14 | 2.44 | 4.27 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.21 | 1.14 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.32 | 0.29 | 0.76 | 0.67 | 0.55 |
| Inventory Turnover | 3.77 | 3.77 | 0.20 | — | — | 0.01 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 88.31 | 85.64 | 107.40 | 84.52 | 149.98 | 165.88 | 34.37 | 3.46 | 8.40 | 8.84 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 2.5% | 2.5% | 4.6% | 3.2% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | 122.1% | 122.1% | 20.0% | 21.8% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 4.5% | 2.1% | 49.1% | 14.7% | 13.1% | 6.8% | 1.7% | — | 19.3% | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 27.0% | — | — | 9.0% | 17.0% | 9.4% | — | — | 24.8% | — | 7.1% |
| Buyback Yield | 1.0% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 3.6% | 5.6% | 0.0% | 9.5% | 1.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 3.4% | 3.5% | 5.5% | 6.8% | 5.6% | 0.0% | 9.5% | 1.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $33M | $33M | $33M | $34M | $32M | $28M | $32M | $31M | $29M | $29M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 28 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying IMMR stock.
Immersion Corporation's current P/E ratio is 22.0x. The historical average is 30.8x. This places it at the 64th percentile of its historical range.
Immersion Corporation's current EV/EBITDA is 5.7x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 24.1x.
Immersion Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is 0.8%. The historical average is -17.3%.
Based on historical data, Immersion Corporation is trading at a P/E of 22.0x. This is at the 64th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Immersion Corporation's current dividend yield is 2.46% with a payout ratio of 122.1%.
Immersion Corporation has 18.8% gross margin and 1.6% operating margin.
Immersion Corporation's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 4.4x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Lumpy licensing distorts ratio readings
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Cheap Book, Costly Earnings
According to current market pricing, Immersion trades at 0.42x book and 0.14x trailing sales, the cheapest multiples in its peer set, yet the 51.4x trailing P/E and a forward EV/EBITDA of 7.73x above the trailing 5.64x imply the market expects near-term earnings to compress.
The 0.42x P/B sits well below Acacia (0.72x), Pixelworks (0.96x) and far below Varonis (10.60x), a discount that appears rationally anchored to a latest-quarter ROE of 0.9% and ROIC of -2.4% — the market is pricing an asset base that is not currently earning its cost of capital. The inversion between trailing (5.64x) and forward (7.73x) EV/EBITDA mathematically requires EBITDA to fall roughly 27%, which is consistent with the operating margin swing from 6.8% in 2025Q3 to -7.0% in 2026Q2. The 2.3% dividend yield warrants scrutiny given that five of the last ten quarters posted negative FCF margins, so payout durability appears contingent on non-operating cash rather than licensing cash generation.
Gross Margins Halved Twice Over
As disclosed in Immersion's quarterly filings, gross margin collapsed from 59.0% in 2024Q2 to 17.0% in 2026Q2 while operating margin swung to -7.0%, indicating the latest reported quarter reflects a cost structure that no longer flexes with the lumpy licensing top line.
The 2025Q1 anomaly (gross margin reported at 4.1% with a $1.2B gross profit line, per prior statement analysis) means any multi-quarter average of margins is unreliable; the only defensible read is the range of high-teens to high-twenties excluding that period. Operating leverage is visibly absent: SG&A roughly doubled from $27.2M to $73.8M per quarter across the window while net margin printed below 2% in eight of ten quarters, three of them negative. Normalized earning power therefore appears to reside in the operating margin line, not the net margin, which prior analysis shows is distorted by non-recurring credits that make the 1.7% headline figure in 2026Q2 a poor proxy for sustainable profitability.
Returns Decayed as Capital Base Quintupled
Based on Immersion's reported figures, ROIC has deteriorated from 10.5% in 2024Q1 to -2.4% in 2026Q2 and ROE from 9.7% to 0.9%, a decay driven almost entirely by a fivefold expansion in total assets to $1.2B rather than by margin compression alone.
This is the classic signature of acquisition-funded expansion that has not yet produced incremental returns: total assets grew to $1.2B while equity rose only 48% to $299.0M, so the denominator of every return metric has inflated ahead of the numerator. The disappearance of $190.5M of net PP&E to zero in 2026Q2 alongside $69.2M of goodwill means ROIC is now calculated against an intangible-and-cash-heavy base, making the metric sensitive to carrying-value assumptions that investors should monitor. On a three-year view, the trend appears to be compounding decay, not a temporary dip, and reversal would require the acquired asset base to begin generating licensing revenue at margins closer to the 2024 levels.
Working Capital Swings Replace Operating Rhythm
Per Immersion's recent financial statements, asset turnover has fallen from 0.49 in 2024Q3 and 2025Q3 to 0.26 in 2026Q2, with DSO ranging between 34 and 91 days, reflecting an operating cycle that appears driven by payment timing on large license settlements rather than recurring volume.
The cash conversion cycle has ranged from 52 to 146 days across the ten-quarter window and is unavailable for 2026Q2 given missing inventory and payable inputs, but the DPO of 65 days against DSO of 49 in that quarter hints at a shift toward paying suppliers faster than collecting — a working-capital drag directionally consistent with the -16.0% FCF margin. The prior cash flow work shows working capital changes swinging $217.4M in a single quarter (2024Q2 to 2024Q3), so low turnover here reflects settlement timing rather than operational inefficiency per se. Analysts should read the sub-0.30 asset turnover primarily as an artifact of the enlarged post-acquisition balance sheet, not as evidence of deteriorating commercial execution.
Modest Debt, Unsettled Coverage
As reported in Immersion's quarterly filings, the debt-to-equity ratio has eased from 0.93 to 0.49 since the debt was introduced in 2024Q2, but interest coverage flipped to -11.45x in 2026Q2 from 15.02x in 2025Q3, indicating coverage is now hostage to quarterly earnings volatility rather than balance sheet strain.
With $272.8M of debt against $186.2M of cash and total equity of $299.0M, absolute leverage appears manageable in isolation, and the deleveraging path from the $394.3M peak suggests deliberate repayment rather than distress. However, the reported D/EBITDA of 20.04x in 2026Q1 against a -11.45x coverage ratio shows that EBITDA is swinging too violently for these ratios to carry underwriting weight; a single strong licensing quarter (as in 2025Q3, D/EBITDA 5.46x) can mechanically halve leverage. Refinancing risk therefore appears low, but the instability of the coverage metrics implies that covenant headroom, should covenants be EBITDA-based, could tighten in weak quarters in ways the trailing leverage ratio would not foreshadow.
Why P/E Misleads on Immersion
The 51.4x trailing P/E is the ratio most commonly misapplied to Immersion's licensing model, because reported net income in eight of ten quarters fell below a 2% margin and at least one quarter carried a large non-recurring credit, rendering the earnings denominator statistically unstable.
Applying a P/E to a company whose quarterly revenue swung 54.7% sequentially (from $650.2M in 2025Q3 to $294.4M in 2026Q2) and whose net margin printed 29.1% in 2024Q2 versus -2.0% in 2025Q4 effectively capitalizes noise; the resulting multiple is a function of timing, not valuation. A more defensible framework would anchor on enterprise-value-based measures relative to a normalized licensing cycle — EV/Sales at 0.14x or an EV/EBITDA smoothed across a full settlement cycle — supplemented by cumulative multi-year free cash flow rather than any single-period earnings figure. Investors should also discount the low P/B of 0.42x as a value signal without confirmation: given the intangible-heavy asset mix and the vanished PP&E, book value itself may not represent recoverable capital in a downside scenario.