Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -79.8x · EV/EBITDA 18.1x · ROE -18.4%. (2009–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $3.5B | $3.1B | $2.7B | $4.0B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $2.6B |
| Enterprise Value | $4.2B | $3.6B | $3.2B | $4.5B | $2.3B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $2.9B | $2.9B |
| P/E Ratio → | -79.84 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 164.36 | — | 67.71 | 72.41 |
| P/S Ratio | 4.17 | 4.89 | 4.05 | 6.46 | 2.84 | 5.14 | 5.06 | 4.65 | 5.62 | 4.70 | 4.57 |
| P/B Ratio | 13.52 | 15.87 | 18.42 | 38.24 | 14.22 | 9.08 | 7.40 | 7.17 | 7.94 | 5.57 | 5.71 |
| P/FCF | 93.58 | 109.87 | — | — | — | — | — | 56.31 | — | 104.98 | 61.02 |
| P/OCF | 36.02 | 42.29 | 31.15 | 41.51 | 18.81 | 21.89 | — | 12.16 | 35.60 | 11.74 | 14.07 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 5.78 | 4.79 | 7.34 | 3.65 | 6.03 | 5.99 | 4.97 | 6.04 | 5.07 | 5.02 |
| EV / EBITDA | 18.08 | 20.67 | 21.16 | 30.37 | 26.23 | 31.04 | 23.21 | 16.77 | 20.03 | 14.56 | 14.35 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 69.24 | 124.01 | 43.38 | 31.41 |
| EV / FCF | — | 129.86 | — | — | — | — | — | 60.16 | — | 113.35 | 67.10 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -3.8% | -3.8% | -8.4% | -4.4% | -14.2% | -8.5% | -1.6% | 7.6% | 5.3% | 12.3% | 16.7% |
| Operating Margin | -4.0% | -4.0% | -8.6% | -4.5% | -14.5% | -8.7% | -1.9% | 7.2% | 4.9% | 11.7% | 16.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -5.0% | -5.0% | -17.1% | -4.4% | -19.8% | -18.7% | -4.6% | 3.0% | -6.4% | 6.7% | 7.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -18.4% | -18.4% | -90.5% | -23.5% | -63.2% | -28.8% | -6.1% | 4.6% | -8.5% | 8.2% | 8.6% |
| ROA | -2.1% | -2.1% | -8.5% | -2.1% | -9.9% | -6.8% | -1.6% | 1.3% | -2.5% | 2.6% | 2.9% |
| ROIC | -2.7% | -2.7% | -6.6% | -3.2% | -10.3% | -4.1% | -1.0% | 5.3% | 3.2% | 7.1% | 9.5% |
| ROCE | -2.9% | -2.9% | -6.9% | -3.5% | -11.0% | -4.5% | -1.0% | 4.3% | 2.7% | 6.1% | 9.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 3.33 | 3.33 | 3.83 | 5.99 | 5.02 | 1.96 | 1.51 | 1.23 | 1.16 | 1.05 | 1.07 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.67 | 3.67 | 3.73 | 4.18 | 7.20 | 5.72 | 4.00 | 2.70 | 2.73 | 2.54 | 2.44 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 2.89 | 3.32 | 5.25 | 4.07 | 1.56 | 1.36 | 0.49 | 0.59 | 0.44 | 0.57 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 3.18 | 3.18 | 3.24 | 3.67 | 5.84 | 4.54 | 3.61 | 1.07 | 1.39 | 1.07 | 1.30 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 19.99 | — | — | — | — | — | 3.85 | — | 8.37 | 6.08 |
| Interest Coverage | -0.67 | -0.67 | -1.46 | -0.85 | -3.54 | -2.16 | -0.46 | 2.23 | 1.46 | 3.25 | 4.29 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.91 | 0.90 | 0.97 | 0.91 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.47 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.97 | 0.91 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 0.13 | 0.72 | 0.52 | 0.71 | 0.57 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.38 | 0.37 | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.39 |
| Inventory Turnover | 50.00 | 50.00 | 201.35 | 203.02 | 331.54 | 250.86 | 238.96 | 277.76 | 403.66 | 304.78 | 515.32 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 89.00 | 44.10 | 53.20 | 48.84 | 68.98 | 114.96 | 37.17 | 94.98 | 57.88 | 73.93 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | 1.9% | 0.4% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 0.8% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 121.0% | — | 60.7% | 49.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.6% | — | 1.5% | 1.4% |
| FCF Yield | 1.1% | 0.9% | — | — | — | — | — | 1.8% | — | 1.0% | 1.6% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.9% | 0.4% | 1.7% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 0.8% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $173M | $165M | $163M | $163M | $163M | $164M | $165M | $165M | $164M | $164M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 17 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying MANU stock.
Manchester United plc's current P/E ratio is -79.8x. The historical average is 87.7x.
Manchester United plc's current EV/EBITDA is 18.1x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 22.7x.
Manchester United plc's return on equity (ROE) is -18.4%. The historical average is -4.1%.
Based on historical data, Manchester United plc is trading at a P/E of -79.8x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Manchester United plc has -3.8% gross margin and -4.0% operating margin.
Manchester United plc's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 3.7x, indicating high leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Leverage compounded by liquidity shortfall
Scarcity Premium Amid Loss-Making Earnings
With a TTM P/E of -83.14 that is economically meaningless given reported net losses, MANU's 18.69x EV/EBITDA and 4.34x EV/Sales still appear to embed a scarcity premium, per current quoted multiples, versus listed European peers such as Juventus and Dortmund that typically trade below these levels.
The P/S of 4.34x and P/B of 14.07x are unusually elevated for a business generating negative gross margins in six of the last ten quarters, which suggests the market is pricing the brand asset rather than the operating entity. The forward EV/EBITDA of 16.92x implies modest EBITDA improvement, but given the second consecutive omission of forward guidance, investors should treat that implied recovery as an assumption rather than a management-backed projection. The divergence between a P/FCF of 97.45x and a negative P/E further underscores that headline cash conversion has been driven by working capital inflows rather than sustained operating profitability.
Structurally Negative Margins Across Season Cycles
According to Manchester United's SEC-reported income statements, gross margin swung from -26.8% to +8.6% over eight quarters before falling back to -12.0% in the latest period, with net margin at -18.2%, indicating that direct squad and matchday costs repeatedly outrun revenue even across full seasonal cycles.
The oscillation appears tied to the timing of player amortization and transfer accounting rather than underlying trading performance, meaning the only quarter of genuine margin stability (2026Q2, +8.6% gross) coincides with a positive ROIC of 1.4%. Since operating income equals gross profit in seven of ten quarters, the operating margin of -12.0% in the latest quarter likely reflects cost classification, so no reliable overhead efficiency can be inferred from the P&L presentation. For true earning power, the wage-to-revenue ratio and commercial segment margin remain the more decision-useful metrics, though neither is disclosed in the data provided.
Return on Capital Absent Across the Cycle
Per Manchester United's quarterly ratio disclosures, ROIC has oscillated between -3.5% and +1.7% over ten quarters, while ROE ranged from -51.7% to +2.2%, suggesting the club has not demonstrated a durable ability to earn returns above its cost of capital over a full cycle.
The pattern appears driven primarily by margin contraction rather than capital efficiency: asset turnover has stayed in a narrow 0.08-0.13 band, indicating the asset base (including player registrations amortized on the balance sheet) is not being cycled more productively over time. Negative ROIC in seven of ten quarters implies that every incremental pound of squad investment has historically been dilutive to returns on a reported basis, which materially weakens the compounding narrative for long-term holders. Investors should monitor whether the INEOS-linked restructuring changes the reinvestment economics, though no reported evidence of that shift is yet visible in the ratio series.
Prepayment Float Underpins Chronic Deficit
As reported in Manchester United's quarterly balance sheets, the current ratio has remained between 0.31 and 0.41 for ten consecutive quarters, with cash of $66.8M against total debt of $688M, indicating the club operates with a persistent working capital deficit rather than a temporary seasonal drawdown.
The gap between the current ratio of 0.33 and quick ratio of 0.31 is minimal because the asset base carries negligible inventory dependence, which is consistent with a service-and-sponsorship model rather than a merchandising-led one. The apparent liquidity underpinning appears to be negative DPO (supplier payment stretch) and season-ticket or sponsorship prepayments, which function as float rather than funded liquidity; under a scenario of league points deductions, broadcast payment triggers, or sponsor termination, that float could compress quickly. The absence of any covenant or refinancing disclosure in the data provided means the adequacy of this position under stress warrants further investigation rather than confident reassurance.
Rising Leverage Squeezed by Shrinking Earnings
Based on Manchester United's reported balance sheet figures, total debt of $688M against equity of $149.5M produces a D/E ratio of 4.60 in 2026Q4, up from 3.33 two years earlier, while interest coverage deteriorated from 1.62x to -1.30x as earnings turned negative.
The leverage trend appears to be driven by denominator erosion rather than incremental borrowing: equity has fallen from $197.4M in 2025Q3 to $149.5M as retained losses accumulate, which mechanically inflates every debt ratio even if gross debt is stable. D/EBITDA of 18.28x in the latest quarter is not a meaningful solvency signal in a business with swingy EBITDA, but the negative coverage of -1.30x indicates that reported earnings currently do not service interest, raising the likelihood of reliance on prepayment proceeds or asset sales to meet obligations. Given the club's Premier League Profitability and Sustainability Rule exposure, investors should watch whether the debt maturity profile forces refinancing on less favorable terms; no such disclosure is provided in the data.
Why P/E and Adjusted EBITDA Mislead Here
The P/E of -83.14 and 16.92x forward EV/EBITDA are the most commonly misapplied ratios for this business model because football clubs carry a mandatory maintenance CapEx — player registration amortization and squad renewal — that consumes reported cash flow without ever appearing as discretionary investment in EBITDA.
Adjusted EBITDA treats squad costs as operating expenses while treating the constant reinvestment needed to hold squad value as capital expenditure, so the implied 16.92x multiple assumes a normalized cash stream that the last ten quarters do not support: cumulative free cash flow was approximately -$290M despite cumulative operating cash flow of roughly +$363M, per the club's reported cash flow statements. The more appropriate lens is free cash flow after maintenance squad CapEx, together with the wage-to-revenue ratio; on that basis the P/FCF of 97.45x and P/S of 4.34x appear to reflect brand scarcity rather than demonstrable earnings power. Until the club can show sustained positive free cash flow through a full season cycle without relying on prepayment float, the negative gross margin of -12.0% should be treated as a live structural risk rather than a timing artifact.