Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -26.2x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -28.9%. (2016–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $75.4B | $11.5B | $16.0B | $38.0B | $74.7B | $109.5B | $39.8B | $6.5B | $5.0B | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $74.7B | $10.8B | $14.8B | $36.3B | $72.7B | $103.5B | $37.5B | $6.4B | $4.4B | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -26.17 | — | — | — | 8.94 | 8.98 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 38.78 | 5.90 | 4.99 | 5.55 | 3.96 | 6.17 | 49.59 | 107.47 | 37.17 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 8.54 | 1.33 | 1.46 | 2.74 | 3.91 | 7.74 | 15.56 | 5.51 | 3.28 | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | 16.31 | 8.21 | 20.33 | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | 15.00 | 8.04 | 19.65 | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 5.55 | 4.62 | 5.30 | 3.85 | 5.84 | 46.62 | 105.75 | 32.55 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 7.44 | 7.65 | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | 7.57 | 7.78 | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | 15.87 | 7.76 | 19.11 | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 55.3% | 55.3% | 54.2% | 31.5% | 71.3% | 85.2% | 95.1% | 48.5% | 81.6% | 90.0% | 86.1% |
| Operating Margin | -158.1% | -158.1% | -123.3% | -61.9% | 49.9% | 75.0% | -95.0% | -906.4% | -347.1% | -130.9% | -206.4% |
| Net Profit Margin | -145.2% | -145.2% | -111.3% | -68.8% | 44.3% | 68.8% | -93.0% | -853.7% | -284.8% | -124.3% | -199.5% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -28.9% | -28.9% | -28.8% | -28.6% | 50.3% | 146.1% | -40.0% | -38.0% | -35.7% | -34.9% | -25.7% |
| ROA | -21.3% | -21.3% | -21.9% | -21.3% | 33.1% | 76.2% | -16.7% | -28.9% | -25.3% | -20.5% | -15.3% |
| ROIC | -26.1% | -26.1% | -27.0% | -21.7% | 55.8% | 237.8% | -91.9% | -41.4% | -49.8% | -30.8% | -20.9% |
| ROCE | -27.6% | -27.6% | -28.9% | -23.3% | 51.7% | 143.8% | -34.7% | -34.3% | -35.6% | -25.1% | -17.8% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 0.12 | 0.07 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.12 | -0.10 | -0.42 | -0.93 | -0.09 | -0.41 | -0.19 | -0.04 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | -0.21 | -0.44 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | -0.44 | -0.44 | -1.22 | — | — | — | -1.12 |
| Interest Coverage | -276.80 | -276.80 | -149.29 | -102.74 | 331.17 | 739.06 | -74.31 | -76.85 | -141.12 | -1938.36 | — |
Net cash position: cash ($2.6B) exceeds total debt ($1.9B)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.29 | 3.29 | 3.67 | 3.42 | 2.73 | 1.76 | 1.43 | 7.89 | 7.02 | 4.09 | 6.68 |
| Quick Ratio | 3.22 | 3.22 | 3.62 | 3.36 | 2.54 | 1.60 | 1.42 | 7.89 | 7.02 | 4.09 | 6.68 |
| Cash Ratio | 2.92 | 2.92 | 3.18 | 2.85 | 2.01 | 1.18 | 1.05 | 7.71 | 6.83 | 3.95 | 6.50 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.16 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 0.08 |
| Inventory Turnover | 5.67 | 5.67 | 12.51 | 23.23 | 5.71 | 1.82 | 0.83 | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 53.32 | 67.55 | 57.62 | 32.58 | 68.39 | 639.69 | 98.80 | 82.65 | 32.64 | 60.45 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 11.2% | 11.1% | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | 6.1% | 12.2% | 4.9% | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.0% | 4.5% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.0% | 4.5% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $389M | $384M | $382M | $416M | $431M | $381M | $331M | $329M | $376M | $64M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 10 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying MRNA stock.
Moderna, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -26.2x. The historical average is 9.0x.
Moderna, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -28.9%. The historical average is -6.4%.
Based on historical data, Moderna, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -26.2x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Moderna, Inc. has 55.3% gross margin and -158.1% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Commercial revenue collapse
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Margin Compression from Capacity Overhang
Gross margin fell from 72.3% in 2024Q3 to 35.9% in 2026Q2, with 2026Q1 turning negative at -145.5% due to inventory write-downs, according to recent SEC filings. Operating margin remains deeply negative, reflecting fixed-cost underutilization.
The gross margin trajectory underscores a structural mismatch between Moderna's pandemic-era manufacturing footprint and the current commercial demand for its respiratory vaccines. The 2026Q1 negative gross margin, driven by a $955M inventory write-down, is a non-cash charge that obscures the underlying unit economics, but the persistent sub-40% margins in subsequent quarters suggest that even normalized production costs are not competitive with the pricing power the company once enjoyed. Operating margin, which swung to -126.4% in 2025Q4, indicates that R&D and SG&A expenses are not scaling down with revenue, implying that the company is prioritizing pipeline investment over near-term profitability. Investors should monitor whether the 'right-sizing' of manufacturing capacity, as mentioned in recent earnings calls, can restore gross margins to the 50-60% range seen in 2024, or if the new commercial reality caps them at lower levels.
Capital Efficiency Decay Amid Pipeline Spend
ROIC has been consistently negative, averaging -8.3% over the last ten quarters, with 2026Q2 at -9.3%, as reported in financial statements. This reflects a capital base that is not generating returns, as the company burns cash on R&D while revenue contracts.
The negative ROIC is not a cyclical dip but a persistent condition, indicating that Moderna's invested capital—primarily its manufacturing assets and R&D expenditures—is not producing adequate returns. The slight improvement from -14.1% in 2026Q1 to -9.3% in 2026Q2 is largely due to a reduction in the capital base from write-downs, not an improvement in earnings power. The company's heavy investment in PP&E, which remains at $2.8B or 25% of total assets, is a drag on capital efficiency, as these assets are underutilized. The path to positive ROIC likely depends on the successful commercialization of higher-margin oncology and rare disease products, which would leverage the same platform without the high-volume, low-price dynamics of vaccines. Until then, the return on capital will remain deeply negative, and investors should view any improvement as a function of cost-cutting rather than genuine value creation.
Working Capital Volatility Masks Cash Burn
Cash conversion cycle swung from 302 days in 2024Q1 to 126 days in 2026Q2, but this improvement is driven by inventory write-downs and timing, not operational efficiency, according to recent SEC filings. DSO remains elevated at 78 days, reflecting slow collections.
The dramatic swings in the cash conversion cycle—from 302 days in 2024Q1 to 41 days in 2026Q1 and back to 126 days in 2026Q2—are not indicative of improving working capital management but rather the lumpy nature of vaccine sales and the impact of non-cash inventory charges. The 2026Q1 CCC of 41 days was artificially low because inventory was written down, reducing DIO to 14 days, while DSO and DPO were also compressed by the low revenue base. In 2026Q2, DIO rebounded to 208 days, suggesting that inventory levels remain high relative to sales, even after the write-downs, which may indicate further obsolescence risk. The elevated DSO of 78 days, compared to the peer average of around 50 days, suggests that Moderna is extending credit to commercial buyers, which could strain liquidity if collections slow. Investors should focus on the underlying cash burn, which is negative, rather than the volatile working capital metrics that are distorted by accounting adjustments.
Liquidity Cushion Thins as Burn Persists
Current ratio fell from 4.03 in 2024Q1 to 2.29 in 2026Q2, while cash dropped to $1.7B, as reported in financial statements. The quick ratio of 2.18 indicates limited inventory dependence, but the rapid decline in liquidity warrants close monitoring.
The liquidity position remains adequate on paper, with a current ratio of 2.29 and a quick ratio of 2.18, but the trend is concerning: the current ratio has nearly halved over the past two years, and cash reserves have dwindled to $1.7B. Given the company's quarterly cash burn of approximately $500-800M, the current cash position provides only about two to three quarters of runway without additional financing or a significant reduction in spending. The quick ratio, which excludes inventory, is only slightly lower than the current ratio, indicating that inventory is not a major component of current assets, but the inventory write-downs suggest that the reported inventory value may be overstated. Under a severe stress scenario—such as a further decline in vaccine sales or a delay in pipeline milestones—the liquidity buffer could be exhausted within a year, forcing the company to raise capital at dilutive terms. Investors should monitor the cash burn rate and any changes in management's cost guidance, as the recent improvement in 2026 operating expense outlook may not be sufficient to offset the revenue decline.
Debt Creeps Higher, Coverage Remains Negative
Debt-to-equity rose from 0.07 in 2024Q4 to 0.19 in 2026Q2, while interest coverage is deeply negative, as reported in financial statements. The company's cash pile provides a buffer, but rising debt and negative EBITDA signal increasing financial risk.
Moderna's leverage is still modest in absolute terms, with total debt of $1.3B against a market cap of over $20B, but the trend is unfavorable: debt has nearly doubled over the past six quarters while equity has been eroded by losses. The interest coverage ratio is not meaningful because EBITDA is negative, but the company's cash position of $1.7B and investment-grade balance sheet provide a cushion. However, the negative operating cash flow and the need to fund a large R&D pipeline suggest that the company may need to access capital markets in the near future, which could be costly given the current valuation. The D/E ratio of 0.19 is still low compared to many biotech peers, but the trajectory is concerning, and investors should monitor whether the company can avoid further debt accumulation by achieving cost reductions or securing partnership milestones. The recent 'right-sizing' of manufacturing may reduce future cash needs, but it also signals that the company is retrenching, which could limit its ability to capitalize on pipeline opportunities.
Misapplied P/S Ratio Overlooks Platform Optionality
The price-to-sales ratio of 11.25 is often cited as expensive, but this metric fails to capture Moderna's platform value, which is better assessed through risk-adjusted NPV of its pipeline, according to industry analysis. Investors should focus on cash burn and clinical milestones.
The most commonly misapplied ratio for Moderna is the price-to-sales (P/S) multiple, which appears extremely high at 11.25x given the recent revenue collapse. However, this ratio is misleading because Moderna's current revenue—dominated by COVID-19 vaccine sales—is not representative of its future earning power. The company's value lies in its mRNA platform, which has the potential to generate multiple blockbuster products across oncology, rare disease, and other therapeutic areas. A more appropriate valuation approach would be a sum-of-the-parts analysis that assigns probabilities to pipeline candidates, or a discounted cash flow model that incorporates the potential for platform-driven revenue diversification. The P/S ratio also fails to account for the company's substantial cash reserves and the non-cash charges that depress earnings. Investors should instead monitor the cash burn rate, the progress of the Merck-partnered INT program, and the commercial uptake of mRESVIA, as these factors will determine whether the platform premium is justified.